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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a district court's final order denying a petition for postconviction relief in a capital case filed by Von Lester Taylor ("Mr. Taylor" or
"Petitioner"). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(I). The
district court entered its order denying the petition on August 17, 2009. (ROA 1211;
Addendum B.) Mr. Taylor timely filed a notice of appeal from that order on September
15, 2009. (ROA 1320; Utah R. App. P. 4(a).)
ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue
Whether the district court erred in holding that Claims 5, 9, 10? 12, 14, 19,21,24,
25, and 27 are procedurally barred because they were not raised in Mr. Taylor's initial
post-conviction petition.
Standard of Review
This Court must "review an appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition
for post-conviction relief for correctness without deference to the lower court's
conclusions of law." Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ^ 13 (quoting Gardner v. Galetka, 2004
UT 42, f7, 94 P.3d 263 ("Gardner HF) (quoting Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, % 43
P.3d 467)). "When confronted with ineffective assistance of counsel claims," this Court
"review[s] a lower court's purely factual findings for clear error, but review[s] the
application of the law to the facts for correctness." Taylor, 2007 UT 12, f 13 (quoting
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ^[58, 150 P.3d 480).

Preservation
This issue arises from the district court's ruling and is thus exemr! *•preservation at that level.
CONS

riONAL P R O v i s i O N S 5 STATUTES, AND RULES

V\K

in

Addendum A:
Federal Rules of Evidence 606(b)
i Halt Lode oi Admin, rroc. Kuli J.v i4->
I hljh (Vide Ann .'; "'R-"? vi-lll4
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202
Utah v. ,;e \

Utah Code . k ^ . $ 78B->-

Av

.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedi ire, R I ile 1(a)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(c)
1 il.ih Ruii^ of \ 1iiimihil I'loeedure 8
Utah Rules of Evidence 606(b)

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Taylor is in state custody at the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah. He is
sentenced to death.
The Course of Proceedings
On November 5, 2007? Mr. Taylor filed a Petition for Relief under the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act ("PCRA") in the district court ("Petition"). (ROA 1 -486.)
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on February 15, 2008. (ROA 528-627.) Petitioner
filed an opposition on May 13, 2008. (ROA 659-800.) On June 13, 2008, Respondent
moved for permission to file a supplemental memorandum in support of its motion to
dismiss. (ROA 823-30.) Petitioner opposed that motion on June 23, 2008. (ROA 83137.) Respondent filed a reply on that request on June 26, 2008 (ROA 838-48), and the
district court on that same date allowed the supplemental memorandum by the State.
(ROA 849-50.) On July 25, 2008, the State filed its supplemental memorandum. (ROA
863-86.) Petitioner filed an opposition on August 27, 2008. (ROA 887-933.) On
February 26, 2009, Respondent filed a reply. (ROA 974-1163.) The district court held
oral argument on the motion to dismiss on July 14, 2009. (ROA 1330.) On August 17,
2009, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss in its Ruling and Order
("Ruling"). (ROA 1211.) Mr. Taylor timely filed his notice of appeal on September 15,
2009. (ROA 1320-22.)

Dispc siti on in th e C' ci i iii I: Be I c:i • i v
Mr.' I a}/ lor is appealing the district court's denial of his Petition as si iccessi/v e and
procedurally barred. (ROA 1211.)
Statement of Facts1
( in I'll' ml- i I I I,,'|||HI j)ii, i fininliiio iln; ib\ searching for employment, Mr
Taylor failed to return to the halfway house where he was sta> ing

One w eek later J!\ !i

Taylor and Edward Deli broke into the Tiede family cabin after seeing Rolf and Kaye
Tiede leave their Summit County cabin with their family and luggage in tow.
I lie folio \ \ ii lg da> ., after an o \ ernight s h o p p i n g li ip in ,Sall I a k e L i l \ , I he I icdes
returned t o the cabin. P a r t o f t h e family parked ;il Hie r a t e d III Www i ^

!

development and Kaye Tiede, together with her mother, Beth Potts, a woman m her
mid /Us, and daughter Linae Tiede, age 20, drove two snowmobiles to the cabin, which
w i Ion jlecl iippi'oxtioakh ivi m null', !iiiii> (IK oak on \\ ohet ('ainon

road, P.oH I icde

and his 16 year-old daughter Tricia Tiede drove to a i epair shop to pick up .idditional
snowmobiles which were being repaired.
Linae Tiede was the first to arrive at the cabin. When she opened the door at the
lop off ho si airs Mi I .i I u < on i lion led In i y it In Ins \ linn In ,m in

>i K •< • 1 \ J \ C 1 tede and M s

Potts were upstairs, Kaye Tiede offered Mr. Taylor money. As she reached into
jacket, Mr. Taylor shot her near her left shoulder. Based on the testimony at trial and the
1

The Statement of Facts is primarily derived from the Ruling, which described its
summary of the facts as "[gjleaned from the record of court proceedings as found by the
court and jury at the time." (ROA 1216.) The basis for the Statement of Facts is found
in the ROA at 1\n 16 ?05 except as otherwise noted.
4

forensic evidence, it appears that Mr. Taylor's shot was responsible for a graze wound on
Kaye Tiede's left arm, and not Gunshot Wound #2, as originally thought. {See Petition
Exhibit 117.2) Ms. Potts was then shot several times, including at least once in the chest
and in the head, either of which could have been the cause of her death.
Linae Tiede witnessed the shootings of her mother and grandmother from several
feet away. (RT3 509.) She unequivocally stated that Mr. Taylor carried a .38 caliber
handgun and Edward Deli carried a .44 caliber weapon. (RT 499, 503.) Linae Tiede
believed that each fired shots from their respective weapons. (RT 499, 503.)
Extremely damaging to Mr. Taylor was the testimony of Dr. Sharon Schnittker of
the Utah State Medical Examiner's Office, who performed the autopsies on Beth Potts and
Kaye Tiede. (RT 700.) Dr. Schnittker testified that .38 caliber bullets were responsible
for at least two of the bullet wounds, Gunshot Wound #2 to Beth Potts, and Gunshot
Wound #2 to Kaye Tiede. (RT 704, 707.) Dr. Schnittker only recovered one bullet from
the two autopsies, a .38 caliber slug that she tied to Gunshot Wound #2 to Kaye Tiede.
(RT 707-08.) Moreover, Gunshot Wound #2 to Kaye Tiede was identified to be a fatal
shot, having gone through from the shoulder, fracturing the second and third ribs, and
passing through the upper lobe of the left lung, and into the aorta, through the right lung,
and finally fracturing the fourth right rib before exiting. (RT 710.)

2

Because the clerk's office did not bates number every page of the Record on
Appeal, Petitioner must frequently use alternative descriptions for reference.
3 «£p> refers to the reporter's transcripts of the Capital Homicide Sentencing
Phase lodged with the Utah Supreme Court in Utah v. Taylor, Case No. 910496.

The projectil

..«-*•.

,

Laboratory indicate that with the possible exception of a bullet graze to Kaye Tiede's arm,
and the non-fatal pellet shots fired by Mr. Taylor, all of the other injuries to Kaye Tiede
i I I i d lii P'olli. were ill I m:l caused In the , I \ caliber weapon carried by Mr. lien

(See

State's Trial Exs, 28 to 38 ) I he exhibits at t t: ial she v e d that fi \ - e Il I magni im III: i ill = ts
were recovered either from the bodies of Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts, or the floor area
under their bodies, while only two .38 caliber bullets were recovered. (Petition Exhibit
85 ) One c f those 3 8 caliber lit illets was wrongfully assumed to have penetrated Ms.
Tiede, and the other "was examined .HHL <» /thiol /v t scltuh < '".n.h.n inn? h m
the Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver."

(Id.; emphasis added.)

final In n

N o evidence

definitively proved that the second bullet was fired from the .38 caliber handgun. (Id.)
penalty phase trial and the expert reports make clear that
five .44 caliber bullets passed throi igh the ' ictims

(I "'e tition Exhibit 86 ) I he ai itopsj

reports and the testimony of Dr. Schnittker unequivocally prove that the two women were
only penetrated by five actual bullets, along with Kaye Tiede being wounded by some bird
sin,»( ,tm I ii iiipiTlinal graze dloiit' lin mm " 1 h1 I <>*>9-' J2; Petition Exhibits 83&84.) As
with the bullet that grazed Kaye Tiede, the bird shot from thr iK \\;\s nof (iil.il i \i I

III1 (

The Bullet Analysis compiled by Detective Joseph Offret on February 28, 1991,

4

I h e bird shot all came from the .38 caliber Smith and Wesson taken from Dennis
Anderson's cabin. The .38 caliber bird shot was packed by a friend of Mr. Anderson's
who was a gun expert and loaded most of his own ammunition. These cartridges were
lightly packed for killing woodpeckers. According to Mr. Anderson, it "is easy to tell the
difference between bird shot and regular bullets." (Petition Exhibit 114, at f6.)

6

reported the results of the examination of the eight bullets recovered from the Tiede Cabin
and the one bullet recovered by the coroner. (Petition Exhibit 86.) Detective Offret
conclusively determined that bullets # 1 (JB13), #2 (JB15), #5 (JB42), #6 (JB46)? and #7
(JB48) were all fired through the bodies of either Kaye Tiede or Beth Potts. {Id.) Having
made this determination, combined with the bird shot from the .38, there are no
unaccounted for entrance wounds. Bullets 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7, were all AA caliber rounds.
The coroner was incorrect when she assumed that the .38 she found in Kaye Tiede's
clothing had passed through her body.
There is no physical evidence tying Mr. Taylor to Beth Potts' shooting. While one
of the wounds was thought to have been caused by a .38 caliber bullet (RT 704), no bullet
was ever recovered that matched that wound.
Mr. Taylor was assumed to have been responsible for killing Kaye Tiede because
the .38 caliber bullet found in the clothing of Kaye Tiede was in the general proximity of
Gunshot Wound #2's exit. Dr. Schnittker has since admitted that she cannot be certain
that the .3 8 caliber bullet she recovered actually caused the injuries of Gunshot Wound #2
to Kaye Tiede, as was previously indicated at trial. (RT 707-08.)
During the autopsy of Kaye Tiede, I recovered a spent
medium caliber bullet in the right shoulder region during
removal of the victim's sweatshirt. Although this bullet was
close to the exit of Gunshot Wound #2, and could have
caused the through-and-through bullet track in the body, I
found no exit perforation through the underlying T-shirt
between the exit of the skin and the sweatshirt. I would have
expected to find such a perforation if the recovered projectile
was responsible for Gunshot Wound #2. An unattached
bullet in the clothing may have changed position within the

clothing by movement of the body after being shot and
post-mortem. The location of this bullet is consistent with
Gunshot Wound #2, but I cannot be certain that this bullet
caused the injuries of Gunshot Wound #2.
Because the bullet I recovered was not recovered from the
body itself, I know of no characteristics on the bullet at this
point, that allow me to definitively conclude that it went
through Kaye Tiede
(Petition Exhibit JL *,, 1fl[5-6.)
Although the crime lab and Detective Offret implied that the one bullet fired from
ILC j s caliber passed through Kaye I iede, no conclusive determination was made, and
(fii.111^ idlriirr "Jim M", , Hi il Ihi

IX M I U 1

• h ill"! n h i a l h

a i j i u hi i.ills g i a / c d l\a;« c h a l t ^

arm. (Petition Exhibit 86.) Whereas the five .44 caliber bullets were either referred to as
having "passed through" or having been "fired through" one of the victims, Detective
<>'!:ei Purely states ; .
K t\ r

]

i

caliber slug, "was recovered from the body of
> .

f

**

l

, I, mi iii'i^ I n f i l l in

was patently incorrect, as the autopsy report shows that the bullet was not recovered from
the body, it was pulled from her sweatshirt:
The projectile passes through-and-through the body and no
projectile is recoveredfrom the body itself. During removal
of the sweatshirt, a projectile is located in the right shoulder
region which appears to be adjacent to the exit of Gunshot
Wound #2. It is a lead projectile with a base diameter of 0.8
cm and is submitted in an evidence container.
(Petition Exhibit 84, at 620; emphasis added.)

Tiede and his daughter Tricia arrived. Mr. Iay lor grabbed Linae by the throat and W- l
8

his gun to her back. Mr. Tiede and Tricia were both ordered into the garage and Mr.
Taylor asked Mr. Tiede for money. Mr. Tiede complied and then Mr. Taylor shot Mr.
Tiede in the face with bird shot. Mr. Taylor shot Mr. Tiede again in the head with bird
shot while Mr. Tiede was lying face down on the ground. Gasoline was scattered through
the cabin and it was set on fire before Mr. Taylor and Mr. Deli left with Linae and Tricia.
When the four of them arrived at the gate to the development, they got into the
Tiedes' car and drove away. Mr. Tiede took a snowmobile to the Weber Canyon Road
gate, where he found a family member and they called the police. Mr. Taylor and Mr.
Deli were apprehended shortly thereafter. Neither Linae nor Tricia were harmed.
On May 1, 1991, Mr. Taylor pled guilty to two counts of capital homicide in the
deaths of Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts and the State agreed to dismiss several other felony
counts of attempted aggravated murder, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnapping,
aggravated robbery, theft, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. On May
16, 17, 21, and 22, 1991, the penalty phase trial was conducted. On May 24, 1991, the
jurors returned a unanimous sentencing decision in favor of death for Mr. Taylor on each
count of capital homicide. Mr. Taylor then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which was
denied by the trial court.
Through his trial counsel, Elliott Levine, Mr. Taylor appealed to this Court on July
8,1992. However, after Mr. Taylor's opening brief was filed, on July 20,1992, the State
requested that the brief be stricken and that Mr. Levine be removed from his
representation of Mr. Taylor. Although Mr. Levine was ordered to withdraw and was
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the direct appeal, this Court remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B, on the claim that trial counsel had
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of his right to effective representation under the Sixth Amendment.
Mr. Savage then pursued the direct appeal by filing Mr. Taylor's brief on June 3,
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denied the petition for a writ of certiorari on October 5, 1998.
On February 2 3 , 1 9 9 8 , Richard P. Mauro was appointed as post-conviction counsel
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Petition for Relief U n d e r the Utah PCRA. Respondent, Hank Galetka, w h o was the
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On March 1, 2004, the post-conviction trial court granted Respondent's motion for
summary judgment and denied post-conviction relief on all of Mr. Taylor's claims. The
signed order and judgment was entered on September 22, 2004.
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The request for a rehearing was denied on March 27, 2007. On September 4, 2007, Mr.
Taylor filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus and, on November 2,2007, a first
amended petition was filed in federal court. Although Mr. Taylor's federal case was, and
is, still pending, on November 5, 2007, he filed this Petition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah state law provides several exceptions to procedural bar, including: unusual
circumstances, newly discovered or suppressed evidence, good cause, and that the claims
in the petition were neither frivolous nor withheld for tactical reasons. Mr. Taylor has
alleged in two claims (Fourteen and Twenty-Four) that newly discovered evidence
preempts the procedural bar. The first of these violations, that the prosecution excluded
non-Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints members from the jury because of their
religion, rendered the penalty phase unconstitutional under the Utah State Constitution.
Mr. Taylor's entire case suffers from "the existence of fundamental unfairness in
a conviction," as Mr. Taylor has credibly pled that he is actually innocent. Mr. Taylor's
innocence of the intentional murders of Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts renders his conviction
fundamentally unfair. Mr. Taylor's innocence is a gateway through procedural bar under
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1036 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, there is good cause for
Claims 5, 9, 10,12,14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27 to be raised in the Petition currently before
this Court and the district court erred in holding that these claims were procedurally barred
because they could have been, but were not previously raised. Accordingly, the Court
should set aside the procedural bars, consider Mr. Taylor's claims on the merits, and grant

n

relief. Alternatively, the Court should reverse the district court and remand the case to
allow the district court to consider the claims on the merits, and to afford Mr. Taylor the
discovery and evidentiary hearing he requested below to further develop the facts entitling
him to relief.
ARGUMENT
I.

Introduction
Petitioner appeals the denial of Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27,

which the district court determined were barred because they could have been, but were
not previously raised on direct appeal or in Petitioner5 s initial petition for post-conviction
relief. (See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(d); Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613
(Utah 1994) ("Gardner IT').)
Mr. Taylor hereby raises and preserves, but does not brief at length any of the
claims deemed successive by the district court. Noting that "Petitioner candidly and
commendably concedes that the following claims were raised and addressed in a prior
proceeding" (ROA 1274-79), the district court determined that Claims 1-4, 6-8, 11,13,
15-18, 20, 22-23, 26, and 28-30 are procedurally barred under the PCRA:
All of the foregoing claims were raised and addressed in a
prior proceeding, either at trial, on direct appeal, in
Petitioner's initial petition for post-conviction relief, or in his
appeal from the denial of his initial petition for
post-conviction relief and, therefore, they are procedurally
barred under the PCRA and no statutory exception exists that
would permit the Court to consider the merits of these claims.
(ROA 1279-80 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(b) and (d)).)
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Mr. Taylor filed these claims in the Petition before this Court to obviate any
exhaustion arguments in federal court and to allow both this Court and the district court
to fully consider the cumulative error claim.
The district court's independent review concurs with both Respondent's (ROA
976-77) and Mr. Taylor's analysis that Claims 1-4, 6-8,11,13,15-18,20,22-23, 26, and
28-30 were previously before this Court. Therefore, Mr. Taylor will not burden this Court
with arguments on the merits of most of these claims again unless this Court determines
that it has not had a full opportunity to review one of these claims before, or if Respondent
reverses course and contends that any or all of these claims have not previously been
presented to this Court for consideration.
This Court's rule on successive petitions is clear, "ground for relief from a
conviction or sentence that has once been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a
prior [post-conviction] proceeding should not be readjudicated unless it can be shown that
there are 'unusual circumstances.'"

Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1036.

While unusual

circumstances exist in the form of Mr. Taylor's assertion of innocence, which would act
as a gateway through procedural bar under Hurst, these claims appear to be unnecessarily
repetitive unless the Court should conclude that these claims are not successive and were
not previously before this Court.
If this Court determines that Respondent, Petitioner, and the district court were
incorrect in their analysis, Mr. Taylor requests that he be permitted to file supplemental
briefing of the relevant claims at that point. Alternatively, if Respondent challenges the

1Q

district court's holding, Mr. Taylor will brief the claims in his reply pursuant to Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(c). Ultimately, if this Court, after examining the
Petition, agrees with Judge Lubeck of the district court that these claims are not materially
different from what was previously presented to this Court, then there is no cause to
reexamine Claims 1-4, 6-8, 11, 13, 15-18, 20, 22-23, and 26 in this appeal.5
II.

Procedural Bar
A.

Mr. Taylor's Petition Was Timely

The district court "opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was
timely filed and consider first whether the successive claims are procedurally barred."
(ROA 1273.) Nonetheless, Mr. Taylor's claims would not be subject to timeliness
restrictions because the "interests ofjustice" exception articulated by this Court in Julian
v. State applies herein. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (1998) ("proper consideration
of meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always be in the interests of
justice. It necessarily follows that no statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied
to bar a habeas petition") (emphasis in original). Mr. Taylor has pled that he is actually
innocent of the two murders he was convicted of, therefore if he were facing a timeliness
bar, the interests of justice exception would apply.

5

Mr. Taylor previously moved to withdraw Claim Twenty-Eight (lethal injection)
from the Petition. In the wake of new developments of law, Mr. Taylor does not believe
that the Petition was the proper forum to present that claim as pled. Claims Twenty-Nine
(ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel) and Thirty (cumulative error) are
being raised again by Mr. Taylor because they have necessarily changed since their first
presentation to this Court. The ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel
could not be fully realized by state post-conviction counsel and cumulative error has
changed with the addition of Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27.
14

B.

The New PCRA Is Not Retroactive

The district court correctly held that the PCRA does not retroactively apply. (ROA
1266.)

Therefore, Mr. Taylor was entitled to the effective representation of

post-conviction counsel throughout his initial post-conviction proceeding.
C.

Utah State Law Provides Several Exceptions to Procedural Bar

The district court noted that both the PCRA and the common law preclude a
petitioner from obtaining "relief... upon any ground that was raised or addressed in any
previous request for post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, raised in a
previous request for post-conviction relief." (ROA 1243-44 (citing Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-35a-106(l)(d); Gardner II, 888P.2dat613 ("Issues that could and should have been
raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus
proceeding absent unusual circumstances.").)
This Court has recognized four basic exceptions to this procedural bar: unusual
circumstances, newly discovered or suppressed evidence, good cause, and the claims in
the petition were neither frivolous nor withheld for tactical reasons.
1.

Unusual Circumstances

In Hurst v. Cook, this Court held that claims previously raised and addressed may
be considered if the petitioner is able to demonstrate "unusual circumstances." Hurst, 111
P.2d at 1036. See also Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, 1J20, 128 P.3d 1123 (the Utah
Supreme Court has "consistently recognized exceptions to [the procedural bar] rule in
'unusual circumstances' where 'good cause5 excuses a petitioner's failure to raise the

15

claim earlier.5')
Unusual circumstances include newly discovered evidence. Hurst, 111 P.2d at
1036. In addition to the other exceptions explained infra, Mr. Taylor's Petition explains
that two claims (Fourteen and Twenty-Four) rest on newly discovered evidence and are
therefore exempt from procedural bar.
2.

Newly Discovered Evidence

There are two instances of newly discovered evidence in the Petition. The clearest
example is found in Claim Fourteen, where Mr. Taylor has pled that the prosecution
excluded non-Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints members from the jury because
of their religion. This exclusion deprived Mr. Taylor of the right to trial by a jury drawn
from a representative cross-section of the community in violation of the Utah Constitution.
Specifically, juror Holly Conner was impermissibly struck by the prosecution. Ms.
Conner was similarly situated to the jurors accepted by the prosecution in every aspect
except for her religion.
This violation was uncovered by federal habeas counsel when they were provided
with one of the prosecutors5 notes by the district court. (Petition Exhibit 77, at Bates Nos.
575-80.) Those notes were not provided to any of Mr. Taylor's former counsel. As
detailed in Section IV(D)(4)? infra, those notes allowed Mr. Taylor's current counsel to
discover the exclusion of non-Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints members from
the jury because of their religion.
Additionally, Claim Twenty-Four described the newly discovered evidence within
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Scott Manley' s declaration. Mr. Manley' s declaration was obtained after a thorough, time
consuming, and costly investigation by the Office of the Federal Public Defender.
Because state post-conviction counsel did not receive the funding deemed reasonable and
necessary by the district court, he could not locate and interview Mr. Manley.
3.

Good Cause

In Hurst, this Court identified five "good cause" common law exceptions to the
procedural bar rule. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1037. Those exceptions are: (1) the denial of a
constitutional right pursuant to new law that is, or might be, retroactive; (2) new facts not
previously known which would show the denial of a constitutional right or might change
the outcome of the trial, (3) the existence of fundamental unfairness in a conviction,
(4) the illegality of a sentence, and (5) a claim overlooked in good faith with no intent to
delay or abuse the writ. Id. The latter four are all applicable in Mr. Taylor's case.
Moreover, this Court has held that these five exceptions are not an exhaustive list. See
Gardner v. Galetka, 2007 UT 3, f 18, 151 P.3d 968 {"Gardner IV) ("We later clarified
that this list of 'good cause5 exceptions is not exhaustive.5').
The third of those reasons, "the existence of fundamental unfairness in a
conviction,55 applies to Mr. Taylor's entire case. Mr. Taylor has credibly pled that he is
actually innocent. If Mr. Taylor is innocent of the murders of Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts,
then his conviction and sentence for intentional murder are fundamentally unfair. Mr.
Taylor's innocence is a gateway through procedural bar under Hurst. See also Sawyer v.
Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 120 L. Ed. 2d 269 (1992) ("We have
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previously held that even if a state prisoner cannot meet the cause and prejudice standard,
a federal court may hear the merits of the successive claims if the failure to hear the claims
would constitute a 'miscarriage of justice.'").
There is good cause for Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19,21,24,25, and 27 to be raised
in the Petition currently before this Court. While the district court held that these claims
could have been, but were not previously raised, that conclusion should not be
determinative because Mr. Taylor is actually innocent. Moreover, some of these claims
relate to new facts not previously known. These two factors, in combination and
individually, have resulted in a fundamentally unfair conviction. Moreover, the claims
were overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay or abuse the writ.
Hurst is not alone in explaining exceptions to procedural bar. In Gardner IV, this
Court held thatprocedural default is not always determinative of a collateral
attack on a conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not
conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in harmony
with constitutional standards." Therefore, even where a
claim of error could have been raised earlier, post-conviction
relief may be available in those "rare cases" or "unusual
circumstances" where "an obvious injustice or a substantial
and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has occurred"
that would make it "unconscionable" not to reexamine the
issue.
Gardner IV, 2007 UT 3,117.
4.

The Claims Were Neither Frivolous Nor Withheld for Tactical
Reasons

According to this Court's definition in Gardner III, a claim is frivolous if it is
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facially implausible. Gardner III, 2004 UT 42, %L 1. Tactical reasoning was addressed by
the United States Supreme Court in Yarboroughv. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1,5,124S.Ct. 1,157
L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003) ("When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others,
there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer
neglect."). Cited by the district court in its Ruling, the court noted that
Other than merely asserting that his claims were overlooked
in good faith, Petitioner nowhere demonstrates that they were
not withheld for tactical reasons. It may well be that all of
the claims he now raises which could have been raised in a
prior post-conviction petition are non-frivolous in nature, but
the Court must presume that post-conviction counsel had a
legitimate tactical reason for not raising them in the prior
petition... in order to overcome this presumption, Petitioner
must show that "there was no 'conceivable tactical basis for
counsel's actions.'" [citation] Not only has Petitioner not
even attempted to specifically meet his burden, it is unlikely
that he could do so.
(ROA 1297-98.)
The district court is incorrect, Mr. Taylor voluminously detailed state postconviction counsel's failings. If, after examining the Petition, the district court believed
that state post-conviction counsel may have had a tactical basis for his failure to bring
these claims, it should have held an evidentiary hearing to further examine the issue. This
is not dissimilar to what this Court did in regards to trial counsel when it ordered the Rule
23B hearing.
A defendant has a right to discovery or an evidentiary hearing if they make a
"substantial threshold showing." Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186, 112 S. Ct.
1840,118 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1992); United States v. Berger, 251 F.3d 894,907 fn.4 (10th Cir.
1Q

2001); United States v. Duncan, 242 F.3d 940 (10th Cir. 2001). Mr. Taylor made such a
showing in the Petition.
There is no conceivable basis for ignoring Mr. Taylor's innocence or doing less
than everything to overturn his death sentence, therefore the district court's presumption
of a tactic or strategy was wrong and further inquiry was necessary.
III.

Statutory Right to the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel
The district court held that under the PCRA, Mr. Taylor had a statutory right to

post-conviction counsel. (ROA 1263.) "[T]he PCRA required the trial court to determine
whether the petitioner was indigent and, if so, 'promptly appoint counsel who is qualified
to represent [petitioners] in death penalty cases as required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.'" (ROA 1263 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(l)(2)(a)).)
This right to counsel would be meaningless without a right to effective counsel. See
Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^{82 ("[petitioner] has a statutory right to effective assistance of
counsel under Utah Code section 78-35a-202.")
The district court properly noted that the right to the effective assistance of counsel
is a substantive right. However, the district court wrongly concluded that Mr. Taylor was
prohibited from bringing Claims 5,9,10,12,14,19,21,24,25, and 27 because they could
have been, but were not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition. In order to have been
raised in a prior petition, state post-conviction counsel would have had to have had the
opportunity to properly plead the claims. State post-conviction counsel was prevented
from developing these claims by his lack of funding.
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IV.

The District Court Erred in Procedurally Barring Claims that Were Not
Raised in Petitioner's Initial Post-Conviction Petition
The district court relied on Menzies and Utah Code Ann. §78-35 a-106 to determine

that:
because the right to post-conviction counsel is a legislatively
created protection, it is constitutionally permissible, and
within the Legislature's power, to exclude from the PCRA an
exception to the procedural bar for successive claims that
were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not,
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Therefore,
Petitioner cannot rely on a statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel to overcome the
procedural bar for successive claims that were raised and
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior
post-conviction proceeding.
(ROA1271.)
First, the district court failed to distinguish between ineffective assistance of
counsel in failing to bring a claim that could have been brought and ineffective assistance
of counsel in being unable to bring a claim because of a State manufactured impediment.
Second, because Mr. Taylor is actually innocent of the intentional murders, he is not
procedurally barred from raising these claims at this time.
A.

Mr. Taylor Was Denied Critical Funds Necessary to Properly
Challenge His Conviction and Sentence

Mr. Taylor has pled that his state post-conviction counsel was prevented from
properly investigating his case and accumulating evidence as a result of the State's
deliberate interference with funding. Although the district court ultimately determined
that the lack of funding did not excuse any of the procedural bars, it conceded that a lack
21

of adequate funding may result in constitutional or statutory violations. (ROA1292.) The
court recognized that Menzies noted that "it may be the case that the statutory [funding]
scheme imposes a crippling burden on [the petitioner]." Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^{20 n.3.
State post-conviction counsel attempted to investigate both guilt and penalty issues
but was hampered by Utah law, which initially capped expenditures at $10,000 per case.
This amount was intended to cover all "expenses," which included the costs of retaining
investigators, experts, and consultants. State post-conviction counsel repeatedly explained
to the district court that the funding cap prevented him from folly developing the factual
bases of Mr. Taylor's habeas claims. (Petition Exhibit 106, at bates nos. 864-74.)
Mr. Taylor's prior post-conviction petition was impaired by (1) the limitations on
expenditures pursuant to Utah Code of Admin. Proc. Rule 25-14-5; (2) generally
insufficient fonds from the Utah Division of Finance ("DOF"); (3) state litigation that
complicated and delayed the authorization and release of fonds; and (4) substantial delays
by the DOF, amounting to, at times, years between the order for payment of fonds and the
actual release of fonds to state post-conviction counsel.
The district court dismissed the problem because of state post-conviction counsel's
failure to use the funds he did have in his possession. However, as explained by Mr.
Taylor's current counsel at the oral argument before the district court on July 14, 2009,
if the quantity of fonds remaining are too little to afford that which is needed, it might as
well be nothing:
when you really look at it, if, for instance, you want to hire a
social historian, which is something that the ABA guidelines
22

suggest should happen in each capital case, if a social
historian costs $5,000 and you have $1,000 left, you can't
spend that $1,000 to get the social historian. You're not
going to get the social historian that you need for $ 1,000. So
it's a catch 22. Do you have $1,000? Yes. Will it get you
something? No. And I think that may have been part of the
problem. Is the experts he needed, the investigation he
needed, exceeded the funds he had.
(ROA 1330; Transcript of July 14, 2009 hearing at 28-29.)
In order for the district court to properly evaluate the impact of the lack of funding,
it was critical that there be clarity on what funds remained.

There is a material

discrepancy between what the district court determined and what Mr. Taylor contends.
According to the Ruling,
based upon the information provided by Petitioner and the
State in their pleadings, it appears that, although the
post-conviction court authorized up to $40,258.59 in
litigation expenses beyond the $ 10,000 maximum at the time,
prior post-conviction counsel ultimately only requested actual
litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555.16, leaving
unused the amount of $8,444.84 by the court's math.6 Even
if incorrect, the principle is sound.
Even if prior
post-conviction counsel could not do all he wanted, funding
in some amount existed to do more. Despite the apparent
funding problems Petitioner argues existed during his prior
post-conviction proceedings, it is difficult for the Court to
conclude that, with unused litigation funds still available in
some amount, the new evidence that Petitioner now possesses
is evidence that could not have been discovered through the
exercise of reasonable diligence as a result of insufficient
funding.
(ROA 1287-88.)
6

The district court evidently relied on Respondent's figures. (See ROA 1030.)
State post-conviction counsel was later allotted an additional $10,000 under an increase
in the funding regulation. This increase brought his total investigative budget to $20,000.
?1

Mr. Taylor concurs that if over $8,400 remained of the $20,000 he received, state
post-conviction counsel was not financially prevented from raising these claims.
However, Mr. Taylor's math is very different from the district court's and Respondent's.
Mr. Taylor believes that less than $2,000 remained.
State habeas counsel had reached the $10,000.00 limit by March 2000. (ROA
1024.) State habeas counsel filed a request with the DOF for expenses exceeding the
$10,000.00 on July 31, 2000 (State's Ex. 10 to Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to
Respondent's Motion to Dismiss), but was denied on August 16, 2000. (State's Ex. 11
to Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.) When the Utah
Attorney General's Office opposed state habeas counsel's OSC for court-approved funds
over the statutory limit on November 13,2000, the cap was still $10,000.00. (State's Ex.
13 to Reply to Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.) State habeas
counsel was forced to expend a significant amount of time and energy fighting the
$10,000.00 limit-rather than working on Mr. Taylor's initial post-conviction petition.
After March 2000, state habeas counsel had no way of investigating the case until January
2001 when the statute changed and Mr. Taylor became entitled to an additional $10,000
in expenses. (ROA 1028.)
The district court was incorrect in its conclusion that state habeas counsel
submitted expenses to DOF totaling $11,555.16, because while the expenses as of May
23,2002 were close to that number, state habeas counsel later submitted bills to the DOF
of $4,000.00 for Dr. Linda Gummow on September 13, 2002, $1,530.27 on March 24,
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2003 for Ted Cilwick, $300.00 on March 25, 2003 for Dr. Gummow, and $650.01 On
October 13, 2003 for Mr. Cilwick, for total expenses (including the district court's
$11.555.16 figure) of $18,035.44. (See Addendum C.) That means state habeas counsel
had less than $2,000.00 left unused. The problem facing state habeas counsel has been
before this Court before. See Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^[20.
The district court's conclusion that "[e]ven if incorrect, the principle is sound," is
wrong for the reason explained by counsel at oral argument.
Turning a blind eye to the costs of conducting a proper post-conviction
investigation is not sound. Post-conviction proceedings are expensive. As a third circuit
judge, Justice Nehring gave the first order on October 8, 1998 for $5,000 to be paid to
state post-conviction counsel. (Petition Exhibit 106.) Several orders for funds deemed
"reasonable and necessary" by the district court followed. Judge Noel ordered almost
$9,000 be paid for investigation on March 31, 1999. (Petition Exhibit 106.) He ordered
almost $3,500 on January 18, 2000. (Petition Exhibit 106.) Finally, saying it was
"reasonable and necessary," Judge Noel ordered $10,000 to be given to state postconviction counsel on July 26, 2000 for the retention of an investigator, $4,800 on that
same date for the retention of a mental health expert, and up to $25,000 for a mitigation
specialist. (Petition Exhibit 106.) It is difficult to reconcile how the district court could
both consider these funds to be necessary and regard the initial state post-conviction
petition to be adequate when it was produced without the benefit of the investigation and
experts that these funds would have obtained. Either the district court was wrong in the
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first instance, or in its current ruling. Mr. Taylor posits to this Court, as he did to the
district court, that at a minimum, an evidentiary hearing is necessary to: (1) determine
what funds were received and what were used, and (2) whether the funds were reasonable
and necessary in the first instance.7
In the alternative, should this Court determine that Justice Nehring and Judge
Noel's orders are entitled to the presumption of correctness, then Mr. Taylor's state postconviction counsel must have had his hands unreasonably tied throughout the course of
the initial post-conviction litigation, and the failure to plead the claims appealed herein
was a direct result of the State's failure to "make good" on the amounts ordered to be paid.
B.

Meritorious Claims Are Always Subject to Review

In each of the claims not raised in Petitioner's prior post-conviction petition, Mr.
Taylor should not be procedurally defaulted for the following reasons:
Mr. Taylor argued at the district court below that these claims are not procedurally
barred because: (1) new facts not previously known show the denial of a constitutional
right or might have changed the outcome of Mr. Taylor's trial; (2) fundamental unfairness
existed in Mr. Taylor's conviction; and/or (3) these claims were overlooked in good faith
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ. Each of these factors constitutes "good cause"

7

Mr. Taylor need not address the district court's own "infinite continuum of
litigation" conundrum at length. Denying relief to Petitioner, the district court argued that
inadequate funding cannot be a basis for a common law exception to the procedural bar
rule because "if 40,000 is provided for post-conviction proceedings, it can always be
claimed that $60,000 was needed; if that is provided, $80,000 could be claimed as
necessary, and there could never be an end to such a claim. There is never enough time
or money." (ROA 1303.) However, the amounts alleged herein as reasonable and
necessary came from the findings of two district court judges, not from Petitioner.
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to justify the filing of these claims. Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037. This Court's holding in
Hurst survives the enactment of the PCRA. Gardner III, 2004 UT 42, ^[17.
Moreover, the principles of Julian regarding statutes of limitation apply equally to
procedural bar. Julian, 966 P.2d at 254. The district court's Ruling provides no guidance
regarding the court's analysis of the claims or why they were deemed non-meritorious.
C.

The PCRA Has Been Crafted by the Utah Attorney General's Office to
its Decided Advantage

Utah is uniquely situated in that the state legislature relies on the Utah Attorney
General's Office ("UAGO") to draft legislation relating to post-conviction proceedings.
As a result, the UAGO has been able to craft the PCRA to its decided advantage. As the
UAGO was the drafter of this legislation, they should be estopped by this Court from
arguing in favor of procedural bars now that their impartiality has resulted in a denial of
Mr. Taylor's basic constitutional rights.
D.

Mr. Taylor's Claims Are Meritorious

A claim is meritorious when it has "an arguable basis in fact, where the alleged
facts would support a claim for relief." Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, ]fl9.
1.

Claim Five - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and District Court
Error in Connection with Mr. Taylor's Change of Venue Motion

Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA
de novo. See Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ^[8, 194 P.3d 913. The Court reviews a district
court's application of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons v. Barnes,
871 P.2d516,518 (Utah 1994); Dunn v. Cook, 791 P.2d 873, 876-77 (Utah 1990). "When

confronted with ineffective assistance of counsel claims/9 this Court "review[s] a lower
court's purely factual findings for clear error, but review[s] the application of the law to
the facts for correctness." Taylor, 2007 UT 12,1J13 (quoting Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ^58).
a.

This Claim Could Not Have Been Brought Earlier

The town of Coalville, Utah was too small for Mr. Taylor to get a fair trial in such
a high profile case. (ROA 233-48.) A defendant is entitled to a venue change when there
is a reasonable likelihood that pretrial publicity will deny the defendant a fair trial. Actual
prejudice need not be shown if the publicity is so inflammatory that the defendant cannot
receive a fair and impartial trial. Sheppardv. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352-53, 86 S. Ct.
1507,16 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1966). However, in most situations actual prejudice will need to
be established to prevail on this claim. This Court held in Lafferty v. State that,
[w]hen a change of venue decision is challenged on appeal
following a jury verdict, the determinative question is
'whether [the] defendant was ultimately tried by a fair and
impartial jury.' The standard for review is abuse of
discretion. In Stubbs, for example, we relied on the juror's
actual voir dire answers to conclude that the jury pool was so
tainted that the trial court probably could not impanel an
impartial jury.
Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73, *{A2 (Utah 2007) (quoting State v. Stubbs, 2005 UT 65,
THflO, 18, 123 P.3d 407 (quoting State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, ^38, 28 P.3d 1278)).
Because Mr. Taylor brought this claim after the jury's verdict and not on an
interlocutory appeal, it is his burden to show that he was not ultimately tried by a fair and
impartial jury. One of the few ways to make such a showing is to interview the jurors
themselves. After conducting interviews with approximately three-quarters of the jurors,
28

Mr. Taylor's federal habeas counsel was able to establish that he was not ultimately tried
by a fair and impartial jury. While a general venue claim could admittedly have been
brought on appeal, only through post-conviction investigation could the specific facts
necessary to make a determination of fairness and impartiality have been accumulated.
b.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Consider this
Claim Because Good Cause Pre-Empted the Procedural
Bar

State post-conviction counsel had neither the individual resources, nor the funds
to seek additional resources, that were required to interview the jurors and conclusively
establish the prejudice of the trial court's ruling denying the change of venue motion. The
investigation performed by federal habeas counsel revealed that most of the jurors knew
one another, as well as Mr. Taylor's prosecutors. Additionally, many were tied either by
friendship or relationship to members of the Sheriffs Department.
Mr. Taylor's Petition substantively pled that a biased juror sat because juror
number five, Blaine Moore, was neither open-minded nor impartial in his jury service.
State post-conviction counsel's failure to plead this claim is understandable when viewed
in the context of the resources expended by the Office of the Federal Public Defender in
establishing the claim. After investigators narrowed potential addresses, many times
multiple visits to the juror's home were necessary before finding and interviewing each
juror. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's jurors were not only spread across Utah, but also peppered
around California.

Without significant resources, these interviews could not have

occurred. Because Mr. Moore has passed away, interviews with as many jurors as

on

possible were necessary to conclusive!) e stablish his bias.
The district court abused its discretion in denying Claim Five without a thorough
inquiry into the denial of funding and its impact on this claim.
"i 11 it 11 I 11 i •, 11 u' 1111»i ni MIL; a n d p r e s e n t s n e w facts not previously known w hich show
the denial of a constitutional r
ineffective assistance of prior state post-conviction counsel occasioned by his lack of
landing. Moreover. Mr. Taylor's actual innocence pn A ides iYood cause to consider this
not procedurall> bancd.
2.

Claim Nine - Mr. Taylor \\ *b Frejudiced by the Trial Court's
Error in Failing to Properly Strike Venire-Members for Cause
During the Penalty Phase Voir Dire

Standard of Review; The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA
Vi *

..

... u >,- .c.wws a uiMi'iti ^ jurt's application

of the common-law procedure
P.2d at 876-77.
a.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying this Claim Because it
Is Not Procedurally Barred and the State's Arguments to
Dismiss Were Baseless

The State's main argument in opposition i

•?

use all of his available peremptory challenges. Therefore, he could have used one of his
]x . .\y :: „. .. . . . ^
S'- \ "-

u strike juror Moore, if he ha J wanted to " i ^ ^ \ "*

"-

ciear that i\
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exhausted all of his peremptory challenges. (CT8 125-27; RT 463.) Mr. Taylor is
uncertain as to basis for the State's assertion.
The State further justified its Motion to Dismiss by citing to this Court's
determination that trial counsel may have had strategic reasons for keeping Mr. Moore.
(ROA 571.) Although there could be no reasonable strategic reason for trial counsel
choosing to keep Mr. Moore, the point is irrelevant, as this claim is against the trial court,
not trial counsel.
Mr. Taylor has now provided substantial evidence that Mr. Moore was
unconstitutionally biased; accordingly, the trial court's erroneous denial of a for-cause
challenge and trial counsel's exhaustion of his peremptory challenges in removing other
unconstitutionally biased jurors, caused Mr. Taylor to be prejudiced by the trial court's
determination.
Claim Nine is meritorious and, as in Claim Five, presents new facts obtained via
a costly in-depth post-conviction investigation, that were not previously known and which
show the denial of a constitutional right. (ROA 294-311.) Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual
innocence provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's claim is
not procedurally barred.

8 " C T » refers to the clerk's transcripts lodged with the Utah Supreme Court in
Utah v. Taylor, Case No. 910496.
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3.

Claim I weive - Mr. I ay lor' s Venire Was Prej udicially Biased by
the Trial Court's Introduction of Blood Atonement into the Voir
Dire

Standard of Review; The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA
Vi .\

.

>^s ,i l( ii.v.,cvic\\>j HMJiU court's applied —

P.2d at 876-77.
a.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying this Claim Because it
Is Not Procedurally B a r r e d a n d the State's Arguments to
Dismiss W e r e Baseless

Blood atonement is a | ><ii I u wl;u l\ iii'.nlii mh ,nidil i n In ,i \ iipiKi! penally ) >h.i»t 11
inclusion upends mitigation entirely, creating a situation where it is an act of benevolence
and compassion to sentence someone U M! .
(hi a: i ni i.' II ni ni llu Mate ^ubiiiil, llial ml does not agree that Taylor ran out of
peremp* M" *•* i !engesbe\v ' .

*s

. '5

T a y l o r ^ counsel did not use all of his available pcr- xr nrto* • chal!e:iizc\s K '^ c ~>~';
3 ! f-.-.465-66)." (ROA 576.) This is a material fact in dispute that necessitated that the
dNrii 1 i null y mi III i ii(lc!ilhii*\ hearing.
Claim Twelve is meritorious and presents nrw f.n Is mil i I'N Mihk km iv< i v<, \\u Ii
show the denial of a constitutional right. (ROA 318-29.) Moreover, Mi". Taylor's actual
innocence provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's claim is
occ(iiiii"(ill\ Ikinoil
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4.

Claim Fourteen - The Exclusion of Non-Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints Members from the Jury Because of Their
Religion Deprived Mr. Taylor of the Right to Trial by a Jury
Drawn from a Representative Cross-Section of the Community

Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA
de novo. See Kell, 2008 UT 62, ^[8. The Court also reviews a district court's application
of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518; Dunn, 791
P.2d at 876-77.
a.

The District Court Wrongly Held That Mr. Taylor Did
Not Argue That This Claim Constituted Newly
Discovered Evidence

The district court is materially incorrect in stating that, "Petitioner nowhere argues
that the foregoing claims are ones that could not have been known and raised in a prior
post-conviction petition." (ROA 1295.)
In his Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, Mr. Taylor argued:
This claim evolves from federal counsel's acquisition of
Exhibit 77 to the Petition. Despite state habeas counsel's
request for all records from the district court, he never
received Exhibit 77. (Addendum A; Decl. of Richard Mauro,
Tf6.) . . . As the State withheld this document from state
habeas counsel, there is no credible argument in favor of
barring this claim. Claim Fourteen is meritorious and
presents new facts not previously known.
(ROA 762; emphasis added.)
This Claim is based on newly discovered evidence which strongly indicates that the
prosecution was striking jurors based on their religious affiliation. The newly discovered
evidence rule requires all of the following:

'

ithc i;,c i^unoiicr nor petitioner's coun^u MIU\ » •• m^
M.iK^ at the time of trial or sentencing or in time to
include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion
or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not
have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence;
indiericu ^v -.*

(:i:;

-.

uulative of evidence

he material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;

.ucu with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of
\:u\ could have found the petitioner gmhv eftl c offense or
• ' - \ v ' U- the \rn1tm t

•- . '

-J

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-lU4(eXiM^/ •
b.

Prior Counsel Did Not Receive (lie Prosecutor's Notes

When federal habeas counsel requester .,.

u

. * , nui^ hu iruiii < le district

court in mid-2007, counsel was proi ided < Itli copie s of se < eral pages of handv i itt s n
notes initially generated by one of the prosecutors. rhese notes, submitted with the
* v^uiion as Exhibit 77, were never provided to state post-conviction counsel, despite his
\^.v.^i w.i,
to Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-(\>n\idii»n I«Y]ief \\i()\

wuu« nvi ^'»^H)^ition
f>™ K00V | v I

|

Richard Mauro, |6.) The revelation of this document a decade later, when federal counsel
made the same request, was significant. Petition exhibit 77 does more than indicate that

9

Although Mr. Taylor's facts fit the criteria of Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-104(e),
he c - not believe that the code section is mandatorily applicable because the newly
disc
-A evidence relates to stn ictural error.
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the prosecutors were improperly striking jurors based on their religion, it shifts the burden
of proof to the prosecution to explain the impermissible peremptory strikes.
The Petition goes to great pains to conduct the sort of inquiry mandated by MillerEl v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 162 L. Ed 2d 196 (2005) and Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), and explains the facts at
issue that make this claim worthy of relief. (ROA 336-53.) Mr. Taylor will not burden
this Court with a recapitulation of what has already been pled in detail. Although the
United States Supreme Court has failed to extend to jurors the right to be free from
religious persecution, this Court should do so under the Utah State Constitution. The Utah
State Constitution states:
The State shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious
test shall be required as a qualification for any office of
public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any
person he incompetent as a witness or juror on account of
religious belief or the absence thereof.
Utah Constitution, Art. I, § 4 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Utah Code states that a "qualified citizen may not be excluded from
jury service on account of... religion . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103 (formerly Utah
Code Ann. § 78-46-3). See also State v. Ball 685 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Utah 1984).
The prosecutor's notes make clear that there was no permissible purpose for
striking juror Holly L. Conner. Because the prosecutor instituted and followed a scoring
system for each of the jurors, it is apparent that Ms. Conner was struck for grounds outside
of her attitudes regarding the death penalty, or any other permissible distinction.

The Ruling concluded that Mr. Taylor
does not discuss nor demonstrate that the new evidence he
now7 possesses is evidence that could, not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence and.
included in a prior post-conviction petition. See Utah ( ode
Ann. § 78B-9-104(l)(f)(I) [sic] ("neither the petitioner nor
petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence. . , in f,"w *
include the evidence in any previously filed . . .
post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have
been discovered through AIL exercise of reasonable
diligence/').
I1A ( ",(1(1 |
I lull d d o i m h '

post-conviction, appellate, or trial counsel to have known that the prosecutor was striking
jurors based on religion. No amount of diligence could have led to the discover}. In iact,
state post;-

v ic tionc ounsel requested the same fj^> iiwinihc^ame district court, but for
' f*

some u

•.

i

exercised reasonable _ 0 ™ c c to no avail. Mr. I a>lor does not know \*'- t l \

-^ »*-!y

now came to light, but now that they have,, this claim,,, is timely raised. This evidence is not
c

•

•

vnown evidence because there was no way to know why the

prosecutor struck Ms. Conner i iiitll his note s si irfaced
The striking of Ms. Conner constitutes structural error, therefore no inquiry
pursuant i.* , i^, v. UUL Ann. < ^8-35a-104(e)(i)-(iv) is necessary.
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c.

This Claim Is Not Procedurally Barred

The district court's determination ignores the reality of how this document made
its way to counsel. Had the document been provided to counsel earlier, it could have been
included in a prior post-conviction petition, but it was not. Accordingly, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-35a-104(e)(1) permits an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for
post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence on the grounds that
newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction
or sentence, because petitioner's counsel did not know of the evidence at the time of trial
or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion
or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through
the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Finally, the State failed to provide material evidence by not turning over the
prosecutor's notes to state post-conviction counsel sooner. As the State withheld this
document from state post-conviction counsel, there is no credible argument in favor of
barring this claim. Claim Fourteen is meritorious and presents new facts not previously
known which show the denial of a constitutional right. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual
innocence provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's claim is
not procedurally barred.
5.

Claim Nineteen - The Jury Was Prejudiced by its Consideration
of Extrinsic Evidence in Violation of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution

Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA

in

of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons, 8" 1 P.2d at 518; Dunn 7° 1
P.2d at 876-77.
a.

The Jurors Considered Two Pieces of Constitutionally
Impermissible Extrinsic Evidence Prior to or During
Deliberations

Juror Jerry Lewis explained that,
A

t f he end of each day everyone on the jury, including the
aiiernates, would meet for 10-20 minutes to compare notes
and discuss the case amongst ourselves. We would compare
notes to see if there was something we had missed ihat
someone else had caught. We talked as a group u»make sure
everyone was on the same page and to *-\plain our
interpretation to the people who had questions about
something.
(Petition bxliii^. j j . ui * :>.)
Jurors iir" ni*l pennitl.'d In discuss (In, i a.-.e w illu/;/vr;/7t? prior to deliberations. This
conduct between the jurors violated the court's instmel HI .ind ,.»ubstantialh efftvled 11 it
verdict, as it removed the individual Dpiiron that each juror is expected to bring to
deliberations. Kichardson v. Marsh* 48 . < ,">. 200„ 206. 107 S. C t 1702, 95 L. Ed. 2d I ?6
(1(>S7) I I 111 !',|l lln almi J in unable .lssimiplmii

Il IIIIIIK lav il I i. 11 |iin >i:> l< II iv illln iir

instructions.").
Additionally, the jury foreperson, Richard Andrews, impermissibly suggested that
the IUIOI.S put themselves in I he place ol the \ iclims ' 1 here was one woman in particular
who washesit.iut 1>a \ -Me fonlrath Sh. \ ah'J1 lo» diMlli aller lln foreman said Mainlining
like, 'if it was your mother or daughter, how would you vote?"* ilVtitinii Klmlm '0 ,it
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Ilio.)
That suggestion interfered with the jury's function to weigh the evidence and
determine whether the government had sustained its burden of proof. To the same degree
that it is improper for a prosecutor to inflame the passions or prejudice of the jury by
implying that the jury has a different role, it is equally impermissible for one juror to take
on that role for the state. See United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570, 574 (1st Cir. 1994)
("Arguments urging a jury to act in any capacity other than as the impartial arbiter of the
facts in the case before it are improper."); Blevins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F.2d 1576,
1580(10thCir. 1984);/vyv. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 ¥2d732,741 (5th Cir. 1978)
(Golden rule appeals are regarded as "improper because it encourages the jury to depart
from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than
on the evidence.").
In the district court, the State criticized Mr. Taylor for not having provided an
affidavit or statement from jury foreperson Richard Andrews in support of this claim.
(ROA 587.) Mr. Andrews passed away on December 18, 2003. The State's protest
highlights the prejudice that delays in this case have caused and provides a prime example
of the prejudice suffered by Mr. Taylor as a result of the deficiencies of former counsel.
Had an evidentiary hearing been previously conducted on this issue, Mr. Andrews'
testimony would be preserved as part of the record. Fearful that more evidence may
disappear if not properly sought out and preserved now, Mr. Taylor requested that the
district court hold an evidentiary hearing on this and the other claims in his Petition. The

district court wrongly failed to urani ,i !v -nng.
tah Rule ol Kvidence 606(b) Allows for an Inquiry into
the Extrinsic K\ idence Considered by the Jury
. ... Mau argued in tne district court that i >^h ^ livid. 606(b) prevents the jurors5
declaratk :- *

• .

si dun I 1 Huh K

....

Evidence 606(b), disallowing the admission of evidence of mental processes - 4' (hr | ' *
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that juror testimony about consideration of extrinsic
i . .JL-LC mav DC eoriMuciVvi by a reviewing court:
While li^oi iiicA tesiih ... . JULMUH: •: .* .J extraneous
prejuii^ nil information w ^ .mproperly brought to the jury's
attention.' a juror kma\ not testify' as to . . . the effect of
anything
nncerning the juror's menial processes in
connection therevxith " K\l <
' <, l*w N-nb) ^ee generally
Tanner v I L -< J States. 485 U.S. H'T. ' T-2 \ 107 S. Ct.
2739, 97 L. kd. 2d 90 (198" i (discussing the L.mimon-law
history of Rule ^()6(b) and the policies underk ii u it). As we
observed in N /;;/?>w/. the dichotomy established by Rule
606(b) pernii i * : juror to testify (either literally or by way of
affidavit) on »!ie question of 'whether any extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to bear upon
a jure
\i\. a iuror may not testify as to the effect the
outside inlormation had upon the juror.5 [United States v.]
Simpson. 950 F.2d 11 ^ 19. | 1521 [(10th Cir. 1991)] (emphasis
in original); Math>\ - :> nited States, 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13
S. Ct. 50? 36 i . Ld. yl7 (1892) (recognizing a distinction
between affidavits bearing on 'the motives and influences' of
the jurors, which are inadmissible to impeach the verdict, and
affi.dav.its bearing on the "existence ui any extraneous
influence/ which are admissible).
I huti'd Stales t Davis. 611

-.

. ,<; *

The distinction between i- svir

••'

. :

the juror was literally inside ur outside the jury room when the alleged irre£^:!< ~iM took
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place; rather, the distinction [is] based on the nature of the allegation." Tanner, 483 U.S.
at 117. The Supreme Court has "held admissible the testimony of jurors describing how
they heard and read prejudicial information not admitted into evidence." Tanner, 483 U.S.
at 117 (quoting Mattox, 146 U.S. at 149).
Therefore, whether Mr. Taylor's jury considered extrinsic evidence is an issue that
requires factual development in an evidentiary hearing. The evidence elicited would not
be barred by the rules of evidence.
Claim Nineteen is meritorious and presents new facts not previously known which
show the denial of a constitutional right. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual innocence
provides good cause to consider this claim. Therefore, Mr. Taylor's claim is not
procedurally barred.
6.

Claim Twenty-One - Mr. Taylor's Constitutional Rights Were
Violated by the Improper Admission of Evidence at the Penalty
Phase of His Trial

Mr. Taylor re-pled this claim because he believed that the State might have argued
that some of the facts raised in this claim were not previously before this Court. As the
State appears to concede that parts (a), (c), (d), and (f) of this claim have already been
raised and are fully exhausted, Mr. Taylor accepts the State's representation as true and
need not oppose the dismissal by this Court of those parts of Claim Twenty-One as
successive.
The dismissal of subsections (b) and (e) as procedurally barred is inappropriate
because Mr. Taylor has pled actual innocence.

^

Claim Twenty-Foui Exculpatory Evidence

Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA
de novo. See Kelt, 2008 UT 62, TJ8. The Court also re\ iews a district court's application
de novo. See Parsons, K ,' I I'.Jd «11 ^ 18: Dunn, i{^ I
P.2d at 876-77.
a.

Hie District Court Erred in Declaring the Evidence of
Scott Manley's Fabricated Testimony to Be Procedurally
Barred

Informal ion obtained horn SI, nil Man lej, describing the extent ol the prosecution's
relationship with him, shows Ihnl lim Sl„ifr fall'iil I

Intl^e critical impeaelimcnl

e\ idence to Mr. Taylor. (Petition Exhibit 115.) Neither Respondent, nor the district court
aw.ii *j;^cd Liic iuu LUtji impeachment evidence fells within the Brady rule.. United States
v. 3av.>* ' •

.'

,

.- -

. *vi" . c u; /• g vjii-m) v.

United States, 405 U.S. 150. I >J *>? " ' •
In his declaration, Mr. Manley states that he was pressured by the parole officers
^. . ,«^. ..nit u i.ie interrogation room;, "two parole officers told me that they knew Von
was gi ii in y i i:ii'!

:;) i ;xpected me to make the stoi ) • :: n « : n bigger. I hey toldme that if

I did not do it they were going to send me back to the pirn on some big liea;1' < 3 tim z ' "'
(Petition Exhibi! "

r

f

"his informal ion could have been used to impeach the

testimoiT . . - .aa^i^v. li^.u^v. mv, Stale iailed to disclose the circumstances under
wh i, Ii f\;l

v

-

.

evidence in violation of Brady and its progeny.
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.. v\Linpatory

Scott Manley's declaration was obtained after a thorough, time consuming, and
costly investigation by the Office of the Federal Public Defender. Mr. Manley was found
in custody in the State of California, and declared that his statement to law enforcement
was a product of coercion and deception. (Petition Exhibit 115,1f1f5-6.) Had state postconviction counsel received the funding deemed reasonable and necessary by the district
court, he would have located and interviewed Mr. Manley, and been able to discredit his
highly damaging testimony, thus reducing the weight of the evidence against Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Manley was identified as a necessary witness by state post-conviction counsel.
Unable to obtain the necessary funding to locate Mr. Manley, neither Petitioner nor
Petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of the state post-conviction
proceeding. His declaration constitutes newly discovered evidence. This material
evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known, and is not merely
impeachment evidence, as it describes misconduct by the police. Finally, viewed with all
the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence undermines a critical witness
against Mr. Taylor, removing premeditation from the jury. Without that evidence, no
reasonable trier of fact could have found Mr. Taylor guilty of the offense of intentional
murder. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(e)(i)-(iv).
Because it meets the statutory requirements for newly discovered evidence, and
because Mr. Taylor's actual innocence provides good cause to consider this claim, it is not
procedurally barred.

Claim I wenty-Fivv
Disproportionate i< I li
Constitutional K i y 11 I s

I'aylor's Death Sentence Is
'ulpability and Violates Hi* :

Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application oi the PCI - 1
• ix , .uri ciLso a\ia\.^ a district court's application.
of the

n. y

P 2d at 876-77.
a.

Recently Developed Evidence Indicates 'That Mr. Taylor
May Not Have Killed Anyone

In iis ,i tiiiHlaiiinnti'il pi u'pl (I

,

w-uciei.aanL .-.,.,. v,.ir* ^'ujvuta

life sentence, was the actual killer ol k r • r v - * -.>

} v

sentence is disproportionate to his culpability and violates his constitutional rights. Mr.
Taylor's post-conviction petition has included, among other things, a declarationfrom,the
i U'iniit/T vtho iwiimiiiril Kan1 'I tnlr .mil 1U ill) I nil , bodies tfiat questions her testimony
against Mr. Taylor at trial.
Dr. Schnittker's declaration calls into question many of the facts relied on by the
Sur.^. .,^a rai^c ^bstantial concerns surrounding whether Mr. Taylor was even guilty of
the * *

.

wi*/.ivi ion was

effectively unavailable to state post-conviction counsel, as he was improper1

y

the lack of funding he received from the State. Mr, Taylor lias credibly pled actual
innocence, meeting the good cause" exception to procedural bar, Moreover, because the
additional evide*

i

'

*

"

unhu.:,_ rcxeaied laets

not previously known which questioned "the existence
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*

• -• •• i n

[Petitioner's] conviction/' it further meets the good cause exception. See Gardner III,
2004 UT 42, fl4; Hurst, 111 P.2d at 1037.
9.

Claim Twenty-Seven - Inadequate Appellate Record

Standard of Review: The Court reviews a district court's application of the PCRA
de novo. See Kell, 2008 UT 62, ^[8. The Court also reviews a district court's application
of the common-law procedural bar de novo. See Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518; Dunn, 791
P.2d at 876-77.
a.

The District Court Erred in Failing to Order a Hearing
into the Prejudice Caused by the Inadequate Appellate
Record

In Claim Twenty-Seven, Mr. Taylor argues, in part, that the transcript of Mr.
Taylor's penalty phase appears to be possibly incorrect, and that the transcripts of Edward
Deli's trial are no longer available. According to the transcript of Mr. Taylor's penalty
phase, Cheryl Chamberlain stated that one of her sons was married to a sister of one of the
prosecutors. (RT 113.) After interviewing veniremembers, federal habeas counsel has
been unable to confirm the statement attributed to Ms. Chamberlain. Mr. Taylor alleges
that if the record is not sound on this one point, then Mr. Taylor cannot rely on any portion
of the record being correct, potentially depriving appellate and habeas counsel of the
ability to recognize errors at trial and bring claims appropriately thereon. Thus, Mr.
Taylor's claim has an arguable basis in fact, that is, that the information attributed to Ms.
Chamberlain is incorrect. The potential error in the record supports Mr. Taylor's claim
that his right to an accurate and complete record may have been violated. See, e.g., Frank

v.Mangum ? ^ I ) S W) V?^x

^^K < I S I S 1 S M (

i d %'MWIS) »f'Wei . ' M I W M .

333 U.S. 196, 201, 68 S. Ct. 514, 92 L. Ed. 64-4 v . r ,,.
Mr. Taylor has further alleged that he has been harmed by the fact 'that Edward
ial ti anscripts are no longer available ,- I.U,W.,^M .»,• i ^: KM .mu .v... .-ui were
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must entail a comparison of the transcripts of both trials. 10 If the prosecution knowingly
used false evidence or acted in bad faith, pursuing fundamentally inconsistent theories in
separate trials against co- dclciidaiits charged with the same murders, the prosecution may
have \ iolated cii le process Si u ?, e g,5 Ngu) }en i } lif it he 3 5 J i ? I! ^11 ? Ui I " III 1 M'th 1 n
2000). A transcript of Mr. Deli's trial is necessary to make the required comparison.
Here again, state post-conviction counsel was precluded from obtaining
the lack o I I ui id nig available to him.. State postconviction counsel was effectively prevailed troin inli n \r\\ 1 « tiiu > \ niivniuiiU r v

If the same evidence was indeed used against both defendants, and the only
difference between the defendants was that Mr. Taylor pled guilty, the different res
support a conclusion that Mr. Taylor's counsel's deficient performance in inducing Mr.
Taylor to plead guilty was prejudicial to Mr. Taylor. Similarly, if the only difference was
the introduction of the Scott Manley taped statement, the different result supports Mr.
Taylor's claim that Mr. Taylor was prejudiced by the trial court's error in admitting the
taped statement - ? n ovidena HViihon Exhibit 1.7, at f6,)
46

well as the jurors from Mr. Taylor's trial. (Addendum A to Petitioner's Opposition to
Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (ROA 659-800); Decl. of Richard
Mauro, ^}8.) Because this claim is meritorious and because the evidence to support this
claim reveals new facts not previously known which would show the denial of the
constitutional right to an accurate and complete record, Mr. Taylor meets the "good cause"
exception and is therefore not procedurally barred. Moreover, Mr. Taylor's actual
innocence provides a good cause exception to consider this claim.
10.

Claim Twenty-Nine - Ineffective Assistance of State Counsel

The district court held that "[bjecause Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance
of prior post-conviction counsel is not a claim that challenges his conviction or sentence,
it is not a cognizable ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, not a claim for
which the PCRA can provide a legal remedy." (ROA 1309.)
The district court missed the import of this claim. Claim Twenty-Nine is not pled
to warrant relief as a stand alone claim, but rather to explain universal failures that
undermined Mr. Taylor's initial state post-conviction proceeding and that excuse
procedural bar.
11.

Claim Thirty - Mr. Taylor Was Denied His Constitutional
Rights Because of the Cumulative Impact of Errors

With the addition of even a single new claim, this Court must conduct a new
cumulative error analysis. Mr. Taylor is entitled to have this Court consider the
cumulative effect of the new facts developed in the investigation paid for by federal
counsel and the newly discovered evidence uncovered by counsel.

Because Mi 1 \\\ hum li/t, pled IIKII lit IS ,H IIJ;I 11S niiiotuin and has presented new
facts not previously known which show the denial of a constitutional right, h i s c I; i i m i s 11»i«i
procedurally barred.
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could potentially yield relief for Mr, Taylor.
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led the jury to believe that the crime was premeditated.
As discussed sup? -a, tactical reasoning was addressed in Gentry, where it was noted
that "fwlheti nminsrl Ionises nni ^onir i>sur- In Hit t \n lliihiuii nul olliei;., Ihere is a strong
presumption that he did so for tactical reasons rather than through she i -
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540 U.S. at 5. Gentry further stated "[t]he issues counsel omitted were not su w.w^ly more
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professional error of constitute *
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successive petition that were not previously raised are claims for which a reasonable basis
can be articulated as to why they were not raised in a prior proceeding," is confusing at
best. (ROA 1297.) The district court supports this statement by way of example, stating
that "given all of the circumstances of the case and the limitations in terms of time,
funding, and resources, it is certainly plausible that these claims were not raised in the
initial post-conviction petition because they were weaker or less persuasive than the other
claims that were raised." (ROA 1298.)
After finding that funding was not at issue, the district court puts it squarely in
question. The prejudice of the lack of funding is inherent in this statement by the district
court. The district court's explanation strongly supports Mr. Taylor's fundamental
argument on appeal that he should not be penalized because of the lack of funding.
The district court's hypothesis that these are weaker claims is incorrect. Nowhere
in the Ruling is there evidence that the district court engaged in an analysis or weighing
of the claims in the initial state post-conviction petition versus the Petition currently
before the Court.
Because no claims were withheld for tactical reasons, the district court was
required to consider whether any of the common law exceptions to the procedural bar rule
apply to this Petition. The district court failed to make such a consideration. (ROA 1299.)
Finally, the district court's reliance on Gentry is misplaced, as Gentry relates to
trial counsel, not state post-conviction counsel.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Taylor asks that the Court reverse the judgment of
the district court, consider his claims on the merits, and grant relief. Alternatively, the
Court should reverse the judgment and remand the case to allow Mr. Taylor, after
discovery and an evidentiary hearing, to prove exceptions to the defaults and entitlement
to relief on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
SEAN K.KENNEDY
Federal Public Defender

DATED: April 30, 2010

By: ^ ^ ^ * * ~ ^ ^
BRIAN M. POMERANTZ
Deputy Federal Public Defender
Attorney for Appellant
VON LESTER TAYLOR
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Addendum A

Fed. Rules of Evidence Rule 606 (3d ed.)
Federal Rules of Evidence
ARTICLE VI. WITNESSES
Rule 606. Competency of Juror as Witness
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of
the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be
afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or
concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1)
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2)
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether
there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence
of any statement by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be
precluded from testifying.

Utah Administrative Code R25-14-5.
Payment of Reasonable Litigation Expenses.
The Division of Finance shall pay reasonable litigation expenses not to exceed a total amount of
$20,000 except as provided in subsection (2).
(2) The Division of Finance shall pay amounts exceeding the total amount if:
(a) before services are performed or expenses are incurred, appointed counsel files a
request with the court to exceed the total amount;
(b) appointed counsel serves the request upon the Division of Finance before or on the
date of filing the request with the court;
(c) the Division of Finance is allowed to respond to the request; and
(d) the court determines there is sufficient cause to exceed the total amount in accordance
with Section 78B-9-202.
(3) Travel costs, including mileage, per diem for meals, and lodging will be reimbursed based on
state rates and criteria published in rule or policy by the Division of Finance. Travel is not
reasonable when the purpose of the travel can reasonably be accomplished in another way, such
as by telephone or correspondence.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104
78-3 5a-104. Grounds for relief ~ Retroactivity of rule.
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been convicted
and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the
following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was prosecuted
is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in an
unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the
conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time
of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed
post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty
of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule announced by the
United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after the
petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by applicable state and federal principles
of retroactivity.
Enacted by Chapter 235, 1996 General Session

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106
78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief — Exception.
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107.
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Enacted by Chapter 235, 1996 General Session

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202
78-35a-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in death penalty cases.
(1) A person who has been sentenced to death and whose conviction and sentence has been
affirmed on appeal shall be advised in open court, on the record, in a hearing scheduled no less
than 30 days prior to the signing of the death warrant, of the provisions of this chapter allowing
challenges to the conviction and death sentence and the appointment of counsel for indigent
defendants.
(2)

(a) If a defendant requests the court to appoint counsel, the court shall determine whether
the defendant is indigent and make findings on the record regarding the defendant's
indigency. If the court finds that the defendant is indigent, it shall promptly appoint
counsel who is qualified to represent defendants in death penalty cases as required by
Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
(b) A defendant who wishes to reject the offer of counsel shall be advised on the record
by the court of the consequences of the rejection before the court may accept the
rejection.
(c) Costs of counsel and other reasonable litigation expenses incurred in providing the
representation provided for in this section shall be paid from state funds by the Division
of Finance according to rules established pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act.

Enacted by Chapter 76, 1997 General Session
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78A-3-102
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-2-2
§ 78A-3-102. Supreme Court jurisdiction
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state law certified by a
court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and authority to
issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, and decrees or in
aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior tofinaljudgment
by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing
actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e);
(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of the United States
or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the

Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or
capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony
or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on legislative
subpoenas.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a court of record
involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall review those
cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 344, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2209, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws
2009, c. 344, § 41, eff. May 12, 2009.
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-1-103
Formerly cited as U.C.A. § 78-46-3
§ 78B-1-103. Jurors selected from random cross section - Opportunity and obligation to serve
(1) It is the policy of this state that:
(a) persons selected for jury service be selected at random from a fair cross section of the
population of the county:
(b) all qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be
considered for service; and
(c) all qualified citizens are obligated to serve when summoned, unless excused.
(2) A qualified citizen may not be excluded from jury service on account of race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, age, occupation, disability, or economic status.

U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-104
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-104
§ 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief-Retroactivity of rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been convicted and
sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction for
post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the following
grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United
States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which
the petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling
statutory provisions;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States
Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the
conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time
of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed
post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have
been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty
of the offense or subject to the sentence received; or
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United
States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after
conviction and sentence became final on direct appeal, and that:
(i) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's
conviction or sentence became final; or
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(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime
for which the petitioner was convicted.
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner establishes
that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of the facts
proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and facts introduced at trial
or during sentencing.
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is
innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3,
Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1168, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 3, eff. May 5, 2008.

U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-9-106
Formerly cited as UT ST § 78-35a-106
§ 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief-Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that:
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion;
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal;
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal;
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107.
(2) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during the
state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that the
state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier time. Any court may raise a
procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an
opportunity to be heard.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (l)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 1170, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2008, c. 288, § 5, eff. May 5, 2008.

U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 4
Constitution of Utah
Article I. Declaration of Rights
Sec. 4. [Religious liberty]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall
any person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the absence
thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor shall any church dominate the State or
interfere with its functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to
any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesiastical
establishment.
CREDIT(S)
Laws 1999, S.J.R. 5, § 1, adopted at election Nov. 7, 2000, eff. Jan. 1, 2001.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4
Title II. Appeals from Judgments and Orders of Trial Courts
RULE 4. APPEAL AS OF RIGHT: WHEN TAKEN
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a matter
of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be
filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or
order appealed from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk
of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
(b) Time for appeal extended by certain motions.
(b)(1) If a party timely files in the trial court any of the following motions, the time for
all parties to appeal from the judgment runs from the entry of the order disposing of the
motion:
(b)(1)(A) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(b)(1)(B) a motion to amend or make additional findings of fact, whether or not
an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion is granted, under
Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(C) a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure;
(b)(1)(D) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure; or
(b)(1)(E) a motion for a new trial under Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
(b)(2) A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of judgment, but before entry
of an order disposing of any motion listed in Rule 4(b), shall be treated as filed after entry
of the order and on the day thereof, except that such a notice of appeal is effective to
appeal only from the underlying judgment. To appeal from a final order disposing of any
motion listed in Rule 4(b), a party must file a notice of appeal or an amended notice of
appeal within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order.
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. A notice of appeal filed after the announcement of
a decision, judgment, or order but before entry of the judgment or order shall be treated as filed
after such entry and on the day thereof.
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, any other party

may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on which the first notice of appeal was
filed, or within the time otherwise prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule, whichever
period last expires.
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good
cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon motion filed not later than 30 days
after the expiration of the time prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this rule. A motion filed
before expiration of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties
in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension shall exceed 30 days past
the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever
occurs later.
(f) Motion to reinstate period for filing a direct appeal in criminal cases. Upon a showing that a
criminal defendant was deprived of the right to appeal, the trial court shall reinstate the
thirty-day period for filing a direct appeal. A defendant seeking such reinstatement shall file a
written motion in the sentencing court and serve the prosecuting entity. If the defendant is not
represented and is indigent, the court shall appoint counsel. The prosecutor shall have 30 days
after service of the motion to file a written response. If the prosecutor opposes the motion, the
trial court shall set a hearing at which the parties may present evidence. If the trial court finds by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has demonstrated that he was deprived of his
right to appeal, it shall enter an order reinstating the time for appeal. The defendant's notice of
appeal must be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
order.
(g) Appeal by an Inmate Confined in an Institution. If an inmate confined in an institution files a
notice of appeal in either a civil or criminal case, the notice of appeal is timely filed if it is
deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or before the last day for filing. Timely
filing may be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of
deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in the
manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in paragraph (d) runs from the
date when the trial court receives the first notice of appeal.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; November 1, 2002; November 1, 2005;
November 1, 2006.]

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B
Title V. General Provisions
RULE 23B. MOTION TO REMAND FOR FINDINGS NECESSARY TO DETERMINATION
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may move the court to
remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, necessary for the appellate court's
determination of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only
upon a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if
true, could support a determination that counsel was ineffective.
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellant's brief. Upon a showing of good
cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing of the appellant's brief. In no
event shall the court permit a motion to be filed after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall
prohibit the court from remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the
claim has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party.
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall conform to the
requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accompanied by affidavits alleging facts
not fully appearing in the record on appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the
attorney. The affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall also be accompanied
by a proposed order or remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed on remand.
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion isfiled.The response shall include a
proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual
issues relevant to each such claim to be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is
granted, unless the responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall
be filed within 10 days after the response is filed.
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a) and (b) of this rule have been met, the
court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to the trial court for the purpose of entry
of findings of fact relevant to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand
shall identify the ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such claim
to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial court to complete the
proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the order of remand, absent a finding by
the trial court of good cause for a delay of reasonable length.
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellant's attorney of record on the appeal faces a
conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new
counsel for the appellant be appointed or retained.
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be vacated upon the filing

of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural steps required by these rules shall not be
stayed by a motion for remand, unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion
of the parties or upon the court's motion.
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall promptly conduct
hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact necessary to determine the
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the
order of remand shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consideration of issues not
specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary hearings shall be conducted without a
jury and as soon as practicable after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the
proponent of the fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial
court shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient performance by
counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, in accordance with the order
of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be completed within 90 days of entry of the order of
remand, unless the trial court finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length.
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all proceedings before the trial
court, the clerk of the trial court and the court reporter shall immediately prepare the record of
the supplemental proceedings as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings
before the trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon preparation of the
supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court has not been
transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the
supplemental proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record.
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial court, the clerk of the
court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for briefing or oral argument under these rules.
Errors claimed to have been made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this
rule are reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. The
findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the
review of findings of fact in^other appeals.
CREDIT(S)
[Adopted effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.]

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and
in the order indicated:
(a)(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose
judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on
appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page
which appears immediately inside the cover.
(a)(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations,
rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where
they are cited.
(a)(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(a)(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the
standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or
(a)(5)(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court.
(a)(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall
be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an
addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(a)(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the
case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and
references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in
accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(a)(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be
a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall
not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(a)(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the

appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record
evidence that supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees
incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such
an award.
(a)(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(a)(l 1) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the
brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall
contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(a)(l 1)(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(a)(l 1)(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not
available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(a)(l 1)(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact
and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph
(a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(b)(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(b)(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the
appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant
to the issues presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new
matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs may be filed
except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to
keep to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It
promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or
the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured person,' "the

taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record
as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings
or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published
depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each volume as
marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately numbered page(s) referred to
within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be
made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in
controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages,
and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents,
tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the
record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice
of appeal shall be deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. Each party shall be entitled to file two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no
party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(g)(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in
the appeal.
(g)(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and
Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and
present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(g)(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief
of Cross-Appellee, which shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of
Cross-Appellant.
(g)(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to
the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause
shown may upon motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The
motion shall state with specificity the issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages
requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion filed at least seven days before
the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be accompanied by a
copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera
inspection. If the motion is granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of
additional pages without further order of the court. Whether the motion is granted or denied, the

draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of
either may join in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of
the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the
attention of a party after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before
decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the
citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall state
the reasons for the supplemental citations. The body of the letter must not exceed 350 words. Any
response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with
accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant,
immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or
stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the
offending lawyer.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 8
Rule 8. Appointment of counsel
(a) A defendant charged with a public offense has the right to self representation, and if indigent,
has the right to court-appointed counsel if the defendant faces a substantial probability of
deprivation of liberty.
(b) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent defendant who is charged
with an offense for which the punishment may be death, the court shall appoint two or more
attorneys to represent such defendant and shall make a finding on the record based on the
requirements set forth below that appointed counsel is proficient in the trial of capital cases. In
making its determination, the court shall ensure that the experience of counsel who are under
consideration for appointment have met the following minimum requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to verdict six felony cases
within the past four years or twenty-five felony cases total;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in
a capital or a felony homicide case which was tried to a jury and which went to final
verdict;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have completed or taught within the past
five years an approved continuing legal education course or courses at least eight hours of
which deal, in substantial part, with the trial of death penalty cases; and
(4) the experience of one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in
the active practice of law.
(c) In making its selection of attorneys for appointment in a capital case, the court should also
consider at least the following factors:
(1) whether one or more of the attorneys under consideration have previously appeared as
counsel or co-counsel in a capital case;
(2) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have sufficient time and support
and can dedicate those resources to the representation of the defendant in the capital case
now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to the defendant;
(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration have engaged in the active
practice of criminal law in the past five years;
(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys being considered; and
(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed
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will fairly, efficiently and effectively provide representation to the defendant.
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to death, the court shall appoint one or
more attorneys to represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is
proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be found proficient to represent on appeal persons
sentenced to death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following
requirements:
(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in at least three felony appeals; and
(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an
approved continuing legal education course which deals, in substantial part, with the trial
or appeal of death penalty cases.
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. Section 78B-9-202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to represent
such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on post-conviction appeal and shall make a finding
that counsel is qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in post-conviction cases. To be
found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following
requirements:
(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have served as counsel in at least three
felony or post-conviction appeals;
(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have appeared as counsel or co-counsel in
a post-conviction case at the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation;
(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have attended and completed or taught
within the past five years an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty cases or with the prosecution or
defense of post-conviction proceedings in death penalty cases;
(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have tried to judgment or verdict three
civil jury or felony cases within the past four years or ten cases total; and
(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five
years in the active practice of law.
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow the guidelines set forth in this rule shall
not of itself be grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively represented the
defendant at trial or on appeal.
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title
77.

(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel shall be paid pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 78B-9-202(2)(a).
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 606
Article VI. Witnesses
RULE 606. COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS
(a) At the trial. A member of the jury may not testify as a witness before that jury in the trial of
the case in which the juror is sitting. If the juror is called so to testify, the opposing party shall be
afforded an opportunity to object out of the presence of the jury.
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or
indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the
jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the
juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a juror's
affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the juror
would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]

Addendum B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

VON LESTER TAYLOR,
RULING and ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 070500645

vs.
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

DATE: August 17, 2009

The above matter came before the court on July 14, 2009 for
oral argument on respondent's motion to dismiss.

Petitioner was present through Brian M. Pomerantz and Megan
B, Moriarty and respondent was present through Thomas B, Brunker
and Erin Riley,

Counsel for petitioner waived the appearance of

petitioner.

In this capital homicide case petitioner filed a successive
petition (petitioner calls it a complete petition) for relief
under the Utah Post Conviction Remedies Act and URCP, Rule 65C,
on November 5, 2007.

To explain the delays involved in this case, the court notes
that petition contained 426 pages of argument. It contained just
over 5 volumes of attachments, perhaps 1000 pages of material.
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The parties have often either informally or by motion and order
obtained extensions of filing deadlines under the rules given the
complexity, length and importance of the issues.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, consisting of 89
pages, on February 15, 2008. Petitioner filed an opposition
response on May 13, 2008, and it was 129 pages in length.

On

June 13, 2008, respondent moved for permission to file a
supplemental memorandum in support if its motion to dismiss.
Petitioner opposed that on June 23, 2008,

Respondent filed a

reply on that request June 26, 2008, and the court on that same
date, June 26, 2008, allowed the supplemental memorandum by the
State.

On July 3, 2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the

State of Utah as the correct respondent rather than the warden
named in the petition.

On July 25, 2008, the State filed a

supplemental memo of rather standard length, 23 pages. Petitioner
filed an opposition on August 27, 2008.

On March 4, 2009,

respondent filed a 179 page reply. On March 13, 2009, respondent
filed a request to submit. Based thereon oral argument was
scheduled originally for April 22, 2009. Respondent filed on
March 17, 2009, a notice that permission to file a sur reply may
be filed. Respondent also moved to continue the oral argument due
to the press of other business and unavailability of counsel.
This date was then scheduled for oral argument.
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Oral argument was held and the court took the issues under
advisement. Before the hearing the court carefully considered the
memoranda and other materials submitted by the parties.

The

court has read all of the pleadings and all of the transcripts
that are part of this record, including the preliminary hearing
and penalty phase hearing, that are on file in the office of the
clerk of this court. The court has examined the exhibits which
are attached to the pleadings and has examined the trial exhibits
which still remain in the office of the clerk of this court in
Summit County.

Since taking the issues under advisement, the

court has further considered the law and facts relating to the
issues and the memoranda of the parties.

Now being fully

advised, the court renders the following Ruling and Order.
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I. Background
Gleaned from the record of court proceedings as found by the
court and jury at the time, almost nineteen years ago, on
December 14, 1990, Petitioner left the Orange Street Community
Correctional Center in Salt Lake City and failed to return.

On

December 21, 1990, Petitioner, along with an accomplice, Edward
Deli, broke into the family cabin of Rolf and Kaye Tiede in
Summit County while the Tiedes were in Salt Lake City shopping.
The following day, the Tiedes returned to the cabin.

Part of the

family parked at the gate to the Beaver Springs development and
Ms. Kaye Tiede, together with her mother, Beth Potts, a woman in
her mid-70s, and daughter Linae Tiede, age 20, drove two
snowmobiles to the cabin, which was located approximately two
miles from the gate which was on the Weber Canyon road.

Mr.

Rolfe Tiede and his 16 year-old daughter Ticia Tiede drove to a
repair shop to pick up additional snowmobiles which were being
repaired.
Linae was the first to arrive at the cabin and when she
opened the door at the top of the stairs Petitioner confronted
her with his gun drawn.
upstairs.

He ordered Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts

Ms. Potts needed assistance because she was partially

blind and needed help walking.

Once all three were upstairs,

Kaye Tiede offered Petitioner money and whatever else he wanted•
Petitioner shot Kaye Tiede near her left shoulder.

The bullet
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passed through her lungs and aorta, causing her death,

Ms. Potts

was then shot several times, including at least once in the chest
and in the head, either of which could have been the cause of her
death.

During the shooting, Linae began to pray, but Petitioner

told her that praying would not help because he worshiped the
devil.
Once the shooting ended, Petitioner determined that he,
Deli, and Linae would leave and that the cabin should be burned
in order to prevent the discovery of any fingerprints.

As they

were preparing to leave, Mr. Tiede and his daughter Ticia
arrived.

Petitioner grabbed Linae by the throat and held his gun

to her back.

Mr. Tiede and Ticia were both ordered into the

garage and Petitioner asked Mr. Tiede for money.

Mr. Tiede

complied and then Petitioner ordered Deli to shoot Mr. Tiede.
When Deli hesitated, Petitioner shot Mr. Tiede in the face.
Petitioner said nothing.

Prior to leaving the cabin with Linae

and Ticia, Petitioner returned to the garage, shot Mr. Tiede
again in the head while Mr. Tiede was lying face down on the
ground "pretending" to be dead, and poured gasoline over him.
Gasoline was scattered through the cabin and it was set on fire
before Petitioner and the others left.

When Petitioner, Deli,

Linae, and Ticia arrived at the gate to the Beaver Springs
development at the Weber Canyon Road, Petitioner ordered everyone
into the Tiede's car and they drove away.
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Mr. Tiede, who was not

killed by the attack, was ultimately able to arouse himself, and
take a snowmobile to the Weber Canyon Road where he found a
family member and they called police.

Following a high-speed

chase, Petitioner and Deli were apprehended and the two girls
were safely taken from Petitioner and Deli.
On December 24, 1990, Petitioner was charged with two counts
of capital homicide in the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Ms, Potts, in
addition to several other felony counts of attempted aggravated
murder, aggravated arson, aggravated kidnaping, aggravated
robbery, theft, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to
stop.
On May 1, 1991, Petitioner pleaded guilty to the two counts
of capital homicide and the State agreed to dismiss all of the
other charges.

On May 16, 17, 21, and 22, 1991, a sentencing

proceeding was convened for the purpose of receiving evidence
concerning the appropriate sentence that should be imposed upon
Petitioner by the jury.

Following their deliberations, on May

24, 1991, the jurors returned a unanimous sentencing decision in
favor of death for Petitioner on each count of capital homicide.
Petitioner then sought to withdraw his guilty plea, which
was denied by the trial court.
Through his trial counsel, Elliott Levine ("Levine"),
Petitioner appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on July 8, 1992.
However, after Petitioner's opening brief was filed, on July 20,
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1992, the State requested that the brief be stricken and that
Levine be removed from his representation of Petitioner.
Although Levine was ordered to withdraw and was replaced by J.
Bruce Savage ("Savage") in September 1993, the opening brief was
not stricken.

During the direct appeal, the Supreme Court

remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing
under Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 23B, on the claim
that trial counsel had been ineffective.

Evidence was presented

to the trial court at that hearing on May 15, 16, 18, 22, 23, and
24, 1995. The trial court concluded that Petitioner had not been
deprived of his right to effective representation under the Sixth
Amendment.
Savage then pursued the direct appeal by filing Petitioner's
brief on June 3, 1996. On October 24, 1997, the Utah Supreme
Court issued its opinion rejecting all of Petitioner's appellate
claims.

State

v. Taylor,

947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997)

(Taylor I),

The United States Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
certiorari on October 5, 1998.
On February 23, 1998, Richard P. Mauro ("Mauro") was
appointed as post-conviction counsel pursuant to the PCRA to
represent Petitioner in his post-conviction action. Approximately
one year later Petitioner filed his Petition for Relief Under the
Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act,

On May 30, 2002, Petitioner

filed his First Amended Petition for Relief Under the Utah Post-
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Conviction Remedies Act.

Respondent, Hank Galetka, who was the

warden/respondent at the time, filed a motion for summary
judgment on September 13, 2002.

Oral argument on the motion for

summary judgment was heard on April 18, 2003.

On March 1, 2004,

the post-conviction trial court, granted Respondent's motion for
summary judgment and denied post-conviction relief on all of
Petitioner's claims.

The signed order and judgment was entered

on September 22, 2004.
Petitioner timely appealed that decision and the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the .post-conviction court, the Honorable
Frank. G. Noel, on January 26, 2007.

12, 156 P.3d 739 (Taylor
denied on March 27, 2007.

II).

Taylor

v.

State,

2007 UT

The request for a rehearing was

The Office of the Federal Public

Defender for the District of Utah was appointed to represent
Petitioner in federal court on March 6, 2007.

On September 4,

2007, Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas
corpus and, on November 2, 2007, a first amended petition was
filed in federal court.

Although Petitioner's federal case was,

and is, still pending, on November 5, 2007, Petitioner filed this
successive petition for post-conviction relief.
To explain the delays involved in this case, the Court notes
that the successive petition contained 426 pages of argument and
over five volumes of attachments.

Moreover, the parties have,

either informally or by motion and order, obtained extensions of
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the filing deadlines given the complexity, length, and importance
of the issues raised.

On February 15, 2008, Respondent filed a

motion to dismiss, consisting of 89 pages.

Petitioner filed a

129 page response in opposition on May 13, 2008.

On June 13,

2008, Respondent requested permission to file a supplemental
memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss, which Petitioner
opposed on June 23, 2008.

Respondent filed a reply on that

request on June 26, 2008 and the Court, on that same date,
allowed the supplemental memorandum by Respondent.

On July 3,

2008, the parties stipulated to substitute the State of Utah as
the correct respondent rather than the warden of the Utah State
Prison.

On July 25, 2008, Respondent filed its supplemental

memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss and Petitioner
filed his response in opposition to the supplemental memorandum
on August 27, 2008.

On March 4, 2009, Respondent filed a 179

page reply to Petitioner's opposition to the motion to dismiss.
On March 13, 2009, Respondent filed a request to submit and,
based upon this request, oral argument was scheduled for April
22, 2009.

Petitioner moved to continue that date due to

conflicts with counsel's schedule. On March 17, 2009, Respondent
filed a request for permission to file a sur reply.

Oral

argument on the motion to dismiss was held on July 14, 2009 and
the Court took the issues raised under advisement.
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II. Summary of the Arguments
A,

Claims Raised in the Successive Petition
Petitioner raised thirty (30) separate grounds for relief in

his successive (complete) petition.

These include claims that

trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to properly
investigate the case, failed to conduct an adequate mitigation
investigation, failed to adequately counsel and advise Petitioner
in connection with his pleas of guilty to two counts of capital
homicide, failed to properly litigate and renew the motion for
change of venue, was laboring under an actual conflict of
interest, performed deficiently during the jury selection process
including failing to properly challenge jurors, failed to make
appropriate challenges for cause, failed to uncover potential
juror bias, and failed to submit voir dire questions, failed to
present an adequate mitigation case, and failed to challenge the
State's case in aggravation.

Petitioner has now abandoned one of

those thirty claims.
Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective
because he failed to properly argue the correct legal standard
for ineffective assistance of trial counsel and failed to raise
issues that could, and should, have been raised.
Petitioner asserts a claim that because the funding
available for his initial post-conviction petition and counsel
was inadequate, his prior post-conviction counsel was unable to
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provide effective representation.
Petitioner also raises claims asserting that the trial court
committed error including that the court improperly denied
Petitioner's motion for change of venue, improperly conducted
individual voir dire of prospective jurors in chambers, failed to
properly grant Petitioner's challenges for cause, asked
impermissible questions and ignored responses during jury
selection, improperly excluded prospective jurors who were not
members of the LDS Church, provided jurors with confusing and
erroneous jury instructions and a special verdict form, and
improperly admitted evidence.
In addition to the foregoing claims related to alleged trial
court error and ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and
post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also asserts that his
conviction and death sentences should be vacated because he did
not receive the competent assistance of mental health experts, he
is actually innocent of causing the deaths of Kaye Tiede and Beth
Potts, there is no factual basis for his guilty pleas, a
disproportionate number of the jurors who served were members of
the LDS Church, jurors were improperly influenced by LDS Church
practices and the relationship between Church leaders and the
victims' families, there was juror misconduct, there was
prosecutorial misconduct, the State failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence, the sentences of death are disproportionate
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to P e t i t i o n e r ' s c u l p a b i l i t y , the Utah death penalty scheme i s
unconstitutional because i t f a i l s to narrow the class

of

murderers e l i g i b l e for the death penalty, there i s an inadequate
appellate record, l e t h a l intravenous injection c o n s t i t u t e s cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, (that claim i s
now abandoned) and the cumulative impact of a l l the errors
committed in his case violated his c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s .

B.

State's Motion to Dismiss
The State responded t o P e t i t i o n e r ' s successive p e t i t i o n with

a motion to dismiss.
F i r s t , the State argues that most of P e t i t i o n e r ' s claims
were raised and adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, therefore,
under both the PCRA and the common law they are absolutely
procedurally barred.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(b) and (d)

(2007) .*
Second, a l l of P e t i t i o n e r ' s claims are ones that could have
been, but were not, raised in a prior proceeding*

Therefore,

under the PCRA, they are a l l procedurally barred.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 78-35a-106( c) and (d).
Third, the State i n i t i a l l y argued that a l l of P e t i t i o n e r ' s
claims were time-barred because they were not raised within one
1

In 1996, the PCRA was found i n T i t l e 78, Chapter 35a. In 2008, the PCRA
was r e - c o d i f i e d as T i t l e 78B, Chapter 9. All references in t h i s r u l i n g t o T i t l e
78, Chapter 35a are t o t h e v e r s i o n of the PCRA t h a t e x i s t e d at the time
P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s successive p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n in 2007.

-9OU 1

year of the petition's accrual date and he had not shown that any
of the claims satisfied the interests of justice exception; i.e.,
he had not established that he had a legitimate reason for not
raising the claim in a prior proceeding nor that any of his
claims were meritorious.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3).

According to the State, the time frame for "accrual" of the postconviction action under the PCRA, even under the 1996 version,
was the date on which the petition for a writ of certiorari was
denied, which was October 5, 1998,

Thus, Petitioner's successive

post-conviction petition is eight years late.
However, in a supplemental memorandum, the State argues that
the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, which removed the interests of
justice exception to the statute of limitations and replaced it
with an equitable tolling provisions, apply to Petitioner's
successive petition.

Thus, according to the State, the interests

of justice exception cannot be relied upon by Petitioner to
excuse an untimely claim.

Furthermore, because Petitioner has

not shown that the tolling provision applies to any of his
claims, all of his claims are time-barred under 2008 amendments
to the PCRA.
Finally, the State argues that Petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel must be
dismissed because it is not a proper claim under the PCRA.

At

the time Petitioner filed his successive petition, the PCRA

-10-

{j >J JL4-8

"establishe[d] a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-

102. Because a claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel is not a challenge to Petitioner's conviction or
sentence, it is not a claim for which relief can be granted under
the PCRA.

Moreover, in its supplemental memorandum addressing

the applicability of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA, the PCRA
now states that

xx

[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as

creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective."
202(4).

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-

In light of this new language, the State also argues

that the current version of the PCRA precludes Petitioner from
obtaining relief on his ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel claim.

C.

Petitioner's Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss
In response to the State's motion to dismiss, Petitioner

begins by asserting that he was falsely led to believe that he,
rather than his co-defendant Edward Deli, caused the deaths of
Kaye Tiede and Ms. Potts and therefore he is factually innocent
of the murders to which he pleaded guilty.

According to

Petitioner, his factual innocence necessarily "trumps the
procedural and timeliness bars relied on by the State."

-11-

(Pet'r

Mem. in Opp. at 15.)

The failure to discover this new evidence

concerning his factual innocence and to raise the claims in his
first petition was the result of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel, which in turn was the result of the
inadequate amount of funding that was made available to prior
post-conviction counsel.

Petitioner argues that his claims are

not time-barred because the mere passage of time can never
justify the continued imprisonment of one who has been denied
fundamental rights. Moreover, the interests of justice exception
under the PCRA has been satisfied.
In addition, he also argues that he has shown "good cause"
or Munusual circumstances" to overcome the procedural bar raised
by the State.

Specifically, he contends that as a result of the

lack of adequate funding and ineffective assistance of prior
post-conviction counsel his claims could not have been raised in
an earlier petition and new facts not previously known
demonstrate either the denial of a constitutional right, that the
outcome of his trial might have been different, or the existence
of fundamental unfairness in his conviction.

Because his claims

were overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay the postconviction process, Petitioner contends that good cause exists
that permits him to raise these claims in his successive
petition, despite the procedural bar,

-12-

D.

Supplemental Memoranda
Prior to filing a reply to Petitioner's oppo3ition, the

State filed a supplemental memorandum in which it argues that the
2008 amendments to the PCRA that removed the interests of justice
exception to the time-bar and ostensibly clarified that postconviction petitioners do not have a right to the effective
assistance of counsel, apply retroactively to Petitioner's
successive post-conviction petition.

Therefore, the State

asserts, Petitioner cannot rely upon the interests of justice
exception to excuse the untimely filing of any successive claim
and cannot assert as a ground for relief that his post-conviction
counsel provided ineffective representation.

In Petitioner's memorandum in opposition to the State's
supplemental memorandum, he argues that the Utah Supreme Court
has exclusive authority to define post-conviction remedies and
procedures.

Because the Supreme Court has already held that the

mere passage of time can never justify rejecting a meritorious
claim, removing the interests of justice exception from the PCRA
is necessarily ineffectual.

Moreover, Petitioner also argues

that the 2008 amendments cannot apply retroactively because (1)
the interests of justice exception constitutes a vested right
that cannot be removed retrospectively, and (2) he has a right
under the Utah Constitution to the effective assistance of post-

-13-

conviction counsel that the legislature cannot extinguish.

E.

State's Reply
In reply, the State repeats the arguments that were set

forth in its supplemental memorandum concerning the retroactive
application of the 2008 amendments to the PCRA.

In addition,

the State argues that even if the 2008 amendments do not apply,
claims alleging ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
are not cognizable under the PCRA, Petitioner has no state or
federal constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel, the statutory right to post-conviction
counsel does not give Petitioner the right to a claim of
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in a successive
petition, and in any event, Petitioner has failed to establish
that his post-conviction counsel was, in fact, ineffective.
Further, the State also contends that Petitioner's claims
are procedurally barred because they are claims that were either
raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in
a prior proceeding and Petitioner has failed to show that any
exception applies or that unusual circumstances exist.

Finally,

although Petitioner frequently asserts that, with appropriate
funding finally provided, his current counsel have discovered new
evidence in the case, Petitioner has not shown that any of the
recently discovered evidence satisfies the requirements of the

-14-
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"newly discovered evidence" standard set forth in the PCRA.

At

best he is essentially making a claim of ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel, a claim for which no relief may be
granted under the PCRA.

III. Discussion
A.

Legal Analysis
1.

The Interests of Justice Exception
a.

Introduction

Under the provisions of the PCRA as they existed when
Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction petition, a
petitioner was "not eligible for relief . , . upon any ground
that . . . [was] barred by the limitation period established in
Section 78-35a-107."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(1)(e)• As with

the current version of the PCRA, the statute of limitations
entitled a petitioner to "relief only if the petition [was] filed
within one year after the cause of action [had] accrued."
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (1).

Utah

Nevertheless, at the time Petitioner

filed his successive petition, the PCRA included an exception
that, if satisfied, would excuse an untimely filing.

Under this

exception, "if the court finds that the interests of justice
require, a court may excuse a petitioner's failure to file within
the time limitations."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (3).

In considering this exception, the Utah Supreme Court has
-15-
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specifically held that a trial court "presented with an untimely
post-conviction petition must consider the interests of justice
exception before disposing of the petition . . . [and] has no
discretion to grant relief on an untimely . . . petition if the
^interests of justice' do not so require,"
2006 UT 21,

116,

134 P. 3d 1133.

Johnson

v.

State,

On the other hand, if the trial

court makes specific findings in support of the interests of
justice exception, then the untimeliness of the successive
petition must be excused.

See id.

at 117.

"An analysis of what

constitutes an exception in the ^interests of justice' should
involve examination of both the meritoriousness of the
petitioner's claim and the reason for an untimely filing.''
v.

State,

2005 UT 62,

116,

123 P.3d

400.

Adams

However, it is not

necessarily required that both prongs of this test be satisfied.
As noted by the Supreme Court, depending upon the facts of the
particular case under consideration, some claims may require no
justification for an untimely filing—such as a claim of actual
innocence supported by DNA evidence—while u an entirely frivolous
claim would not meet the ^interests of justice' exception even
with the best possible excuse for the late filing."

Id.

In

other cases, a clear assessment of both prongs will be necessary
to determine whether the interests of justice exception is
satisfied.

x>

[W]e expect that the district court will give

appropriate weight to each of [these] factors according to the
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Id.

circumstances of a particular case."

b.

Retroactive Application of Statutory Amendments

During the 2008 legislative session the interests of justice
exception was removed from the PCRA and replaced with equitable
tolling provisions which toll the limitations period "for any
period during which the petitioner was prevented from filing a
petition due to state action in violation of the United States
Constitution, or due to physical or mental incapacity."
Code Ann. § 78B-9-107 (3).

Utah

This change went into effect on May 5,

2008 and therefore, no interests of justice exception currently
exists in the PCRA to excuse the failure of a petitioner to
timely file a petition for post-conviction relief.

"Ordinarily

the facts and the law in a given lawsuit are to be applied as of
the date of the filing of the original complaint."

Archer

Utah

It is

State

Land

Bd. , 392

P.2d

622,

624

( UT 1964).

v.

generally true that "legislation is not given retroactive
effect."

B.A.M.

120,

128 P.3d

Co.,

2004

Dev.,

1161.

UT 80,

139,

L.L.C.

v.

Salt

See also Goebel
104

P.3d

1185

Lake
v.

Salt

County,
Lake

2006
City

UT
S.

2,
R.R.

(MA statute is not to be

applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares that
it operates retroactively.")/ Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 ("No part
of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared."),
-17-

However, "[a]n exception to the general rule against
retroactivity applies to changes which are procedural only,"
Olsen

v.

Samuel Mclntyre

Inv.

Co.,

956 P.2d

257,

261

(Utah

1998).

Unlike substantive law, which "creates, defines[,] and regulates
the rights and duties of the parties which may give rise to a
cause of action," procedural law "prescribes the practice and
procedure or the legal machinery by which the substantive law is
Petty v. Clark,

determined or made effective."
593-594

(Utah 1948).

192 P.2d

589,

Thus, "statutes which operate in

furtherance of a remedy already existing and which neither create
new rights nor destroy existing rights . . . appl[y]
retrospectively to accrued or pending actions to further the
legislature's remedial purpose,"
704 P.2d 581,

582

(Utah

1985).

Marshall

v.

Industrial

Comm'n,

Furthermore, "statutory amendments

that merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be
given retroactive effect."
Utah State

Tax Comm'n,

953 P.2d

added) , See also Oakland
P.2d 208,

210-211

(Utah

Evans

& Sutherland

435,

Constr.

1974)

Computer

440 (Utah 1997)

Co. v. Industrial

Corp.

v.

(emphasis
Comm'n,

520

(general principle against

retroactive application "has no application where the later
statute or amendment deals only with clarification or
amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior
to its enactment." (emphasis added)).

That is, "an exception

exists for amendments clarifying statutes, which are applied
-18-
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retroactively, so long as they M o not enlarge, eliminate, or
destroy vested or contractual rights.'"

Keegan

P. 2d 618,

of Equalization

State

620 (Utah

1995)

Tax Comm'n ex rel.

1993)).

(quoting Board
Benchmark,

Inc.,

v. State,

864 P.2d

882,

896
v.

Utah

884

(Utah

Nevertheless, as the Utah Court of Appeals has expressly

held, "[w]hen the Legislature amends a statute, we presume it
intended to make a substantive, rather than procedural or
remedial change."

Wilde

v. Wilde,

2001 UT App 318,

113,

35 P. 3d

341.

c.

Whether the 2008 Amendments to the PCRA Apply
Retroactively

Nowhere in the 2008 amendments is there language declaring
that the removal of the interests of justice exception should
apply retroactively*

In addition, because the amendments also do

not expressly state that they are clarifying in nature, there is
a rebuttable presumption that the amendments are substantive and,
therefore, should not be applied retroactively.

See State

Amador,

("Every

804 P.2d

1233,

1234

(Utah Ct.

App.

1990)

v.

amendment not expressly characterized as a clarification carries
the rebuttable presumption that it is intended to change existing
legal rights and liabilities.").
Country

Mgmt.,

2004 UT 12,

concurring) (same).

136,

See also Thomas v. Color
84 P.3d

1201

(Durham, C,J.,

Even without the presumption, however, a
-19-
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persuasive argument exists that removing the interests of justice
exception from the PCRA constitutes a substantive change.
Whether an amendment affects substantive rights "should be
informed and guided by ^familiar considerations of fair notice,
reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.'"
Radixr

527 U.S.

Prods.,

511 U.S.

343,

357-58

244,

270

(1999)
(1994)).

(quoting
See also

Martin

Landgraf
Goebel,

v.

v.
USI

Film

2004 UT 80

at 139 ("Convenience, reasonableness, and justice are factors we
consider in deciding whether a statute has a merely remedial or
procedural purpose.").
When Petitioner filed his successive post-conviction
petition in November 2007 he had a reasonable expectation that if
the State raised the time-bar as a ground for dismissing the
claims, he would have the opportunity to argue that the interests
of justice exception applies and that his untimely filing should
be excused.

Having reasonably relied on the existence of the

interests of justice exception to excuse his untimeliness, to now
preclude him from asserting it would constitute an unfair
windfall for the State and would be unfair to some one in
Petitioner's position.

Moreover, in the same way that a

legislative amendment removing the defense of an expired statute
of limitations is a change that affects the vested rights of a
defendant, see Roark

v. Crajbtree, 893 P.2d

1058,

1062

(Utah

1995)

("Since 1900, this court has consistently maintained that the

-20-

boi

defense of an expired statute of limitations is a vested
right."), it follows by force of logic that a legislative
amendment removing a statutory exception to the defense of an
expired statute of limitations is also a change that affects the
vested rights of a plaintiff.

Thus, the 2008 amendments are

substantive in nature because they eliminate a vested right held
by Petitioner at the time he filed his successive post-conviction
petition.

See Smith

v.

Cook,

803 P. 2d 188,

192 (Utah 1990)

(a

statute is considered substantive if it "eliminate[s] or
destroy[s] vested rights,").
Notwithstanding language in Keegan

suggesting that

clarifying statutes cannot be applied retroactively if they
eliminate vested rights, Keegan, 896 P.2d
argues that Keegan

at

620,

the State

does not state the governing law.

The State

contends that the purpose of the 2008 amendments was to clarify
the unamended PCRA, and therefore the amendments should be
applied retroactively to Petitioner's case.

The court does not

find this argument to be persuasive.
First, despite the State's contention otherwise, more recent
cases appear to provide support for Keegan.

The case of Evans &

Sutherland,

specifically states

which was decided after Keegan,

that "under a long-standing exception to the general rule against
applying statutes retroactively, statutory amendments that merely
clarify an ambiguity in an original statute will be given

-21-

retroactive effect."

Use of the word "merely" certainly

suggests that amendments that do more than simply clarify should
not be applied retroactively.

Clearly, as the Keegan

case holds,

changes that enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual
rights do more than merely clarify and, therefore, are not
applied retroactively.
Wiley,

2001 UT 107,

Furthermore, the case of Kilpatrick

31 P. 3d 1130,

v.

which the State cites as an

example of a recent case that ostensibly treats the clarifying
exception as independent from the general rule against
retroactivity, also can be read as supporting Keegan.

After

stating that legislative amendments may be applied retroactively
when the purpose of the change is to clarify the meaning of an
earlier statute, the Supreme Court went on to state that
"[f]urther, in light of the fact that we have now reversed the
jury's verdict, the plaintiffs have no vested or contractual
right that would prohibit application of the amended statute."
Id,

at 159.

In other words, because the clarifying amendments do

not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights,
i.e. they are procedural, they may be retroactively applied to
the case.
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals has directly held that
clarifying amendments are procedural in nature.

See Wilde,

2001

UT App 318 at 114 (X\A procedural or remedial law ^provides a
different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive

-22-

Ut)l

rights,' or clarifies the meaning of an earlier enactment."
(quoting Pilcher
(Utah 1983)

v.

Department

of Soc.

(emphasis added)).

Servs.,

663 P.2d

450,

455

Based upon the foregoing

analysis, the principle enunciated in Keegan

that clarifying

amendments may be applied retroactively as long as they do not
enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights,
appears to be controlling law.
However, even if the principle set forth in Keegan is
incorrect, the State has nevertheless failed to persuasively
demonstrate that the 2008 amendments are clarifying in nature.
Relying on State v. Bishop,

753 P.2d

439

on other grounds as recognized by State
1283

(Utah 1994),

(Utah
v.

1988),

Baker,

overruled

884 P.2d

1280,

the State contends that legislative acts

amending a statute constitute "persuasive evidence of the
legislature's intent when it passed the former, unamended
statute," Id.
to clarify.

at

486,

i.e., that the amending statute was meant

Because, according to the State, the Utah Supreme

Court incorrectly interpreted the interests of justice exception
in the Adams case to allow a petitioner to escape the time-bar
any time the petitioner could explain the delay and show that the
claim was potentially meritorious, the fact alone that the
legislature amended the PCRA to remove the interest of justice
exception and replace it with an equitable tolling provision is
persuasive evidence that the legislature intended to clarify what
-23-

it meant when the interests of justice exception was originally
included in the PCRA.
However, while the State correctly quotes Bishop,

the

amending statute referred to in the case was specifically
Id.

entitled "Clarifying Child Kidnaping and Sexual Abuse Act."
(emphasis added),

It is at least arguable that the language

quoted by the State draws its meaning from this context, and
therefore that the persuasiveness referred to is tied to the
language of the amending statute itself stating that it is
clarifying the prior enactment.

Thus, simply because the

legislature amended the PCRA after the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the interests of justice exception in Adams,
this does not necessarily mean that the legislature intended the
2008 amendments to be clarifying in nature, particularly in light
of the fact that, unlike Bishop,

no legislative language was

included in the amendments suggesting that the amendments were
intended only to be clarifying.
In addition, citing to the case of Horton
Daughter,

785 P.2d

1087

(Utah

1989),

v.

Goldminer's

the State also argues that

because a "purpose of a statute of limitations is to cut off
untimely claims regardless of the claim's potential merit/"
(State's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. at 9) {emphasis added), the
Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the interests of justice
exception is illogical insofar as it defeats the purpose of
-24-
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having a limitations statute in the first place.

The Horton

case

states that "[i]n general, statutes of limitation are intended to
compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time
and to suppress stale and fraudulent claims so that claims are
Id.

advanced while evidence to rebut them is still fresh."
1091.

at

Nothing in this language suggests that statutes of

limitations are intended to cut off claims regardless of their
potential merit*
Horton

Indeed, following the above-quoted language,

case cites to Burnett v. New York Central

424 (1965)

R.R.,

380

U.S.

which held that

[s]tatutes of limitations are primarily designed to
assure fairness to defendants. Such statutes "promote
justice by preventing surprises through the revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.

The theory is that even if one has a just

claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice
to defend within the period of limitation and that the
right to be free of stale claims in time comes to
prevail over the right to prosecute them." . . • The
policy of repose, designed to protect defendants, is
frequently outweighed, howeverr where the interests of
justice require vindication of the plaintiffrs rights.
Id.

at 428 (quoting Order

of Railroad

Telegraphers

v.

Railway

-25-
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Express Agency, Inc.,
added)).

321 U.S.

342,

348-49

(1944)

(emphasis

This language suggests that it is not true that a

limitations statute cuts off untimely claims "regardless of the
claim's potential merit."

While the State argues that the Utah

Supreme Court "made the interests of justice exception so broad,
that it defeated the purpose of the statute of limitations,"
(State's Supplemental Mem, in Supp. at 9), and therefore, that
the 2008 amendments removing the interests of justice exception
should be viewed as clarifying in nature, this argument is not
particularly persuasive given the fact that the "rule" relied
upon by the State may not stand for the precise proposition the
State suggests it does.

The State's arguments simply do not show

that the 2008 amendments merely clarify the prior unamended PCRA.
Furthermore, as Petitioner points out, prior to the Adams
case being decided, the Utah Supreme Court held in Julian
State,

966 P.2d 249

(Utah 1998)

v.

that the "proper consideration of

meritorious claims raised in a habeas corpus petition will always
be in the interests of justice.

It necessarily follows that no

statute of limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a
habeas petition."

Id.

at 254.

Based upon this language, the

legislature should have been on notice of the broadness of the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the interests of justice
exception.

Yet, if the 2008 amendments were genuinely intended

to clarify the legislature's original intent with respect to the

-26-

interests of justice exception, the State has failed to
adequately explain why the legislature waited nearly ten years to
ultimately remove the interests of justice exception from the
PCRA.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, it is the court's
conclusion that the 2008 amendments removing the interests of
justice exception from the PCRA are not necessarily clarifying in
nature.

Moreover, even if their purpose is to clarify, the

amendments do more than clarify insofar as they eliminate a
vested right held by Petitioner at the time he filed his
successive post-conviction petition, namely his right to raise
the interests of justice exception as a reason to excuse the
untimely filing of his successive petition.

The 2008 amendments

are substantive in nature and, consistent with the general rule
against retroactive application of substantive changes, they
cannot be applied retroactively.

Petitioner is entitled,

therefore, to assert the interests of justice exception to excuse
the untimeliness of his successive post-conviction petition.

2.

Procedural Bar Rule
a.

Introduction

The PCRA "establishes a substantive legal remedy for any
person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal
offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies."

Utah

-27-
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Code Ann. § 78-35a~102(1).

While the "PCRA affords a convicted

defendant the opportunity to have his conviction and sentence
vacated or modified under certain circumstances," Lafferty
State,

2007 UT 73, $44,

175 P.3d

530,

v.

because a petition for

post-conviction relief "is a collateral attack on a conviction or
sentence [and] . . . not a substitute for appellate review,"

Taylor

II,

2007 UT 12 at $14, a petitioner "is not eligible for

relief on claims that were ^raised or addressed7 on direct
appeal."

Kell

v.

State,

2008 UT 62,

113,

Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106{l)(b) (2002)).
2007 UT 73 at

194 P.3d

913 (citing

See also

Lafferty,

$44 ("Claims that were brought on direct appeal are

ineligible for consideration in post-conviction actions.").

Such

issues are dismissed as an abuse of the post-conviction process
without a ruling on the merits.

No exceptions exist for this

procedural bar under the PCRA, including assertions that
appellate counsel less than adequately raised or argued the

issues on appeal. See Kell,

2008 UT 62 at $17 (after opportunity

to be heard on appeal, "[w]e presume that this court gave full
consideration to the claims, regardless of whether [petitioner's]
counsel raised them in the most effective manner.").

In addition to permitting the dismissal of successive postconviction claims previously raised and addressed at trial or on
direct appeal, the PCRA also precludes a petitioner from
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obtaining "relief . . . upon any ground that was raised or
addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for
post-conviction relief.'' Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1) (d) . The
same is true under the common law.
P.2d

608,

613 (Utah

1994)

(Gardner

See Gardner
I)

v. Holden,

888

("Issues that could and

should have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, may not
properly be raised in a habeas corpus proceeding absent unusual
circumstances.").

Unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to

initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann, § 78-35a106(1)( c ) , which includes a statutory exception based upon
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2), no exception based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly included in
the PCRA that would apply to claims raised in a successive
petition for post-conviction relief that could have been, but
were not, raised in a prior proceeding.

Thus, any successive

claim that was raised or that could have been raised, but was
not, in a prior post-conviction petition is procedurally barred
and no exception exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure.
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b.

Common Law E x c e p t i o n s t o t h e Procedural Bar Rule 2

Notwithstanding the language of t h e PCRA, under t h e common
law as s e t f o r t h by t h e Utah Supreme Court, the m e r i t s of a claim
t h a t was p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e d and addressed in a p r i o r proceeding
may be considered by the t r i a l court i f the p e t i t i o n e r i s able t o
demonstrate "unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s . "
1029, 1036 (Utah 1989)

See Hurst v. Cook, 111 P. 2d

(a "ground for r e l i e f from a conviction or

sentence t h a t has once been f u l l y and f a i r l y adjudicated on
appeal or in a p r i o r habeas proceeding should not be
readjudicated u n l e s s i t can be shown t h a t t h e r e are ^unusual
circumstances.'").

See a l s o Allen

v. Friel,

2008 UT 56, $12, 194

P. 3d 903 ("When t h e ground for p r e c l u s i o n i s t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r
already addressed . . . the i s s u e , the p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim w i l l
not be allowed in a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f proceeding absent
unusual c i r c u m s t a n c e s . " } ; Lairjby v. Barnes,
(Utah 1990) (same).

793 P.2d 311, 318

"For example, a p r i o r a d j u d i c a t i o n i s not a

bar t o reexamination of a conviction i f t h e r e has been a
r e t r o a c t i v e change i n the law, a subsequent discovery of
suppressed evidence, or newly discovered e v i d e n c e . "
2

Hurst,

111

When P e t i t i o n e r f i l e d h i s successive p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f ,
the PCRA " e s t a b l i s h e [ d ] a s u b s t a n t i v e l e g a l remedy for any person who
challenge[d] a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who ha[d]
exhausted a l l other l e g a l remedies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(1), However,
in 2008, the phrase "a s u b s t a n t i v e l e g a l remedy" was removed and replaced with
"the sole remedy."
Nevertheless, although t h e "amendment appears to have
extinguished [the] common law writ a u t h o r i t y for future c a s e s [ , bjecause
[ P e t i t i o n e r ] sought p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f p r i o r t o the implementation of the
2008 amendment, r e l i e f through [the] common law writ a u t h o r i t y i s s t i l l a v a i l a b l e
t o him."

Peterson

v.

Kennard,

2008 UT 90,

-30-

116,

201 P.3d

956.

P.2d at

1036.

With respect to claims not previously raised, the Utah
Supreme Court has "consistently recognized exceptions to [the
procedural bar] rule in ^unusual circumstances' where ^good
cause' excuses a petitioner's failure to raise the claim
earlier."

Tillman

(citing Hurst,

v. State,

177 P.2d

at

2005 UT 56r
1036).

120,

128 P.3d

1123

See also Utah R. Civ. P.

65C( c) ("Additional claims relating to the legality of the
conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent [postconviction] proceedings except for good cause shown.").
According to the Supreme Court, it has
long been our law[] that a procedural default is not
always determinative of a collateral attack on a
conviction where it is alleged that the trial was not
conducted within the bounds of basic fairness or in
harmony with constitutional standards.

Therefore, even

where a claim of error could have been raised earlier,
post-conviction relief may be available in those "rare
cases" or "unusual circumstances" where "an obvious
injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right has occurred" that would make it
"unconscionable" not to reexamine the issue.
Gardner

v. Galetka,

See also Medel

v.

2007 UT 3,
State,

117,

2008 UT 32,

-31-

151 P.3d
120,

968

184 P.3d

(Gardner
1226

III).

P[P]rocedural defaults (such as the ban on successive petitions)
should not be determinative in those rare and unusual cases . . .
[where it would be] unconscionable not to reexamine the issue
[raised].").
The Supreme Court has identified five "good cause" common
law exceptions3 to the procedural bar rule, three of which have
been codified either by statute or procedural rule.

These common

law exceptions are:
(1) the denial of a constitutional right pursuant to
new law that is, or might be, retroactive, (2) new
facts not previously known which would show the denial
of a constitutional right or might change the outcome
of the trial, (3) the existence of fundamental
unfairness in a conviction, (4) the illegality of a
sentence, [and] (5) a claim overlooked in good faith
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ.
Hurst,

777 P.2d at 1037.

At the time Petitioner filed his

successive petition, exception (1) was implicitly included in the
PCRA via Section 78~35a-106(d), exception (2) was expressly
provided for in Section 78-35a~104(1)(e), and exception (4) was
covered by Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Importantly, because the common law exceptions ^retain their
The Utah Supreme Court has also made clear that the list of common law
exceptions set forth in Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989) is not an
exhaustive list. See Gardner v. Galetka,
2001 UT 3, $18, 151 P. 3d 968 ("We later
clarified that this list of ^good cause' exceptions is not exhaustive."),
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independent constitutional significance/' Gardner
2004 UT 42,

115,

94 P. 3d 263

(Gardner

II),

v.

Galetka,

they can be asserted

by petitioners raising successive post-conviction claims
regardless of whether the exception has been included in the
PCRA.
However, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that because
frivolous claims and claims previously withheld for tactical
reasons must be summarily denied, see Hurst,

111 P.2d

at

1031,

post conviction petitioners must first demonstrate that a claim
is neither frivolous nor was it withheld for tactical reasons
before the post-conviction court is required to consider whether
any common law exceptions apply that would excuse a petitioner's
failure to raise the successive claim in a prior proceeding.
Gardner

III,

2001 UT 3 at

See

126 (because "[f]rivolous claims, . . .

and claims that are withheld for tactical reasons should be
summarily denied[,] . , . a separate and distinct procedural
determination for successive post-conviction claims [must be]
made before [the trial court] reach[es] an analysis under the
^good cause' common law exceptions.").

In other words, the trial

court is required to summarily dismiss all successive postconviction claims that are frivolous or that were withheld for
tactical reasons before considering the applicability of the
common law exceptions.
A claim is frivolous if it is facially implausible.

See

id.
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at 121.

Thus, a petitioner raising a successive post-conviction

claim must first demonstrate that the claim is not facially
implausible before requesting that the trial court consider the
common law exceptions.

As for claims withheld for tactical

reasons, in nearly all cases, if the substance of a successive
claim was not raised in a prior post-conviction petition, it must
be presumed that the reason for not raising it was tactical or
See Yarborough

strategic in nature.
(2003)

v. Gentry,

540 U.S.

1, 5

("When counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of

others, there is a strong presumption that he did so for tactical
reasons rather than through sheer neglect."); Strickland
Washington,

466 U.S.

668r

689 (1984)

v.

(n[T]he defendant must

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action ^might be considered sound trial strategy.f"
(quoting Michel

v.

Louisiana,

350 U.S.

91, 101

(1955)).

Thus, with respect to any successive claim, in order for the
trial court to even consider the common law exceptions, the
petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that no tactical
reasons existed for counsel not to have raised the claim which is
now raised in the successive proceeding.

That is, the petitioner

must demonstrate that "there was no ^conceivable tactical basis
for counsel's actions.'"
162 (quoting State
1998)).

See also

State

v. Bryant,
State

v. Clark,

2004 UT 25, 16, 89 P. 3d

965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App.

v, Crosby,

927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)

-341

*

•/ f

("[W]e give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical
decisions and will not question such decisions unless there is no
reasonable basis supporting them."); State
P.2d

914,

915

(Utah 1962)

v.

Farnsworth,

368

(defendant charged with burglary did

not have incompetent counsel where the "record indicate[d] no
action or inaction by the trial attorney which could not
rationally find explanation in a legitimate exercise of
strategy.").

c.

Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar
Rule Based Upon a State Constitutional Right to
the Effective Assistance of Post-Conviction
Counsel

In addition to raising an independent claim of ineffective
assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, Petitioner also
argues that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
constitutes a common law exception to the procedural bar rule
and, therefore, many of his other claims are not procedurally
barred because the failure to raise these claims in his prior
post-conviction petition was the result of ineffective
representation.

In his memorandum opposing the State's

supplemental motion to dismiss, he provides support for this
argument by arguing that he has both a state constitutional right
and a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-35-

conviction counsel*
There is no question that Petitioner had a state
constitutional right to the effective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel during his criminal proceedings.

See Utah

Const, art. I, § 12 ("In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to . . . defend . . . by counsel.")•

The Utah

Supreme Court has expressly held that a "defendant in a criminal
proceeding has a constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel at all critical stages of the prosecution."
Hamilton,

132 P.2d

505,

506-507

art. I, § 12). See also State
(Utah 1971)

(Utah 1986)
v. Eichler,

State

v.

(citing Utah Const,
483 P.2d

887,

889

("It is in accordance with the assurance of the Utah

State Constitution that an accused be provided with the
assistance of counsel at every important stage of the proceedings
against him.").

This includes not only the criminal trial, but

the appeal as well.

See Utah Const, art. I, § 12 ("In all

criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to
have a speedy public trial . . . and the right to appeal.").
also State

v.

Tuttle,

713 P.2d

703,

704 (Utah 1985)

See

("The Utah

Constitution provides that a defendant in a criminal prosecution
shall have a ^right to appeal in all cases.'

This shows that the

drafters of our constitution considered the right of appeal
essential to a fair criminal proceeding." (quoting Utah Const,
art. I, § 12). Furthermore, as noted above, because the "right
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to counsel includes effective assistance of counsel/" State

v.

Burns, 2000 UT 56, 123, 4 P. 3d 795, i t follows that Petitioner
had a s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right to the effective assistance of
counsel both at t r i a l and on appeal.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Utah Constitution guarantees
a criminal defendant the right to effective representation at
t r i a l and on appeal does not, in and of i t s e l f , warrant the
conclusion that a s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right -to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel e x i s t s .

The Utah Supreme

Court has never held that post-conviction p e t i t i o n e r s in a death
penalty case4 have a s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l right to post-conviction
counsel.

In Menzies v. Galetka,

2006 UT 81, 150 P.3d 480, the

Supreme Court expressly avoided the issue when i t declared t h a t ,
[wjhile we have not yet considered whether such a r i g h t
exists under the Utah Constitution, there i s no need to
do so in t h i s case . . . .

We do not foreclose the

p o s s i b i l i t y that an indigent death row inmate may have
a right to the effective assistance of counsel under
the Utah Constitution, but t h a t question must wait for

4

I n t h e c a s e of Hutchlngs

v.

State,

2003

UT 52,

84 P.3d

1150,

t h e Utah

Supreme Court considered a d e c i s i o n by t h e Utah Court of Appeals affirming the
t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l of a s u c c e s s i v e , n o n - c a p i t a l p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
r e l i e f . One of t h e claims r a i s e d by the p e t i t i o n e r was t h a t he was "wrongfully
denied counsel for purposes of . , . h i s f i r s t p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
r e l i e f . I d . a t 119. The Supreme Court held t h a t while the p e t i t i o n e r "may have
b e n e f i t t e d from p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s i s t a n c e i n the d r a f t i n g and p r e s e n t a t i o n of h i s
[ f i r s t ] p e t i t i o n , t h e r e i s no s t a t u t o r y or c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o counsel in a
c i v i l p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f . ' ' I d . a t 520 {emphasis added).
-37-

another day.
Id.

at 184.

Because the Supreme Court has never expressly

recognized a constitutional right to effective post-conviction
counsel, Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that a
proper interpretation of the Utah Constitution yields such a
right.
Although the Supreme Court has held that the "scope of
Utah's constitutional protections 'may be broader or narrower
than' those offered by the [federal constitution], ^depending on
[our] state constitution's language, history, and
interpretation,'" American

Bush v. City

of South

Salt

Lake,

UT 40, %9, 140 P. 3d 1235

fquoting West v. Thomson Newspapers,

P.2d

1994)),

999,

1004 n.4

(Utah

2006
812

based upon a careful

consideration of Petitioner's arguments, it is the Court's
conclusion that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the Utah
Constitution includes the right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel.
First, Petitioner argues that he has a state constitutional
right to post-conviction counsel under Article I, Section 12.
However, any reliance on Article I, Section 12!s guarantee of the
right to counsel is misplaced.

While it may be true that the

underlying facts associated with a post-conviction petition
concern a criminal conviction and sentence, post-conviction
proceedings themselves are civil in nature.

-38-

The Utah Supreme

Court has specifically held that "a petition for post-conviction
relief is a civil action, specifically governed by rule 65C of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure."

12,

110,

120,

61 P. 3d 978.

84 P.3d

1150

Wickham

See also Hutchings

v.

v.

Galetka,

State,

2002

UT

2003 UT 52,

("[T]here is no statutory or constitutional

right to counsel in a civil petition for post-conviction
relief.").
n

Moreover, the Utah Court of Appeals has held that, to

avoid any misconceptions . . ., it is reiterated that the Utah

Const. Art. I, § 12 declares the right to be defended by counsel
applies only in criminal prosecutions, not civil actions."

Walker

v.

Carlson,

(emphasis added).

740 P.2d

1372,

1373-14

(Utah Ct.

App.

1987)

Thus, because post-conviction proceedings are

civil in nature, Petitioner cannot justifiably rely upon Article
I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to argue that he had a
state constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel while prosecuting his first post-conviction
petition.
Second, although Petitioner claims that there has been a
steady movement toward the recognition of a state constitutional
right to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, his
argument relies primarily on language from cases emphasizing the
need for state-funded post-conviction counsel and he does not
cite to any language suggesting that a state constitutional right
to effective post-conviction counsel is or may be necessary.
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See, e.g., Julian,

966 P. 2d at 259 (Zimmerman, J, , concurring)

(because the "initial post-conviction proceeding is really part
of the criminal trial and review process[,] . . . the defendant
should be provided with paid counsel and one state-financed
Parsons

automatic post-conviction proceeding." (emphasis added));
v. Barnes,

811 P.2d

516,

530

(Utah 1994)

("We decline to address

and decide in this proceeding'whether under the Utah Constitution
appointed counsel in a first habeas proceeding has a right to be
compensated by the state." (emphasis added)); Gardner
608 at

I,

888 P.2d

622 ("[T]here may be extraordinary cases in which a

petitioner for habeas corpus might be entitled under the Utah
Constitution to state-compensated counsel, expert witnesses, or
investigators." (emphasis added)).
Third, Petitioner argues that while "the [Supreme] Court
stated that it has xnot yet considered whether [the right to
counsel] exists under the Utah Constitution,' the [Supreme]
[C]ourt indicated that such a right may exist, for example when
the lack of state funding
petitioners."
(citing Menzies,

%

imposes a crippling burden' on capital

(Pet'r Mem. in Opp. to Supplemental Mot. at 23)
2006 UT 81 at 1 84 and %20 n.3.)

plain reading of the Menzies

However, a

decision indicates that in footnote

3 the Supreme Court was referring to administrative rules
implementing the now-outdated funding requirements of the PCRA
and was simply commenting on the fact that the former statutory
-40-

funding scheme, with i t s absolute caps on the payment of
attorneys fees and l i t i g a t i o n costs, could impose a crippling
burden on capital p e t i t i o n e r s .

While i t may be argued that the

Supreme Court was suggesting that without sufficient funds, postconviction counsel may be unable to properly represent his
c l i e n t , i . e . provide effective representation, nowhere in the
decision, either impliedly or expressly, did the Supreme Court
link inadequate s t a t e funding with the existence of a s t a t e
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Thus, Petitioner has failed to show that there has been a "steady
movement" toward recognizing a s t a t e constitutional r i g h t to
effective post-conviction counsel or that such a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
right i s required where inadequate funding is provided.
Fourth, Petitioner argues that because the due process
clause in Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution has been
interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court to provide broader
protections than i t s federal counterpart, the Utah Constitution's
due process clause should be interpreted to guarantee the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. 5

This i s

Presumably, P e t i t i o n e r makes the argument t h a t the due process clause
under t h e s t a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n i s broader than i t s federal c o u n t e r p a r t because he
recognizes t h a t he had no f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o the e f f e c t i v e
a s s i s t a n c e of p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel during h i s i n i t i a l s t a t e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
proceeding. The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has e x p r e s s l y held t h a t , under the
federal c o n s t i t u t i o n , % v [t]here i s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o an a t t o r n e y in s t a t e
p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n proceedings.
Consequently,
a petitioner
cannot
claim
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel i n such p r o c e e d i n g s . " Coleman
v. Thompson,

501 U.S.

722,

752 (1991).

See a l s o Menzies

v. Galetka,

2006 UT 81,

184, 150 P. 3d 480 (nWe do, however, note t h a t the United S t a t e s Supreme Court has
previously declined t o recognize a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e
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consistent, he argues, with other jurisdictions that have
recognized a state constitutional right to effective postconviction counsel under the due process clause of their state
constitutions.

However, the case law from Alaska, Florida, and

Mississippi upon which Petitioner relies and the arguments he
makes are unpersuasive.
P. 3d 889 (Alaska

2003)

It is true that in Grinols

v. State,

14

the Alaska Supreme Court held that "the

right to counsel in a first application for post-conviction
relief is of a constitutional nature, required under the due
process clause of the Alaska Constitution," id.

at

894,

and, not

surprisingly, that this includes the right to effective
representation which may be challenged in a second petition for
post-conviction relief.

See id.

at 895.

However, whether the

Florida Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel under the Florida
Constitution is, at best, unclear.
opinion in Arbelaez

As noted in the concurring

v. JButterworth, 138 So.

2d 326

(Fla.

1999),

the Florida Supreme Court has "sent out an ambiguous, if not
implicitly contradictory signal, when [it] declined to recognize
a specific constitutional obligation of the State for provision
of post-conviction counsel in capital cases, while at the same
time recognizing a limited constitutional due process right to
counsel in all post-conviction proceedings."

Id.

at

329

assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.").
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(Anstead, J,, concurring).
The same is true of the Mississippi case, Jackson
732 So.2d

187 (Miss.

1999),

cited by Petitioner.

v.

State,

Although the

concurring opinion in that case stated that the majority erred in
suggesting that a right to post-conviction counsel is found in
the Mississippi Constitution, see id.

at 191-92,

the majority

opinion itself makes no such express conclusion.

Rather, in the

context of encouraging the Mississippi legislature to establish a
statewide public defender system, the Mississippi Supreme Court
stated, "[w]e therefore find that [the petitioner], as a death
row inmate, is entitled to appointed and compensated counsel to
represent him in his state post-conviction efforts."

Id.

at

191.

No mention was made whether this entitlement was constitutional
or statutory in nature.
Moreover, it is at least noteworthy that the supreme courts
of other states have specifically held that their state
constitutions do not include a right to post-conviction counsel.
See In re Beasley,

107 S.W.3d

696,

697 (Tex.

App.

2003)

("Similarly, the Texas Constitution provides no right to counsel
in a post-conviction collateral attack."); McKague v.
Nevada State

Prison,

912 P.2d 255,

258 (Nev.

1996)

Warden,

("The Nevada

Constitution also does not guarantee a right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. . . . " } ; State v. Crowder,
652,

653-654

(Ohio

1991)

573

N.E.2d

("We agree with the court of appeals
-43-
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that an indigent petitioner has neither a state nor a federal
constitutional right to be represented by an attorney in a postconviction proceeding.").
Finally, in its reply to Petitioner's memorandum in
opposition to the motion to dismiss, the State raises a
noteworthy policy argument against the position that the Utah
Constitution should be interpreted to guarantee a right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. According to the
State, if the Utah Constitution guarantees a right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, it will allow
petitioners "to file endless successive petitions re-litigating
claims that they previously lost and raising new claims that they
should have raised in a prior proceeding, and arguing that the
court must reach their merits because any one of a seemingly
endless string of post-conviction counsel had been ineffective."
(State's Mem. in Reply at 31.)

Under this "infinite continuum of

litigation" argument, a state constitutional right to postconviction counsel would result in "an infinite continuum of
litigation in many criminal cases."
425,

429 (9th

Cir.

1993).

Bonin

As the Bonin

v.

Vasquez,

999

F.2d

court noted, if a

petitioner
has a [constitutional] right to competent counsel in
his or her first state post-conviction proceeding
because that is the first forum in which the

-44UsJ1 w 0,

ineffectiveness of trial counsel can be alleged, it
follows that the petitioner has a [constitutional]
right to counsel in the second state post-conviction
proceeding, for that is the first forum in which he or
she can raise a challenge based on counsel's
performance in the first state post-conviction
proceeding. . . . And so it would go.
Id.

at 429-30.

The same conclusion was reached by the Arizona

Supreme Court when it considered this same issue.
Mata,

916 P.2d

1035

(Ariz.

1996),

In State

the Arizona Supreme Court held

that
if defendant deserved effective representation on his
first [post-conviction petition] to litigate effectiveness on appeal, then it must follow that he be
effectively represented on the second in order to
litigate the first. This is because defendant's
argument is based on the ill-begotten notion that the
right to effective counsel on appeal is empty without
effective counsel to challenge appellate counsel's
performance.

v.

According to defendant's own logic, the

right to effective assistance on the first [postconviction petition] would also be meaningless without
another proceeding in which defendant could argue that
counsel on that petition was inadequate.
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We reject

this infinitely regressive notion.

Id. at

1052-53.

In light of the foregoing policy argument, if the Utah
Constitution is interpreted to include a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel, then any capital
petitioner would be in a position to effectively delay and even
halt the full effects of his sentence.

In order to avoid this

arguably unjust and one-sided result, the Utah Constitution
should not be interpreted to include a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Support for this

conclusion is found in Menzies

There the State argued

itself.

that a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel ^would make capital post-conviction
litigation interminable and end the finality of death sentences."
Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at 184.

The Utah Supreme Court side-stepped

making a direct ruling on this argument by stating that "A[a]s
important as finality is, it does not have a higher value than
constitutional guarantees of liberty."'
P.2d at 1035).

Id.

{quoting Hurst,

111

Nevertheless, in the context of the State's

infinite continuum of litigation argument, the Supreme Court
specifically noted that the PCRA prevents this from occurring
because "Utah's post-conviction legislation and associated rules
contain appropriate limitations to assist courts in streamlining
post-conviction review in death penalty cases."

Id.

Since a

-46-
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constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel would not be subject to the statutory and rule
constraints the Supreme Court has held exists to prevent the
possibility of endless post-conviction litigation, the Supreme
Court's statement is at least an implied rejection of the notion
that the Utah Constitution includes a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.
Based upon a careful assessment of the arguments provided by
Petitioner in support of his contention that capital petitioners
enjoy a state constitutional right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel, it is the Court's conclusion that
Petitioner has not sufficiently demonstrated that a proper
interpretation of the Utah Constitution includes a right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Therefore,

Petitioner cannot assert an exception, common law or otherwise,
to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because he
has failed to demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the
Utah Constitution guarantees him such a right.

-47-
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d.

Whether an Exception Exists to the Procedural Bar
Rule Based Upon a Statutory Right to the Effective
Assistance of Post-Conviction Counsel

Although Petitioner has not shown that he had a state
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel during his
initial post-conviction proceedings, nor that a common law
exception to the procedural bar rule exists based upon
constitutional and common law considerations, under the PCRA he
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel.

During the

pendency of his initial petition for post-conviction relief, the
PCRA required the trial court to determine whether the petitioner
was indigent and, if so, "promptly appoint counsel who is
qualified to represent [petitioners] in death penalty cases as
required by Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(1)(2)(a).

In the Menzies

case, the

Utah Supreme Court considered whether the statutory right to
post-conviction counsel entitled capital petitioners to the
effective assistance of counsel.

The Supreme Court noted that

"[g]iven the high stakes inherent in such [capital postconviction] proceedings—life and liberty—providing a petitioner
the procedural safeguard of appointed counsel is an important
step in assuring that the underlying criminal conviction was
accurate."

Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at

182.

In order to take

seriously this legislatively created protection, the Supreme
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Court concluded that the statutory right to post-conviction
counsel necessarily includes "a statutory right to effective
assistance of counsel."

Id.

When the State filed its memorandum in support of the motion
to dismiss on February 15, 2008, the State did not contest that
Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel.

However, new amendments to the PCRA

that went into effect on May 5, 2008 added language specifically
stating that "[njothing in this chapter shall be construed as
creating the right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel, and relief may not be granted on any claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective."
202(4).

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-

In light of this change, in both a supplemental pleading

filed on July 25, 2008 and its memorandum in reply filed on
February 26, 2009, the State argues that the "no effective
assistance of counsel" provision in the PCRA retroactively
applies to Petitioner's case and, as a result, while he may have
had a statutory right to post-conviction counsel, he did not have
a statutory right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel.

Therefore, the State argues, Petitioner cannot overcome

the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were raised and
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior
post-conviction petition by relying on a statutory right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because the PCRA
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now expressly denies Petitioner this statutory right.
The State provides three reasons in support of its
contention that the new "no effective assistance of counsel"
amendment applies retroactively: First, the new amendment is
merely procedural in nature because it neither narrows nor
eliminates Petitioner's cause of action and only affects how
Petitioner will proceed with his litigation.

Second, the new

amendment merely clarifies the Legislature's original intent with
respect to the right to effective representation in postconviction proceedings that may have been put into question by
the Utah Supreme Court's erroneous conclusion in Menzies

that the

prior Section 202 of the PCRA included the right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Third, the Legislature

intended that the new amendment apply to Petitioner's case.
During the 2008 legislative session, Petitioner's case was
pending and counsel for the State testified before the Senate
Judiciary, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice Committee and
enumerated the problems the new amendment was intended to remedy
and that the amendments were needed immediately.

Petitioner argues in response that the Menzies

decision

effectively vested him with a statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel and that this Court does
not have the authority to overrule the Utah Supreme Court.
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In

addition, he also contends that his right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel is substantive in nature
and that the amendment does more than simply clarify the PCRA, it
eliminates this substantive right.

Therefore, according to

Petitioner, the "no effective assistance of counsel" amendment
should not be applied retroactively.

After carefully considering the arguments, it is the Court's
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel"
amendment to the PCRA does not retroactively apply to
Petitioner's case and, therefore, that Petitioner was entitled to
the effective representation of post-conviction counsel during
his initial post-conviction proceeding.
First, the Court finds unpersuasive the State's argument
that the Legislature intended the new amendment to apply
retroactively.

Nowhere in the 2008 amendments to the PCRA is

there language that either impliedly or expressly declares that
the new legislation should apply retroactively.

Moreover, the

fact that counsel for the State argued before a Senate committee
that "[w]e need these amendments now for the reasons that I've,
I've already said," (State's Supplemental Mem. in Supp. at 18,)
does little, in the Court's view, to suggest that the Legislature
itself intended the 2008 amendments to apply retroactively.
Second, because Petitioner was appointed counsel under the
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PCRA and the Utah Supreme Court has held that capital postconviction petitioners are statutorily entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel under the PCRA, the mandate rule requires
this Court to abide by the Supreme Court's ruling.

Under the

mandate rule,
pronouncements of an appellate court on legal issues in
a case become the law of the case and must be followed
in subsequent proceedings of that case.

The lower

court must not depart from the mandate, and any change
with respect to the legal issues governed by the
mandate must be made by the appellate court that
established it or by a court to which it, in turn, owes
obedience.
Thurston
1995)•

v. Box Elder

County,

892 P. 2d 1034,

1037-1038

(Utah

The fact that the Supreme Court held in a separate case

that capital petitioners have a statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel does not alter the
application of the rule.
Menzies,

In light of the Supreme Court ruling in

this Court must afford Petitioner the right to the

effective assistance of post-conviction counsel.
Third, while it is true that "statutory amendments that
merely clarify an ambiguity in an original statute [must] be
given retroactive effect/' Evans

& Sutherland,

953 P.2d at

440,

they can only be "applied retroactively[] so long as they M o not
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enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested or contractual rights.'"

Keegan,
at

884) .

896 P.2d

at

620 (quoting Board

of Equalization,

864

P.2d

While not dispositive, the timing of the "no effective

assistance of counsel" amendment certainly suggests that- it was
intended not as a clarification of the prior PCRA, but as a
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Menzies.

In

addition, the amendment nowhere includes language indicating that
it was enacted for purposes of clarification.

Moreover, as noted

above, Petitioner had a vested right to the effective assistance
of post-conviction counsel during his initial post-conviction
proceedings which the amendment would eliminate if applied
retroactively.
Finally, the right to the effective assistance of counsel is
a substantive right.

In the Menzies

decision, the Supreme Court

set aside the trial court's judgment against the petitioner
because the deficient performance of his attorney "effectively
forfeited the entire post-conviction proceeding itself."

Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at

1100.

Clearly, post-conviction counsel's

failure in that case to provide effective representation
literally undermined every substantive right the petitioner was
entitled to during the course of the proceedings.

The fact that

the failure to provide effective representation affected the
petitioner's substantive rights is a good indication that the
right to the effective assistance of counsel is itself a
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substantive right.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is the Court's
conclusion that the "no effective assistance of counsel"
provision cannot retroactively apply to Petitioner's case and,
therefore, that Petitioner had a statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel during his initial postconviction proceedings.
Despite this conclusion, however, it is not accurate that
Petitioner's statutory right requires the Court to read into the
PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not,
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

The statutory right to

the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a
legislatively created protection and, therefore, it is the
Legislature that has the power, and the prerogative, to determine
whether this statutory right constitutes an exception to the
procedural bar rule with respect to successive post-conviction
claims that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but
were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding.
language from the Menzies

Indeed,

decision itself does not demonstrate

otherwise and, in fact, supports this general principle.
previously explained, on appeal in Menzies

As

the State presented

the Supreme Court with the "infinite continuum of litigation"
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argument contending "that ^writing an effective assistance
requirement into section [7 8-35a-202] would make c a p i t a l postconviction l i t i g a t i o n interminable and end the f i n a l i t y of death
sentences.'''

Id. at 184.

In response to t h i s argument, the

Supreme Court stated t h a t , while "[w]e would be remiss in our
constitutional role if we were to allow f i n a l i t y to trump the
i n t e r e s t s at stake in post-conviction death penalty
proceedings[, ] . . . Utah's post-conviction l e g i s l a t i o n and
associated rules contain appropriate limitations to a s s i s t courts
in streamlining post-conviction review in death penalty cases ."
Id.

For support, the Supreme Court cited to Section 78-35a-106,

where the Legislature excluded from the PCRA any reference to
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel as an exception
to the procedural bar for successive claims that were raised and
addressed, or could have been, but were not, raised in a prior
post-conviction p e t i t i o n . 6
Based upon the foregoing analysis, i t i s the Court's

6
In a d d i t i o n , in concluding t h a t the s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
counsel includes the r i g h t t o t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel, the Supreme
Court explained t h a t , by providing for t h i s r i g h t , i t b e l i e v e d the L e g i s l a t u r e
had e x p r e s s l y recognized the "high s t a k e s inherent in such p r o c e e d i n g s , " Menzies
v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, 182, 150 P. 3d 480.
In order t o take s e r i o u s l y the
L e g i s l a t u r e ' s p r o v i s i o n for t h e appointment of counsel, i t was e s s e n t i a l , in the
Supreme C o u r t ' s view, t o conclude t h a t the r i g h t t o p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel
included the r i g h t t o the e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. See i d . {"We refuse
merely to pay l i p s e r v i c e t o t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e l y c r e a t e d p r o t e c t i o n by holding
t h a t a p e t i t i o n e r in a p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n death p e n a l t y proceeding i s only e n t i t l e d
t o i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of appointed counsel. Therefore, we hold t h a t [the
p e t i t i o n e r ] has a s t a t u t o r y r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel under Utah
Code s e c t i o n 78-35a-202,").
There was never any i n d i c a t i o n i n the Supreme
C o u r t ' s reasoning t h a t t h i s conclusion was somehow c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y mandated.
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conclusion that because the right to post-conviction counsel is a
legislatively created protection, it is constitutionally
permissible, and within the Legislature's power, to exclude from
the PCRA an exception to the procedural bar for successive claims
that were raised and addressed, or could have been, but were not,
raised in a prior post-conviction petition based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel.

Therefore, Petitioner

cannot rely on a statutory right to the effective assistance of
post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural bar for
successive claims that were raised and addressed, or could have
been, but were not, raised in a prior post-conviction proceeding,

B,

Petitioner's Post-Conviction Claims
1.

Timeliness

The statute of limitations set forth in the PCRA required
Petitioner to file his successive petition for post-conviction
relief within one year from the time his cause of action accrued.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (1).

In Petitioner's case, his

post-conviction action accrued on October 5, 1998, the date on
which the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review of
his direct appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.

Thus, Petitioner

had until October 5, 1999 to file his current post-conviction
action.

Because his petition was not filed until November 5,

2007, it is over eight years too late, and therefore it is
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untimely.

With the exception of claim I, 7 Petitioner does not

d i r e c t l y contest the untimeliness of his successive p e t i t i o n
other than to quote language from Julian indicating that "the
mere passage of time can never j u s t i f y continued imprisonment of
one who has been denied fundamental r i g h t s , "
254 (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) .

Julian,

966 P. 2d at

Rather, Petitioner a s s e r t s that the

Court should excuse the untimeliness pursuant to the PCRA's
" i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e " exception.

As explained previously in

Section I I I . A . l . a . , the Utah Supreme Court has s p e c i f i c a l l y held
t h a t a t r i a l court "presented with an untimely post-conviction
p e t i t i o n must consider the i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e exception before
disposing of the p e t i t i o n . "

Johnson, 2006 UT 21 at 116.

An

analysis of what c o n s t i t u t e s an exception "in the i n t e r e s t s of
j u s t i c e " involves more than simply making a determination that
the successive claim is non-frivolous.

The Court must go one

step further and examine both the meritoriousness of the
p e t i t i o n e r ' s claim and the reason for [the] untimely f i l i n g . "
Adams,

2005 UT 62 at

116,

The apparent advantage of t h i s approach i s t h a t , by engaging
in a merits analysis of each untimely successive claim, the post-

in claim 1, P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s t h a t he could only have brought t h i s claim
a f t e r l e a r n i n g of the Utah Supreme C o u r t ' s use of an erroneous l e g a l standard t o
evaluate whether he had been prejudiced by t r i a l c o u n s e l ' s d e f i c i e n t performance
during the p e n a l t y phase of t h e t r i a l .
Since the Supreme C o u r t ' s decision
affirming the d e n i a l of h i s i n i t i a l p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n was not entered
u n t i l January 26, 2007 r he a s s e r t e d t h a t he had one year from t h a t date t o r a i s e
t h i s claim.
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conviction court will presumably be ensuring that "truly"
legitimate claims are not overlooked, i.e., those claims "where
x

an obvious injustice or a substantial and prejudicial denial of

a constitutional right has occurred' that would make it
^unconscionable' not to reexamine the issue."
UT 3 at 117.

Gardner

III,

2007

However, a merits review of claims is generally

inconsistent with the purposes of the procedural bar rule- to
promote finality, conserve judicial resources, and encourage the
orderly and prompt administration of justice.
v. Wiseman,

297 F.3d

rule promotes

uA

975,

979-80

(10th

Cir.

See United

2002)

States

(procedural bar

the interests of judicial efficiency,

conservation of scarce judicial resources, and orderly and prompt
administration of justice.'" (quoting Hines
F.2d 506,

509 (10th

Cir.

1992)).

v.

United

States,

971

Indeed, in the case of

successive claims that are untimely, this purpose is undermined
by the interests of justice analysis which requires that a merits
review of each claim be performed even for those claims which
may, ultimately, be procedurally barred and, hence, would
otherwise not require a merits review.
In order to avoid having to engage in an unnecessary review
of the merits of Petitioner's successive claims, the Court has
opted to simply assume that Petitioner's successive petition was
timely filed and consider first whether the successive claims are
procedurally barred.

If, and only if, the Court determines that
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a claim would not be procedurally barred had it been timely filed
will the Court then conduct an interests of justice analysis on
that claim to determine whether the untimeliness of the claim
should be excused.

2.

Claims that Were Raised and Addressed in a Prior
Proceeding

Petitioner candidly and commendably concedes that the
following claims were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding:
Claim 1, alleging that Petitioner's constitutionally
deficient legal representation at the penalty phase of his
capital trial requires reversal of his death sentence.

This

claim was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal of
his conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, and 21 in
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, and 10
in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction
petition*

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 34);

Claim 2, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence
of death were obtained in violation of his constitutional right
to the competent assistance of mental health experts.

This claim

was previously raised as claim 1 in the direct appeal, and as
claims 3 and 21 in his initial petition for post-conviction
relief, and as claims 1 and 7 in the appeal from the denial of
his initial post-conviction petition.
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(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp.

at 133-34);
Claim 3, alleging that Petitioner's guilty plea is
constitutionally defective.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 1 in the direct appeal of his conviction and sentence, and
as claims 1, 1(a)(1), 1(a)(2), 1(a)(3), 2, and 17 in his initial
petition for post-conviction relief, and as claim 2 in the appeal
from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition.

(See

Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 140);
Claim 4, alleging that Petitioner is actually innocent of
Kaye Tiede's and Beth Potts' homicides and there is no factual
basis for his guilty plea.

This claim was previously raised as

claims 17 and 18 in is initial petition for post-conviction
relief.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 157);

Claim 6, alleging that Petitioner's conviction and sentence
are invalid because defense counsel labored under actual
conflicts of interest that adversely impacted his representation
of Petitioner.

This claim was previously raised as claim 24 in

his initial post-conviction petition and as claim 12 in the
appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction petition.
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 190);
Claim 7, alleging that Petitioner's penalty phase voir dire
was infected by trial court error, prosecutorial misconduct, and
the ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

This claim was

previously raised as claim 14 in his initial petition for post-
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conviction relief and as claims 5 and 6 in the appeal from the
denial of his initial post-conviction petition.

(See Petfr Mem.

in Supp. at 201);
Claim 8, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by trial
counsel's constitutionally ineffective assistance throughout the
penalty phase voir dire.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and
as claim 5 in the appeal from the denial of his initial postconviction petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 221);

Claim 11, alleging that trial counsel did not submit written
proposed voir dire questions to the court and failed to take
steps to insure that the jury selection process would result in a
fair and impartial jury.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 14 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief.
(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 255);
Claim 13, alleging that the trial court unconstitutionally
limited the scope of voir dire and asked inappropriate questions
regarding the religion practiced by the jurors.

This claim was

previously raised as claim 15 in the initial petition for postconviction relief.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 270);

Claim 15, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury
instructions and a special verdict form that were
unconstitutionally weighed in favor of aggravation over
mitigation.

This claim was previously raised as claims 7, 9, and
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11 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as
claim 4 in the appeal from the denial of his initial postconviction petition.

(See Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 294);

Claim 16, alleging that the jury instructions contained no
option for imposition or consideration of a life sentence in
violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights.

This claim was

previously raised as claims 12 and 13 in the initial petition for
post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in the appeal from the
denial of his initial post-conviction petition.

(See Pet'r Mem.

in Supp. at 310);
Claim 17, alleging that the reasonable doubt instruction was
unconstitutional.

This claim was previously raised as claim 6 in

the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 4 in
the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition.

(See

Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 322);
Claim 18, alleging that the trial court erred in giving jury
instructions at the penalty phase that improperly shifted the
burden of proof to Petitioner.

This claim was previously raised

as claims 5 and 8 in the initial petition for post-conviction
relief.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 327);

Claim 20, alleging that Petitioner's conviction is
unconstitutional because there was a complete breakdown in the
adversarial process.

This claim repeats the claims alleged in

claim 1 and claim 6 of his current post-conviction petition.
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As

noted above, the allegations raised in these claims were
previously raised as claims 1 in the direct appeal of his
conviction and sentence, and as claims 4, 17, 18, 21, and 24 in
his initial post-conviction petition, and as claims 1, 3, 10, and
12 in the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction
petition.

(See Pet'r Mem, in Supp, at 34, 190);

Claim 22, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights
were violated by the improper admission of the taped statement of
Scott Manley.

This claim was previously raised as claim 22 in

the initial petition for post-conviction relief and as claim 8 in
the appeal from the denial of his initial post-conviction
petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 350);

Claim 23, alleging that Petitioner's convictions,
confinement, and sentence are unconstitutional due to
prosecutorial misconduct.

This claim was previously raised as

claim 23 in the initial petition for post-conviction relief and
as claim 9 in the appeal from the denial of his initial postconviction petition.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 368);

Claim 26, alleging that the instructions, taken as a whole,
fail to narrow the category of persons eligible for the death
penalty in violation of Petitioner's constitutional rights.

This

claim was previously raised as claim 10 in the initial petition
for post-conviction relief.

(See Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 390);

Claim 28, alleging that lethal injection violates
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Petitioner 7 s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.

This claim was previously raised as claims

20 and 25 in the i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post-conviction r e l i e f and
as claims 11 and 13 in the appeal from the denial of his postconviction p e t i t i o n .

(See P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at 401); 8

Claim 29, alleging ineffective assistance of s t a t e counsel.
With respect to the ineffective assistance of t r i a l and appellate
counsel, t h i s claim was previously raised as claim 19 in the
i n i t i a l petition for post-conviction r e l i e f and as claim 10 in
the appeal from the denial of his post-conviction p e t i t i o n .

(See

P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at 409);
Claim 30, alleging that Petitioner was denied his
constitutional rights because of the cumulative impact of errors.
This claim was previously raised as claim 2 in the direct appeal
of his conviction and sentence.

(See P e t ' r Mem. in Supp. at

416} .

All of the foregoing claims were raised and addressed in a
prior proceeding, e i t h e r at t r i a l , on direct appeal, in
P e t i t i o n e r ' s i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post-conviction r e l i e f , or in
his appeal from the denial of his i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n for post8

In addition t o acknowledging t h a t t h i s claim was p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e in his
i n i t i a l p e t i t i o n e r for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f and i n t h e appeal from the denial
of h i s p e t i t i o n , in h i s memorandum i n opposition t o the S t a t e ' s motion to
dismiss, he moved t o withdraw t h i s claim on the b a s i s t h a t , " [ i j n the wake of new
developments, [ P e t i t i o n e r ] does not b e l i e v e t h a t the P e t i t i o n i s the proper forum
for t h i s claim in i t s c u r r e n t form." ( P e t ' r Mem, in Opp. a t 123).
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conviction relief and, therefore, they are procedurally barred
under the PCRA and no statutory exception exists that would
permit the Court to consider the merits of these claims.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(b) and (d). See also Kell,

2008 UT

62 at 113 (a post-conviction petitioner "is not eligible for
relief on claims that were ^raised or addressed' on direct
appeal,") .

This is so even for claims that appellate counsel

failed to raise in the most effective manner.

See id.

at Jfl7

(after opportunity to be heard on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court
"presume[s] that [it] gave full consideration to the claims,
regardless of whether [petitioner's] counsel raised them in the
most effective manner."). See also State
889

(Utah 1989)

v.

Carter/

776 P.2d

886f

(Supreme Court has, "after fully considering the

substance of particular claims raised on appeal, summarily (and
often without written analysis) dismissed the same as meritless
or of no effect. . . . Accordingly, after fully reviewing every
claim raised in [a] case, we discuss at length only those issues
critical to th[e] appeal.'7).
However, in Hurst,

the Utah Supreme Court stated that a

"ground for relief from a conviction or sentence that has once
been fully and fairly adjudicated on appeal or in a prior [postconviction] proceeding should not be readjudicated unless it can
be shown that there are ^unusual circumstances.'"
P.2d

at 1036

(emphasis added).

Hurst,

777

Broadly speaking, the Supreme
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Court has defined "unusual circumstances" to mean circumstances
"where an obvious i n j u s t i c e or a substantial and prejudicial
denial of a constitutional right has occurred."

Id. at 1035.

Nevertheless, although i t remains unclear what, precisely,,
constitutes the full range of "unusual circumstances," the
Supreme Court provided several p o s s i b i l i t i e s , "[f]or example, a
prior adjudication i s not a bar to reexamination of a conviction
if there has been a retroactive change in the law, a subsequent
discovery of suppressed evidence, or newly discovered evidence."
Id.
Petitioner makes several arguments for the proposition that
unusual circumstances exist that excuse the procedural bar as i t
applies to the successive claims he raises that have already been
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding. 9
In the s e c t i o n of h i s memorandum in opposition t o t h e S t a t e ' s motion t o
dismiss where he p r e s e n t s h i s discussion t h a t the claims t h a t were previously
r a i s e d are not p r o c e d u r a l l y barred, P e t i t i o n e r r a i s e s two i s s u e s t h a t , in the
Court's view, are not r e l e v a n t t o whether "unusual circumstances" e x i s t t h a t
would excuse the procedural b a r .
F i r s t , P e t i t i o n e r informs the Court t h a t the Utah Attorney General's Office
i s engaged in a two-pronged e f f o r t " t o eliminate the Utah Supreme Court's common
law exceptions t o f a i l u r e s t o r a i s e claims in p r i o r proceedings r e g a r d l e s s of the
resulting unfairness."
( P e t ' r Mem. in 0pp. at 45).
The f i r s t prong i s the
Attorney General's u n i l a t e r a l attempt t o amend the PCRA t o i t s advantage and to
the disadvantage of p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n e r s . The second prong i s t o amend
the Utah Constitution t o allow the l e g i s l a t u r e , r a t h e r than the Supreme Court,
t o define p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n procedures, r i g h t s , and remedies.
Even i f what
P e t i t i o n e r a s s e r t s i s t r u e , simply because the Attorney General may be seeking
t o amend the PCRA, with or without the input and a s s i s t a n c e of other i n t e r e s t e d
p a r t i e s , has no bearing whatsoever on whether "unusual circumstances" e x i s t t h a t
would excuse the procedural bar in t h i s case. Obviously, the Attorney General's
Office i s e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the l e g i s l a t i v e process and seek to affect
t h e laws of the s t a t e j u s t as any other organization or governmental agency or
i n d i v i d u a l i s e n t i t l e d t o do. Moreover, P e t i t i o n e r ' s b a l d a s s e r t i o n t h a t the
Attorney General's motive i s t o "seek[] g r e a t e r power t o expedite executions
r e g a r d l e s s of t h e m e r i t s of t h e c l a i m s , " i d . a t 45, i s unhelpful and simply
i r r e l e v a n t t o any d i s c u s s i o n concerning the e x i s t e n c e of common law exceptions
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F i r s t , P e t i t i o n e r argues that, after having received
adequate funds and performing a more thorough investigation of
the case than was previously performed by p r i o r post-conviction
counsel, new facts not previously known were discovered which (1)
establish the denial of a constitutional r i g h t , (2) might have
changed the outcome of the t r i a l , and (3) e s t a b l i s h the existence
of fundamental unfairness in P e t i t i o n e r ' s conviction. 1 0
P e t ' r Mem. in Opp. at 48).

(See

P e t i t i o n e r ' s basic argument is t h a t ,

on the basis of new evidence he discovered as a r e s u l t of more
funding and a more thorough investigation of his case, an

to the procedural bar r u l e .
Second, with r e s p e c t t o several of h i s s u c c e s s i v e claims, including claims
a s s e r t i n g i s s u e s t h a t were r a i s e d and addressed in a p r i o r proceeding, P e t i t i o n e r
argues t h a t "the PCRA has been c r a f t e d by t h e S t a t e t o i t s decided advantage .
• . [because t ] h e S t a t e has made the o r i g i n a l t r i a l court the f i r s t stop [for
p e t i t i o n e r s seeking p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f ] . "
Id, a t 73,
According to
P e t i t i o n e r , t h i s model c r e a t e s a c o n f l i c t because i t i s v> commons ense t h a t
attacking a j u d g e ' s d e c i s i o n s i s an i n e f f e c t i v e way of gaining an Impartial
hearing from a c o u r t . "
Id.
As a r e s u l t , p r i o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n counsel was
prevented from r a i s i n g claims, or was r e q u i r e d t o "water down" claims, in order
t o avoid p o t e n t i a l l y r a i s i n g the i r e of the p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n judge who was the
same judge who p r e s i d e d at P e t i t i o n e r ' s t r i a l .
Contrary t o P e t i t i o n e r ' s
a s s e r t i o n s , i t was not t h e Attorney General who was t h e d r a f t e r of the r u l e t h a t
required the t r i a l court t o p r e s i d e over h i s p r i o r p e t i t i o n for p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n
r e l i e f . Rather, i t was mandated by a r u l e of c i v i l procedure promulgated by the
Utah Supreme Court.
See Utah R. Civ, P. 65C(f) ,
Furthermore, i t i s not
commonsense, but more a jaded view of Utah's j u d i c i a l system, t h a t challenging
a judge's decision p r e c l u d e s an i m p a r t i a l hearing on whether the j u d g e ' s p r i o r
r u l i n g s or a c t i o n s were c o r r e c t . Judges are e t h i c a l l y r e q u i r e d t o be i m p a r t i a l ,
regardless of t h e i s s u e s t h a t are being considered. See Utah Code of J u d i c i a l
Conduct, Canon 1 and Canon 3(B). P e t i t i o n e r has p r e s e n t e d no evidence whatsoever
t h a t his p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n judge acted u n e t h i c a l l y or was incapable of being
impartial when p r e s e n t e d with i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o how the judge conducted the
trial.
Again, t h i s argument i s unhelpful and i r r e l e v a n t to any discussion
concerning the e x i s t e n c e of common law exceptions t o the procedural bar r u l e .
10

P e t i t i o n e r a l s o argues t h a t the claims were "overlooked i n good f a i t h
with no i n t e n t t o delay or abuse the w r i t . " Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d 1029, 1031
(Utah 1989).
This p a r t i c u l a r common law exception c l e a r l y cannot apply t o the
claims t h a t were r a i s e d and addressed i n a p r i o r proceeding. Obviously, i f the
claims were p r e v i o u s l y r a i s e d , they were not overlooked.
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exception to the procedural bar exists for all of the claims he
has raised in his successive post-conviction petition that were
raised and address in a prior proceeding.

Therefore, he

contends, the Court should reconsider these previously raised
claims in light of the new evidence.
As noted above, in 1989 when the Hurst

case was decided, the

Supreme Court indicated that newly discovered evidence
constitutes "'unusual circumstances" under the common law that
would justify reconsidering a previously adjudicated claim.
However, in Gardner

II,

the Supreme Court explained that, with

the .passage of the PCRA in 1996, the legislature effectively .
codified the common law "newly discovered evidence'' exception to
the procedural bar.

See Gardner

II,

2004 UT 42 at

114

("Likewise, the [PCRA] also provides for relief on the basis of
^newly discovered material evidence,' thereby incorporating the
second Hurst

factor.").

See also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-

104(1) (e) . In doing so, rather than identifying newly discovered
evidence as an exception to the procedural bar rule, the
legislature reformulated it as an independent statutory ground
for post-conviction relief.

As a result, technically there is no

exception under the PCRA to the procedural bar rule on the basis
of newly discovered evidence.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has held that "despite
the statutory enactment of the majority of the Hurst
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factors, all

five common law exceptions retain their independent
constitutional significance and may be examined by this court in
our review of post-conviction petitions/' Gardner
at

II,

2004 UT 42

125, the Supreme Court also expressly stated that it will

"defer to the legislature unless these fundamental safeguards are
repealed or otherwise restricted."

Id.

Because the legislature

has neither repealed nor otherwise restricted the PCRA's "newly
discovered evidence'7 ground for relief since Gardner

II was

decided, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(1); Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-104(l) (1996), the requirements for relying upon newly
discovered evidence under the PCRA and as a common law exception
are co-extensive.

It follows that because Petitioner has

asserted an exception to the procedural bar rule on the basis "of
new facts not previously known which show the denial of a
constitutional right or might have changed the outcome of
[Petitioner's] trial [, and] the existence of fundamental
unfairness in [Petitioner's] conviction," (Pet'r Mem. in Opp. at
48} (emphasis added), he cannot overcome the procedural bar for
the successive claims he raises that were raised and addressed in
a prior proceeding unless he satisfies the requirements set forth
in the PCRA for raising a ground for relief based upon newly
discovered evidence.
Under the PCRA, reliance upon newly discovered evidence
requires a petitioner to establish that
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(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's
counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction
proceeding, and the evidence could not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely
cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely
impeachment evidence; and
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly
discovered material evidence demonstrates that no
reasonable trier of fact could have found the
petitioner guilty of the offense or subject to the
sentence received.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104(l) (e) (I)-(iv).

Nowhere in his

pleadings does Petitioner specifically address any of these
requirements for relying upon newly discovered evidence.

At

best, and entirely by implication, he suggests that the new
evidence is material, is not merely cumulative, and is not merely
impeachment.

Significantly, however, Petitioner does not discuss

nor demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is
evidence that could not have been discovered through the exercise
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of reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction
petition.

That is, he does not affirmatively establish that the

State, or any other governmental agency, purposefully withheld
material evidence or failed to provide material evidence when
requested.

Moreover, there is no indication that the affidavits

and additional reports submitted by Petitioner in his current
successive petition could not have been presented in support of
the claims he raised in his prior post-conviction proceeding.
Rather than argue that the new evidence he now possesses

could

not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence, Petitioner instead contends that the evidence was not
discovered as a result of inadequate funding for prior postconviction counsel.
There appears to be little question that prior postconviction counsel was frustrated at the funding mechanism in
place at the time Petitioner's initial petition for postconviction relief was filed and that post-conviction counsel
believed the funding provided was inadequate and permitted him to
perform only a perfunctory investigation into Petitioner's case.
Petitioner alleges that prior post-conviction counsel requested
payments in excess of the funding caps from the Division of
Finance ("Finance") pursuant to the administrative rules
governing the payment of counsel, but that these requests were
denied despite the fact that the post-conviction court authorized
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the requested funding. Two separate judges deemed the funding to
be reasonable and necessary. Initially, the funding available to
prior post-conviction counsel was $25,000 in attorney fees and
$10,000 in litigation expenses.

Prior post-conviction counsel

indicated to the post-conviction court that the $10,000 limit was
insufficient to perform an adequate investigation and,
ultimately, the court authorized up to $40,258.59 in litigation
expenses beyond the $10,000 limit.

Upon request from prior post-

conviction counsel for payment, Finance denied the request.
Subsequently, Finance modified its rules and raised the
amount of attorney fees by $5,000, for a maximum of $30,000, and
the amount for litigation expenses by $10,000, for a maximum of
$20,000.

However, based upon the information provided by

Petitioner and the State in their pleadings, it appears that,
although the post-conviction court authorized up to $40,258.59 in
litigation expenses beyond the $10,000 maximum at the time, prior
post-conviction counsel ultimately only requested actual
litigation expenses in the amount of $11,555.16, leaving unused
the amount of $8,444.84 by the court's math.
the principle is sound.

Even if incorrect,

Even if prior post-conviction counsel

could not do all he wanted, funding in some amount existed to do
more.

Despite the apparent funding problems Petitioner argues

existed during his prior post-conviction proceedings, it is
difficult for the Court to conclude that, with unused litigation
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funds still available in some amount, the new evidence that
Petitioner now possesses is evidence that could not have been
discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence as a
result of insufficient funding.
In any event, even if the Court were to conclude that the
funding available hampered prior post-conviction counsel's
ability to perform the type of investigation he believed was
necessary in the case and, for that reason, the new evidence he
now has not only was not discovered, but also could not have been
discovered, Petitioner fails to discuss or demonstrate that, when
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings.
Thus, because Petitioner has failed to satisfy all of the
requirements set forth in 78-35a-104(e)(I)-(iv) for relying upon
newly discovered evidence, either as an independent postconviction claim or as a common law exception to the procedural
bar rule, the State is entitled to a dismissal of Petitioner's
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior
proceeding.
Second, in addition to asserting an exception to the
procedural bar on the basis of newly discovered evidence,
Petitioner also specifically argues that ineffective assistance
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of trial, appellate, and prior post-conviction counsel are coinmon
law exceptions to the procedural bar rule.
Supp. at 32-33).

Ineffective assistance of counsel is not one of

the common law exceptions enumerated in Hurst
list in Hurst

(See Pet'r Mem, in

and, although the

was not intended to be exhaustive, see Gardner

III,

2001 UT 3 at 118 ("We later clarified that this list of ^good
cause' exceptions is not exhaustive*")/ it is also true that the
Utah Supreme Court has never formally recognized ineffective
assistance of counsel as a common law exception to the procedural
bar rule.
In any case, it is simply unclear to the Court how
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel can possibly
constitute a common law exception to the procedural bar of
Petitioner's successive post-conviction claims that were already
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding.

For example, the

fact that trial counsel may have ineffectively raised a claim
that Petitioner now raises again in his successive petition is
irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and addressed in a
prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to an independent
claim on direct appeal that trial counsel was ineffective in
raising the claim.

Thus, while trial counsel's ineffectiveness

in raising a claim may itself constitute a separate claim on
direct appeal, it does not constitute an exception to the
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that
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were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding.
The same is true for ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel.

The fact that appellate counsel may have ineffectively

raised a claim that Petitioner now raises again in his successive
petition is irrelevant to whether the claim was raised and
addressed in a prior proceeding, although it would be relevant to
an independent claim in an initial post-conviction petition that
appellate counsel was ineffective in raising the claim.

Thus,

while appellate counsel's ineffectiveness in raising a claim may
itself constitute a separate claim in an initial post-conviction
petition, it does not constitute an exception to the procedural
bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that were raised
and addressed in a prior proceeding.
As for Petitioner's assertion that ineffective assistance of
prior post-conviction counsel constitutes a common law exception
to the procedural bar rulef this argument also fails.

As the

Court concluded above in Section III. A. 2. c , Petitioner did not
demonstrate that a proper interpretation of the Utah Constitution
includes a right to the effective assistance of post-conviction
counsel.

Therefore, Petitioner cannot assert a common law

exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for claims that were
raised and addressed in a prior proceeding based upon a state
constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel because the Utah Constitution does not
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guarantee him this right*
Moreover, the Court also concluded above that the right to
the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel is a
legislatively created protection.

As a statutory right, rather

than a common law right, Petitioner cannot rely upon this right
as the basis for asserting a common law exception to the
procedural bar rule for successive post-conviction claims that
were raised and addressed in a prior proceeding.
Therefore, because Petitioner has not demonstrated that
ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, or post-conviction
counsel constitute common law exceptions to the procedural bar
rule, the State is entitled to the dismissal of Petitioner's
successive claims that were raised and addressed in a prior
proceeding.
Finally, in the same section of his memorandum in support of
the successive petition where Petitioner discusses the law
governing common law exceptions to the procedural bar rule and
where he specifically asserts that ineffective assistance of
counsel constitutes a common law exception, he also appears to at
least imply that the "severe funding limitations [that] ma[de]
proper and thorough investigation impossible," (Pet'r Mem. in
Supp, at 33), constitutes a common law exception to the
procedural bar rule.

If this is Petitioner's contention, it is,

again, unclear to the Court how this is so.

Common law
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exceptions enumerated by the Supreme Court deal with the
discovery of new or suppressed evidence, new law, and fundamental
or constitutional errors.

Lack of adequate funding for post-

conviction counsel may provide an explanation in support of
Petitioner's allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was
ineffective or why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally
adequate investigation or why counsel failed to discover
important evidence in the case.

Indeed, in addressing his claim

related to the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel,
Petitioner asserts that

N%

[b]ecause of the administrative rule

which severely limit[ed] funding of both the defense and
investigation of post-conviction cases, including the retention
of the services of crucial and fundamental expert services, . . .
[his prior post-conviction] counsel was unable to provide
effective assistance of counsel."
See also Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at

(Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 415).

120 n.3

(in the context of

commenting on "the funds needed to secure [the petitioner] a
proper post-conviction proceeding," the Utah Supreme Court noted
that

xx

it may be the case that the statutory [funding] scheme

imposes a crippling burden on [the petitioner],").

Thus, it is

conceivable that the lack of adequate funding may result in
constitutional or statutory violations.

However, inadequate

funding, in and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules
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are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights.
In the Court's view, the lack of adequate funding is not
relevant to whether the procedural bar should be excused with
respect to claims raised by Petitioner in his successive postconviction petition that were already raised and addressed in a
prior proceeding.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's
successive claims listed above (all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14,
19, 21, 24, 25 and 27) that were already raised and addressed in
a prior proceeding are procedurally barred under the PCRA and
under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the
Court to consider the merits of these claims.
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these
claims, again, all but Claims 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25
and 27.

3,

Claims that Could Have Been, But Were Not, Raised in
Petitioner's Prior Post-Conviction Petition

The PCRA specifically precludes Petitioner from obtaining
"relief . . . upon any ground that . . . could have been, but was
not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (1) (d).
precluded by the common law.

Such claims are also

See Gardner

I,

888 P. 2d at

613

-78-

$i-^ik;9v

("Issues that could and should have been raised on direct appeal,
but were not, may not properly be raised in a habeas corpus
proceeding absent unusual circumstances,"). With respect to the
following claims, they are all claims that could have been, but
were not, raised in Petitioner's prior post-conviction petition:
Claim 5, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel
and trial court error in connection with Petitioner's motion to
change venue;
Claim 9, alleging that Petitioner was prejudiced by the
trial court's error in failing to properly strike venire-members
for cause during the penalty phase voir dire;
Claim 10, alleging that the trial court failed to ask
numerous voir dire questions resulting in a flawed jury selection
process;
Claim 12, alleging that Petitioner's jury venire was
prejudicially biased by the trial court's introduction of the
concept of "blood atonement" into the voir dire;
Claim 14, alleging that the exclusion from the jury of
persons who were not members of the LDS Church deprived
Petitioner of the right to trial by a jury drawn from a
representative cross-section of the community;
Claim 19, alleging that the jury was prejudiced by it's
consideration of extrinsic evidence in violation of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States
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Constitution;
Claim 21, alleging that Petitioner's constitutional rights
were violated by the improper admission of evidence at the
penalty phase of his trial, including (1) the videotape made by
Deli of Petitioner in the Tiede's cabin before the homicides, (2)
allowing the prosecution to elicit and perform irrelevant and
prejudicial in-court "demonstrations," (3) opinion testimony from
James Bell, (4) testimony from James Holland, (5) photographs of
the Kaye Tiede and Beth Potts before their deaths, and (6) Linae
Tiede's statement regarding Petitioner's purported devil worship;
Claim 24, alleging that the State failed to disclose
material exculpatory evidence;
Claim 25, alleging that Petitioner's death sentence is
disproportionate to his culpability and violates his
constitutional rights; and
Claim 27, alleging that Petitioner has been prejudiced in
investigating and presenting post-conviction claims and in
gathering additional evidence to prove his entitlement to relief
as a result of an inadequate and unreliable appellate recordPetitioner nowhere argues that the foregoing claims are ones
that could not have been known and raised in a prior postconviction petition.

As explained previously in Section

III.A.2.a., unlike the procedural bar rule that applies to
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initial post-conviction petitions, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a106(1}( c ) , which includes a statutory exception based upon
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel, see Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 (2), no exception based upon the
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel is expressly
included in the PCRA.

Thus, any successive claim that was raised

or that could have been raised, but was not, in a prior postconviction petition, is procedurally barred and no exception
exists under the PCRA to excuse this failure.
However, although no statutory exception applies to excuse
the failure to raise these types of claims in a prior postconviction petition, because the common law exceptions have
"independent constitutional significance," Gardner
at $15,

II,

2004 UT 42

the common law exceptions may be relied upon in order to

overcome the procedural bar.

Petitioner asserts that four common

law exceptions apply that excuse his procedural default,
including the three that were previously discussed in Section
II.B.: (1) the discovery of new evidence as a result of more
funding and a more thorough investigation of the case, (2)
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, (3) that
severe funding limitations existed at the time Petitioner filed
his prior post-conviction petition which made a proper and
thorough investigation of his case impossible, and (4) all of the
claims that were not previously raised were overlooked in good
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faith with no 'intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction
process.
As an initial matter,- the Utah Supreme Court has explained
that before the post-conviction court is required to consider
whether any of the common law exceptions apply to excuse the
procedural bar, a determination must be made that the claims that
could have been raised in a prior post-conviction petition, but
were not, are not frivolous and were not withheld for tactical

See Gardner

reasons.
claims,

III,

2001 UT 3 at

126 (because " [f]rivolous

. . . and claims that are withheld for tactical

should be summarily denied[,]

. . .

a separate and distinct

procedural determination for successive post-conviction
[must be] made before
under the

reasons

claims

[the trial court] reach[es] an analysis

*good cause' common law exceptions.'').

Other than m e r e l y asserting that his claims were overlooked
in good faith, Petitioner nowhere demonstrates that they were not
withheld for tactical reasons.

It may well be that all of the

claims he now raises which could have been raised in a prior
post-conviction petition are non-frivolous in nature, but the
Court must presume that post-conviction counsel had a legitimate
tactical reason for not raising them in the prior petition.
Gentry,

540

U.S.

at

5

See

("When counsel focuses on some issues to

the exclusion of o t h e r s , there is a strong presumption that he
did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer n e g l e c t . " ) .
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As explained above, in order to overcome this presumption,
Petitioner must show that "there was no ^conceivable tactical
basis for counsel's actions.'"
Bryant,

965 P.2d

at

542).

Clark,

2004 UT 25 at

16 (quoting

Not only has Petitioner not even

attempted to specifically meet his burden, it is unlikely that he
could do so.
All of the claims raised in Petitioner's successive petition
that were not previously raised

are claims for which a

reasonable basis can be articulated as to why they were not
raised in a prior proceeding.

For example, given all of the

circumstances of the case and the limitations in terms of timef
funding, and resources, it is certainly plausible that these
claims were not raised in the initial post-conviction petition
because they were weaker or less persuasive than the other claims
that were raised. Raising weaker claims would have distracted the
post-conviction court from fuller consideration of the stronger
claims.

Raising weaker claims could well have been futile and

resulted in a determination the claims were frivolous on their
face.

This could have been seen as reducing the effectiveness of

the arguments as to the stronger claims.

Any of these reasons

constitute a conceivable tactical basis why post-conviction
counsel would not have raised them in Petitioner's prior postconviction petition.
Furthermore, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of his
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successive petition, for every claim that could have been, but
was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, Petitioner
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these
successive claims

N>

in state court pleadings, briefs and

associated filings, hearing, and argument."

(Pet'r Mem. in Supp.

at 174, 235, 252, 259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 394),

If

that is true, then even though the issues related to his current
claims may not have been specifically and discretely raised as an
independent claim in his prior post-conviction petition, they are
issues that must have been known to prior post-conviction
counsel.

They are not, therefore, claims that were overlooked in

good faith because the issues involved were present in various
state court pleadings submitted or argued by Petitioner's prior
trial, appellate, or post-conviction counsel.
Because Petitioner has not satisfied his burden of
demonstrating that the claims he now raises that could have been,
but were not, raised in his prior post-conviction petition were
not withheld for tactical reasons, the Court cannot consider
whether any of the common law exceptions to the procedural bar
rule apply to his successive petition for post-conviction relief.
On this basis alone, the State is entitled to the dismissal of
these claims.
Nevertheless, even had Petitioner satisfied his burden of
demonstrating that his claims were not withheld for tactical
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reasons, he has not shown that any common law exceptions apply
that would overcome the procedural bar.
First, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the
discovery of new evidence that resulted from a more recent, and
more thorough, investigation of the case because of increased
funding available.

As previously explained in Section II.B.,

however, because the statutory and common law exceptions for
newly discovered evidence are co-extensive, in order to rely upon
this common law exception, Petitioner must satisfy the strict
requirements set forth in Section 78-35a-104 (e) (I)-(iv).
Petitioner has not met this strict requirement.

At best, and

entirely by implication, his pleadings suggests that the new
evidence he has discovered is material, is not merely cumulative,
and is not merely impeachment.

However, he does not discuss nor

demonstrate that the new evidence he now possesses is evidence
that could not have been discovered through the exercise of
reasonable diligence and included in a prior post-conviction
petition.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (f) (I) (%\

. .

neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the
evidence . . .

in time to include the evidence in any previously

filed . . . post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could
not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.").

He argues that the lack of funding available for

prior post-conviction counsel prevented counsel from performing a
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constitutionally adequate investigation of Petitioner's case.
This argument, however, is at least somewhat contradicted by the
fact that unused litigation funds were still available at the
conclusion of his prior post-conviction proceedings.
Further, most of the claims do not involve "investigation"
but relate to matters in the record-the change of venue issues,
voir dire, the admission of certain evidence, the jury
composition, and others.
Moreover, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that, when
viewed with all of the other evidence presented in the case, no
reasonable trier of fact could have found him guilty of the
offense to which he pleaded guilty or subject to the sentences of
death he received following the penalty phase proceedings.

See

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104 (1) (f) (iv), formerly 78-35a-104 (e) p .
. . viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered
material evidence demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact
could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense or subject
to the sentence received.").

Because Petitioner has failed to

satisfy all of the requirements set forth in the PCRA, he cannot
rely upon newly discovered evidence as a common law exception to
the procedural bar rule.
Second, Petitioner asserts an exception based upon the
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel.

As the

Court concluded above in Section III.A.2.c, Petitioner cannot
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assert a common law exception to the PCRA's procedural bar for
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior
post-conviction petition based upon a state constitutional right
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel because
the Utah Constitution does not guarantee him such a right,
Moreover, although Petitioner has a statutory right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, because this is
a legislatively created right, rather than a common law right,
Petitioner cannot rely upon this statutory right as the basis for
asserting a common law exception to the procedural bar rule.
Third, Petitioner argues that a common law exception exists
based upon the severe funding limitations that existed at the
time Petitioner filed his prior post-conviction petition, which
made a proper and thorough investigation of his case impossible.
As noted above, the lack of adequate funding for post-conviction
counsel may provide an explanation in support of Petitioner's
allegations that prior post-conviction counsel was ineffective or
why counsel was unable to do a constitutionally adequate
investigation or why counsel failed to discover allegedly
important evidence in the case.

However, inadequate funding, in

and of itself, is neither a violation of Petitioner's
constitutional rights nor, so long as the proper funding rules
are followed, is it a violation of Petitioner's statutory rights.
Thus, the lack of adequate funding is not a common law exception
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to the procedural bar rule that excuses claims that could have
been, but were not, raised, in a prior petition for postconviction relief.
Moreover, as to this argument, it is an argument in this
context that relates to the "infinite continuum of litigation"
concept, only in this context it is and could be run amok.

If

$40,000 is provided for post-conviction proceedings, it can
always be claimed that $60,000 was needed; if that is provided,
$80,000 could be claimed as necessary, and there could never be
an end to such a claim.

There is never enough time or money.

However, the argument is not directly made by Petitioner, but
based on this notion, this cannot be a basis for a common law
exception to the procedural bar rule.
Finally, Petitioner argues that all of the claims he now
raises that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior
post-conviction petitioner are claims that were overlooked in
good faith with no intent to delay the post-conviction process.
Without question, this is a legitimate common law exception to
the procedural bar rule that has been expressly recognized by the
Utah Supreme Court.

See Hurst,

111 P.2d at

1031

("A showing of

good cause that justifies the filing of a successive claim may be
established by showing . . . a claim overlooked in good faith
with no intent to delay or abuse the writ.").

However, the

explanations Petitioner provides in his pleadings lead the Court
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to believe that the claims were notf in fact, overlooked in good
faith.

As noted above, in Petitioner's memorandum in support of

this successive petition, for each claim that could have been,
but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition, he
states that he fairly presented the issues associated with these
claims "in state court pleadings, briefs and associated filings,
hearing, and argument."

(Pet'r Mem, in Supp. at 174, 235, 252,

259, 277, 331, 338, 379, 385, and 394). Thus, the issues on the
basis of which he now raises claims that were not raised in his
prior post-conviction petition were apparently known, or should
have been known, to prior post-conviction counsel.

They are not,

therefore, claims that the Court can conclude were overlooked in
good faith.

Again, many of the claims in this category are based

on facts in the trial record, not facts that require an
independent investigation beyond examination of the written
record.
Furthermore, even if the Court's inferences from the
language Petitioner uses in his pleadings are not warranted,
other than making the bald assertion that the claims were
overlooked in good faith, Petitioner fails to provide a detailed
argument explaining how the exception applies to his case or the
reasons in support of this exception.

As the State points out,

Petitioner nowhere provides legal support for the proposition
that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies "merely
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because the evidence [does] not establish that [Petitioner] held
back his claim[s] for tactical purposes."
at 89-90),

(State's Mem. in Reply

Indeed, in light of the Utah Supreme Court's view

that exceptions to the procedural bar rule should only apply "in
those rare and unusual cases in which Aan obvious injustice or a
substantial and prejudicial denial of a constitutional right has
occurred,' making it unconscionable not to reexamine the issue,"
Medel,

2008 UT 32 at

120 (emphasis added), if a procedural bar

can be overcome merely by stating that a claim that could have
been, but was not, raised in a prior post-conviction petition was
overlooked in good faith with no intent to delay, the exception
would effectively eviscerate the rule.
Nevertheless, although Petitioner does not set forth a
compelling basis for this argument, presumably the reasons he has
in support of the "overlooked in good faith" exception are based
upon his contention that new evidence exists that went
undiscovered until recently because prior post-conviction counsel
was either ineffective or insufficient funding was available to
perform a constitutionally adequate investigation.
Even these reasons, however, are insufficient for the Court
to conclude that the "overlooked in good faith" exception applies
in Petitioner's case.

In the most recent decision from the Utah

Supreme Court where the "overlooked in good faith" exception was
addressed in the context of the discovery of new evidence, see
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Tillman,

2005 UT 56.

The Utah Supreme Court carefully set forth

the grounds in support of the "overlooked in good faith"
exception.

There the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's

post-conviction claim that the State had failed to disclose
material exculpatory evidence NVas overlooked in good faith with
no intent to delay or abuse the post-conviction process," id, at
125f

because (1) the petitioner "had no reason to believe that

there [was] undisclosed [evidence] until the State revealed [its]
existence some nineteen years later," and (2) the State had made
"affirmative representations . . , that no such [evidence]
existed."

In Petitioner's case, he does not argue that he had

no reason to believe that the new evidence he now possesses did
not exist.

Nor does he establish that the State, or any other

governmental agency, affirmatively represented to his prior postconviction counsel that this new evidence did not exist.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, all of Petitioner's
claims that could have been, but were not, raised in his prior
post-conviction petition are procedurally barred under the PCRA
and under the common law and Petitioner has not shown that any
statutory or common law exceptions apply that would permit the
Court to consider the merits of these claims.
Therefore, the State is entitled to a dismissal of these
claims, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 27.
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4.

Claim Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Prior PostConviction Counsel

In claim 29 of his successive petition, Petitioner argues
that because the funding mechanism in place during his prior
post-conviction proceedings "severely limit[ed the] funding of
both the defense and investigation of post-conviction cases,
including the retention of the services of crucial and
fundamental expert services, and repeated necessity to litigate
funding, [Petitioner's prior post-conviction] counsel was unable
to provide effective assistance of counsel."

(Pet'r Mem. in

Supp. at 415). This claim is not procedurally barred insofar as
it is not a claim that was raised and addressed in a prior
proceeding.

Moreover, it is also not a claim that could have

been, but was not, raised as a substantive claim in Petitioner's
prior post-conviction petition.
On the other hand, it is a claim that, at least in theory,
could have been raised in a prior proceeding.

That is, a claim

of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could have
been raised in a Rule 60(b) motion to set aside the judgment,
see, e.g., Menzies,

2006 UT 81 at 12 ("Following the dismissal of

[the petitioner's] case, [post-conviction counsel] withdrew and
new counsel was appointed.

[The petitioner] then moved to set

aside the district court's dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure."), or on appeal following the post-conviction
court's dismissal of Petitioner's post-conviction petition.
Practically speaking, however, this was not possible because
prior post-conviction counsel continued his representation of
Petitioner through the appeal of the dismissal of the post-

conviction petition.
(Utah

1994)

See Pascual

v. Carver,

876 P. 2d 364,

366

("Counsel on appeal is not expected to allege his own

ineffectiveness as counsel for the defendant at trial.'');

Parsons,

871 P.2d at 521 ("[T]rial counsel cannot reasonably be

expected to raise the issue of his or her own incompetence on
appeal."). However, given the circumstances this issue may have
been properly raised on appeal, not as a per

se

claim that prior

post-conviction counsel was ineffective, but as a claim that he
was rendered ineffective by the inadequate funding.

This court

does not believe that such a claim would be precluded by the
above authorities.
Nevertheless, a claim of ineffective assistance of prior
post-conviction counsel is not a valid basis for relief under the
PCRA or the common law and, therefore, the State is entitled to a
dismissal of this claim.
As the State points out, when Petitioner filed his
successive post-conviction petition, the PCRA provided "a
substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense."

Utah Code Ann. §
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78-35a-102(1) (emphasis added).

However, whether prior post-

conviction counsel was ineffective is immaterial to whether
Petitioner's guilty pleas and the imposition of his death
sentences complied with constitutional and statutory
requirements.

Because Petitioner's claim of ineffective

assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a claim that
challenges his conviction or sentence, it is not a cognizable
ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, not a claim for
which the PCRA can provide a legal remedy.
Moreover, although the PCRA allows a petitioner to seek
relief on the basis that he "had ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or the
Utah Constitution," Utah Code Ann- § 78-35a-104 (1) (d), a claim of
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel does not
fall within the ambit of this ground for relief because
Petitioner is not entitled to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel under either the federal or state
constitutions.

The United States Supreme Court has expressly

held that, under the federal constitution, M[t]here is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction
proceedings.

Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim

constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such
proceedings/'
See also Menzies,

Coleman

v.

Thompson,

501 U.S.

122,

752

(1991).

2006 UT 81 at 184 ("We do, however, note that
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the United States Supreme Court has previously declined to
recognize a federal constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings.").
In addition, as the Court previously discussed in Section
III.A.2.C, Petitioner does not have a right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel under the Utah
Constitution.

Therefore, because Petitioner does not have a

constitutional right to the effective assistance of postconviction counsel under either the federal and state
constitutions, he cannot seek post-conviction relief by asserting
that he "had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
the United States Constitution or the Utah Constitution."

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1) (d).
Based upon the foregoing analysis, Petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel is not a
recognized ground for relief under the PCRA and, therefore, the
State is entitled to a dismissal of this claim, claim 29.

IV. Conclusion
Almost nineteen years ago, Petitioner was charged with,
pleaded guilty to, and was sentenced to death for the murders of
Kay Tiede and Beth Potts.

On direct appeal to the Utah Supreme

Court, Petitioner's guilty pleas and sentence of death for both
murders were upheld.

Petitioner subsequently filed a petition
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for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty pleas and death
sentence.

After several years of litigation, the post-conviction

trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and
denied post-conviction relief on all of Petitioner's claims.

On

appeal, the post-conviction court's grant of summary judgment was
affirmed.

Petitioner then sought relief in federal court.

Although Petitioner's federal case was, and is, still pending,
Petitioner filed a successive petition for post-conviction relief
in state district court raising thirty separate claims.

The

State responded with a motion to dismiss.
The parties' arguments for and against dismissal of the
successive petition has required the Court to resolve numerous
legal issues, including:

(1) that the 2008 amendments to the

PCRA, which removed the interests of justice exception to the
time-bar, does not apply retroactively to Petitioner's case and,
therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to rely on the interests
of justice exception to argue that, if the filing of his
successive post-conviction petition was untimely, it should be
excused in the interests of justice; (2) that Petitioner has not
shown that he has either a federal or state constitutional right
to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel and,
therefore, that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
is not a common law exception to the procedural bar rule; (3)
that the 2008 amendments to the PCRA expressly stating that post-
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conviction petitioners do not have a statutory right to the
effective assistance of post-conviction counsel, does not apply
retroactively to Petitioner's case and, therefore, in light of
the Menzies

decision, Petitioner had the statutory right to the

effective assistance of post-conviction counsel during his
initial post-conviction proceedings; and (4) that because the
statutory right to post-conviction counsel is a legislatively
created protection, it is constitutionally permissible, and
within the Utah Legislature's power, to exclude from the PCRA an
exception to the procedural bar rule based upon ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel and, therefore, that
Petitioner cannot rely on his statutory right to the effective
assistance of post-conviction counsel to overcome the procedural
bar for successive claims that could have been, but were not,
raised in his prior post-conviction petition.
Although the parties disagree on whether the untimeliness of
Petitioner's successive post-conviction petition should be
excused, in order to avoid performing a merits review of each
claim to determine whether the interests of justice exception
applies, which has the potential of being both unnecessary and
counter-productive, the Court has proceeded on the assumption
that Petitioner's successive petition is not time-barred.
Relying on the foregoing legal conclusions, and after carefully
considering all of Petitioner's claims, the Court concludes that
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all of his claims, with the exception of his claim alleging
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, are
procedurally barred either because they were raised and addressed
in a prior proceeding or because they are claims that could have
been, but were not, raised in his prior petition for postconviction relief.
As for the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
claim, the Court concludes that it is not a cognizable claim
under the PCRA because it is not a challenge to Petitioner's
conviction or sentence.

Therefore, it is not a claim for which

the PCRA can provide a legal remedy.

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the
State's motion to dismiss Petitioner's successive post-conviction
petition.

Order
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State's Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief
Under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act is dismissed.

This Ruling and Order constitute the final order of the
Court.

No further order is necessary to effectuate the Court's
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decision.

DATED this

ll

2009,

day of

BY THE COURT:

Judge Bruce C. Lubeck
Third Judicial District Cour
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Addendum C

RICHARD P. MAURO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
43 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500
FAX (801) 364-3232

September 13, 2002

Mr. Lynn Vellinga
Assistant Director
Utah Division of Finance
2110 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for
litigation expenses.

Dear Mr. Vellinga:
I have enclosed a bill for Dr. Linda Gummow for services completed as part of litigation
expenses in the above matter. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of Administarive
Procedure 25-14-5.
Please pay Dr. Gummow directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank
you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD P. MAURO

P

FROM : CONGB* GUMMOU

JUL. 9.2002 8:58PM P
r NO. : 4853702

Conger & Gummow

247 E. 2100 S.
Salt Lak* City, UT8411S
(801)485*8802

7/9/02
TO: R. Mauro, Esq.
FROM: Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D.
RE: Neuropsychological Evaluation of Von Taylor
Thefeesfor the neuropsychological evaluation of Mr. Taylor including record review and
provision of a written summary are itemized in the table below.
Date
4/10/02
4/11/02
4/12/02
4/15/02
4/23/02
4/27/02
5/1 /02
Total

Service
Time
Record Review
10.0
Administer Tests
5.0
Administer Tests
5.0
Administer Teste
5,0
Administer Tests
5.0
Score Tests and Prepare Summary 5.0
Review test results interview family 5.0

Charge
$1T000.00
$ 500.00
$ 500.00
$ 500.00
$ 500.00
$ 500.00
$ 500.00
$4,000,00

Pleaseremitpayment to the address above. Thank youfaryour courtesy.

.y^2^<«-^^-^^
Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D.

RICHARD P. MAURO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
43 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500
FAX (801) 364-3232

March 24, 2003

Mr. Lynn Vellinga
Assistant Director
Utah Division of Finance
2110 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for
litigation expenses for investigation.

Dear Mr. Vellinga:
I have enclosed a bill for investigator Ted Cilwick for services completed as part of
litigation expenses in the above matter. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of
Administarive Procedure 25-14-5.
Please pay Mr. Cilwick directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank you
for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD P. MAURO

TED CILWICK
Certified
Paralegal

Licensed
Investigator
UcMlOQISS

13820 North 3100 West
Collinston,Utah 84306

Days 801-242-2209
Home 43^458^3141

March 20,2003
Dear Rich Mauro:
Here is a bill for work I've done on the Von Taylor death-penalty appeal case.
Please send it in to the state at your next convenient moment thank you.

6/4/02
6/5/02
6/6/02
6/7/02
6/14/02
6/24/02
7/1/02
2/4/03
2/12/03
2/14/03
2/15/03
2/27/03
3/1/03
3/2/03
3/3/03
3/4/03

0.4 hrs, meet w/Rich Mauro re further investigation
0.8 hrs, go to Matheson Courthouse, pull Manley prior cases, start
looking for him
0.8 hrs, re Manley: talk w/court clerk in Des Moines and write recordsrequest; talk w/warden at prison; do Internet search for him
1.4 hrs, read Mauro petition; in Weber and Davis courthouses, check
files re S. Manley; more on Internet
0.1 hrs, talk w/Iowa state police re Manley crim. record request
0.4 hrs, deal w/Iowa state police identification bureau, write them letter
re Manley
0.6 hrs, go to Manley address 13* South, talk w/complex mgr.; write
memo to Mauro
1.6 hrs, go to L. Gummow's office, meet w/her and Mauro re further
invest., inc. family
1.4 hrs, meet w/Rich Mauro; talk w/Taylor's fether, talk w/Mary G.;
talk w/Kaye C.
LI hrs, read materialsfromMauro in prep, family interviews
0.1 hrs, talk w/Kaye C. re large meeting
0.1 hrs, talk w/Kaye's husband
4.6 hrs, 36 miles, go to Brigham City, interview client's family and
5 siblings
3.1 hrs, write 9.5-pagereportyesterday meeting; draft John's release
and write him letter, phone conf w/Mauro re further invest.
2.4 hrs, 46 miles, go to Ogden, find and interview Steve Taylor, write 4pagereport;talk on phone w/R- Taylor
1.5 hrs, go to Ogden, look for and find Chris T.'s job, go there 2x; talk

3/6/03
3/10/03
3/18/03

on phone w/T. Taylor about Von-Steve's accident; draft top of
affidavit for Mauro
1.9 hrs, in SLC, go to Robert T's home, interview him, write 2.5-page
report; talk on phone w/Chris TVs girlfriend; w/Kathy 0.
2.5 hrs, go to Ogden, interview Kathy 0., write 2.5-page report; in
SLC, meet w/Mauro re my affidavit, further invest.
4.1 hrs, 116 miles, roundtrip Brigham-SLC, meet w/Mauro and family
member of victims'
28,9 Hours: 198 Miles

28.9 Hours @$50
$1,445.00
198 Miles @$0 365
72.27
Fee for Iowa crim. record .. 13.00
$1,530.27 TOTAL

ThankY/i
TED piLWICK

RICHARD R MAURO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
43 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500
FAX (801)36^3232

March 25, 2003

Mr. Lynn Vellinga
Assistant Director
Utah Division of Finance
2110 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for
litigation expenses.

Dear Mr. Vellinga:
I have enclosed an additional bill for Dr. Linda Gummow for services completed as part of
litigation expenses in the above matter. I have also enclosed a copy of the court order authorizing
payment. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of Administarive Procedure 25-14-5.
Please pay Dr. Gummow directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank
you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD P. MAURO

cc. Dr. Linda Gummow

Conger & Gummow

247 E 2100 S.
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

(801)485-8802

3/21/03
TO: R. Mauro, Esq.
FROM: Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D.
RE: Von Taylor
As per your request, I provided three hours of consultation and affidavit preparation in
this matter. The charge for this service is $300.00. Please send the bill in for payment.
Payment can be sent to the above address.
Thank you for your courtesy.

Linda J. Gummow, Ph.D.
Cc: David Munk

i

RICHARD P. MAURO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
43 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
TELEPHONE (801) 363-9500
FAX (801)364-3232

October 13,2003

Mr. Lynn Vellinga
Assistant Director
Utah Division of Finance
2110 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

RE: Von Lester Taylor v. Hank Galetka, Case No. 990902315. Disbursement of funds for
litigation expenses for investigation.

Dear Mr. Vellinga:
I have enclosed a bill for investigator Ted Cilwick for services completed as part of
litigation expenses in the above matter. This request is made pursuant to Utah Rule of
Administarive Procedure 25-14-5.
Please pay Mr. Cilwick directly. If you have any questions, please contact me. Thank
you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

RICHARD P. MAURO

TED CILWICK
Certified
Paralegal

Licensed
Investigator
Uc.#100268

13820 North 3100 West
Collinston, Utah 84306

Days 801-242-2209
Home 435-458-3141

Oct. 2, 2003
Dear Rich Mauro:
Here is a bill for work on VON LESTER TAYLOR'S case. Please send it in to the state,
thank vou.

8/23/03
8/24/03

8.8 hrs, 405 miles, roundtrip travel Collinston-Gunnison state prison,
interview co-def. E. Deli
1.1 hrs, write 4/2-page report of yesterday Deli interview
9.9 Hours; 405 Miles

9.9 Hours @$50
405 Miles @$0.36
Meal

$495.00
145.80
9.21
$650.01 TOTAL

Thank You,
TED CILWICK

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that, on the 30th day of April, 2010, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT was mailed by first-class mail to:

Thomas B. Brunker
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorneys General
Utah Attorney General's Office
Criminal Appeals
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Counsel for Respondent

( 0, (JMJkAnu%j)J
Stephanie Verhamme

